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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of 
Merger Accounting Method on Stock Brices 
February 198G 
Michael L. Davis 
B.S., California State University, Fresno 
M.B.A., Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professors Pieter T. Elgers, 
James E. Owers and Ceorge 1. Treyz 
The pooling of interests method of accounting for mergers has been the source 
of much controversy, both prior to and after the release of APB No. 16, Busi¬ 
ness Combinations. Because the method often leads to higher reported earnings 
compared to the purchase method, there has been a concern that the stock¬ 
holders of companies using the pooling method make abnormal gains from higher 
stock prices as a direct consequence of reporting relatively higher earnings. Yet, 
if the merger is a nontaxable exchange of securities, the cash flows are identical 
under the two methods, and an efficient capital market should respond to the 
real economic consequences of the merger and not be affected by the particular 
accounting method used. 
This study investigates the impact of merger accounting method on stock 
prices for a sample of 213 tax-free mergers during the period 1971 to 1982. 
Abnormal residuals are examined throughout the entire merger process for both 
acquirors and acquired firms to determine if companies using the pooling of in¬ 
terests method garner higher stock prices when that method will result in higher 
future earnings compared to the purchase method. I he results show that there 
v 
is rio abnormal price movements for the acquiring firms using the pooling 
method during the entire merger process, but that, purchase method acquiring 
firms reap large significant positive abnormal returns that do not dissipate and 
are inversely related to the purchase method’s impact on future earnings. The 
results are found to be relatively insensitive to choice of market index, varia¬ 
tions in model specification, and income strategy (minimize/maximize). The 
magnitude of the abnormal returns to acquired firms is similiar to other studies. 
However, those for purchase method acquiring firms are much higher than any 
previously reported, suggesting that result,s from previous studies that, did not 
control for merger accounting method are actually a weighted average of three 
type of mergers: taxable purchase method mergers, tax-free purchase method 
mergers and tax-free pooling method mergers. 
vi 
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One implication of the Efficient, Capital Markets hypothesis is that 
securities prices are not affected by the “packaging'’ of information. In other 
words, if alternative accounting practices have no effects on a firm’s cash flows, 
investors should be able to “see through” the veil of accounting practices and 
not alter the value of the firm. Stated another way, if two firms are identical 
in every way except for the choice of one accounting procedure that causes 
reported earnings of the two firms to differ, without altering the equality of 
their cash flows, an efficient market should be unaffected by the form of infor¬ 
mation disclosure and value the two firms equally. 
One situation where this should be observed is accounting for tax-free busi¬ 
ness combinations, which are consummated by an exchange primarily of 
securities. Two accounting methods exist to record the combination, the 
“pooling of interests” method and the “purchase" method, and they apply to all 
business combinations, not just tax-free mergers. The two methods can, and of¬ 
ten do, result in significant differences in the calculation of net income. 1 his is 
because all assets and liabilities of the acquired firm are recorded at book value 
under the pooling of interests method, whereas they are recorded at fair market 
value under the purchase method. In cases where the fair market value of the 
assets is higher than the book value, larger cost of goods sold and depreciation 
charges depress earnings. If the present value of long term debt has declined, 
the difference is amortized as additional interest expense. In addition, if the 
1 
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value of the securities exchanged exceeds the fair market value of the identifi¬ 
able net assets of the acquired firm, goodwill is recorded and amortized under 
the purchase method, resulting in still lower earnings. 
If the combination qualifies as a tax-free reorganization under Section 279 
of the Internal Revenue Code, the increase in these expenses is not deductible 
for tax purposes, so that the difference in reported net income under the two 
accounting methods has no direct impact on the firm’s underlying cash flows. 
Since the method of accounting and tax status of the combination is usually 
disclosed in the proxy statement, an informationally efficient securities market 
should not react to the accounting method selected in tax-free reorganizations. 
Broadly stated, the purpose of this study is to determine if there is a differen¬ 
tial market reaction to the accounting method used in these types of mergers. 
It is possible that the market is informationally efficient in these situa¬ 
tions, yet still reacts to the choice of accounting method due to the potential 
indirect effects on cash flows. For example, under the pooling of interests 
method, retained earnings of the two firms are combined whereas under the pur¬ 
chase method, only the retained earnings of the acquiring firm remains. The 
market might forecast higher potential dividends with the pooling method and 
impound the present value of the forecast in share prices. Or, the pooling 
method firms, with their higher reported earnings, may be subject to higher 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman [1978]) than purchase method firms. 
Lastly, the acquiring firm may plan to spin off a segment of the acquired firm, 
which increases cash flows, but prevents use of the pooling method under the 
rules of APB 16.1 
^Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 16, “Business Combinations, (N.^.: A1CPA, 1970). 
At this time, however, the existence, magnitude and explanation of these 
effects are unknown. Yet, opposition to pooling of interests accounting has ex¬ 
isted since the early 1960s. Prior to APB 16, management could literally 
choose which of the two methods to use. The five guidelines in ARB 48J were 
open to wide interpretation, so that many acquisitions, where part of the target 
company was acquired under the purchase accounting rules and part under the 
pooling method rules, were able to be treated entirely as a pooling, and the 
term “dirty pooling” became quite common. Lintner j 1971, p. 106 argued that 
“Dirty pooling suppression of asset costs at the time of merger to pad sub¬ 
sequent earnings, and other accounting devices which are likely to mislead many 
shareholders, clearly raise issues of the greatest practical importance...” He sug¬ 
gested that shareholders of companies that used pooling of interests accounting 
made abnormal gains due to higher stock prices caused by higher reported earn¬ 
ings. Purchase accounting, it was felt, did not convey misleading information so 
that stock prices were not distorted. The controversy lessened somewhat when 
APB 16 became effective October 31, 1970 because it prescribes twelve necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a combination to be accounted for as a pooling of 
interests, so that the two methods are no longer alternatives for a given com¬ 
bination. However, Arthur Andersen &; Co. [ 1976. p. 93j argues that, the twelve 
criteria “are arbitrary and regulatory in nature. Many of them invite efforts at 
evasion and at artificial structuring of combination transactions in a manner in¬ 




York: A1CPA, 1957). 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48, “Business 
1 
interests and purchase accounting widened in October 1970 when APB 17’ also 
became effective. This opinion requires that intangible assets, such as goodwill, 
be amortized over a period not less than ten years and not more than forty 
whereas previously an unlimited life was allowable with no amortization. 
Even though Arthur Andersen’s comments were directed toward use of 
pooling of interests accounting, the purchase method can also be used to distort 
the financial condition of the combined entities and was the cause for renewal of 
the controversy in 1981 and 1982 when acquiring firms in the banking and 
savings and loan industries began using the purchase method, whereas histori¬ 
cally they had used the pooling of interests method. During this time, many 
financial institutions were experiencing losses and many had or were close to ex¬ 
hausting their net worth. Regulatory authorities arranged for merger into heal¬ 
thier institutions, and although all twelve requirements of APB 16 could be 
met, one or more was purposely failed, so that the purchase method could be 
used. This allowed the acquiring firm to record receivables at fair market 
value, which was much less than book value, and to amortize the difference to 
income (as an increase in interest income) over the remaining life of the loans. 
The difference between the cost of the acquisition (usually minimal), and the 
book value, after adjusting receivables, was recorded as goodwill, to be amor¬ 
tized over the maximum period of forty years, whereas the remaining life of the 
receivables was much shorter. As a result, during the shorter remaining life of 
the receivables, significant paper profits could be recognized, which would be ex¬ 
actly offset during the period when only goodwill was to be amortized. lo ter¬ 
minate use of the purchase method in this way, FASB 72, Accounting for Cer- 
’Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 17, “Intangible Assets, (N.Y.: AICPA, 1970). 
tain Acquisitions of Banking or Thrift Institutions, was issued in February 1983 
and required amortization of the goodwill over the remaining life of the loan 
portfolio. 
The only empirical evidence to date on this issue is by Schipper and 
Thompson 1983a. b . Leftwich 1981 and Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker ( 1978 . 
hereafter HKM). Schipper and Thompson's first study examined the economic 
impact of firms that embarked on acquisition programs during the late 1950s 
and 1960s. They also measured the reaction of their sample to certain institu¬ 
tional changes relating to mergers during 1967-1970 (the Williams amendments, 
the 1969 Tax Reform Act and APB 16 and 17). They found that acquisitions 
activity had a favorable ex ante impact on the value of firms announcing an in¬ 
tention to engage in acquisitions and that all of the institutional changes, except 
for APB 16 and 17, caused a significant negative impact. There was no sig¬ 
nificant reaction to the two APBs. Their second study was a more intensive 
investigation into the same merger related regulations, but again, the reaction to 
APB 16 and 17 was insignificant. However, neither study looks at the par¬ 
ticulars of the accounting method used and the potential for differential 
economic impact of the requirements specified in APB 16 and 17. In other 
words, the accounting method was not a variable of interest. 
Leftwich focused in more detail on the deliberation period surrounding the 
the release of APB 16 and 17 by selecting 21 events that involved press releases 
about the proposed accounting rules, testimony at congressional hearings, APB 
meetings and publication of exposure drafts. I sing a sample of 338 acquiring 
firms that engaged in 1.139 mergers during November 1968 to December 1972, 
of which approximately 90% were poolings, he calculated cumulative average 
residuals for the 10 days surrounding each event date. Eight of the events 
resulted in statistically significant negative CARs.4 However, due to the heavy 
bias in his sample toward firms that used pooling of interests accounting, his 
results do not really capture the potentially differential reaction of purchase 
method firms. In other words, a “control” sample of firms primarily using the 
purchase method throughout this period may or may not have reacted dif¬ 
ferently from Leftwich’s sample, so that his study is more of an examination of 
a mandated accounting change, using the purchase-pooling of interests con¬ 
troversy as an example, than a direct test of a difference in reaction to the two 
methods. 
HKM is the only direct test of this potential difference. HKM examined a 
sample of 122 poolings and 37 purchases during 1954-1964, all of which were 
tax-free mergers. Their pooling method sample showed no statistically sig¬ 
nificant market reaction during the twelve months before to eleven months after 
the merger date, whereas their purchase method sample exhibited significant 
positive cumulative average residuals (CARs) from ten months prior to six 
months prior to the merger and from two months prior to eight months after 
the merger. Although HKM concluded that the pooling of interests method 
does not lead to abnormal security price movements, their results do provide 
evidence for a differential response between the two methods. Due to the small 
sample of purchase method mergers5 and to the fact that most of them occurred 
during the first four years of their eleven year time period, HKM did not draw 
any inferences from this finding. However, if the reaction of their purchase 
4Five wore significant at the .02 level and three at the .10 level. 
JTo overcome potential cross-sectional correlation among residuals when several mergers occurred in 
the same calendar month, HKM combined these mergers into a portfolio and estimated residuals and 
CARs for the portfolio. As a result, statistical tests were performed on a sample of 21 portfolios. 
I 
method group is representative of all tax-free purchase method mergers, then 
this is evidence that the market is responding differently to a choice in account¬ 
ing method that has no direct cash flow implications. 
Before discussing the scope of this study, one additional segment of empiri¬ 
cal research must be considered that will have an impact on constructing a set 
of reasonable hypotheses. Beginning in 1971, many studies in the area of cor¬ 
porate acquisitions have observed abnormal gains accruing to shareholders of the 
acquiring and/or acquired company during the period surrounding the announce¬ 
ment of the proposed merger and the sustainment of much of these gains well 
past the merger effective date. None of these studies, however, addressed the 
purchase versus pooling of interests issue, as their primary focus was to measure 
the gains to the parties involved. For example, Wansley, Roenfeldt and Cooley 
[ 1983] observed positive abnormal returns of 38% for a sample of 101 acquired 
firms during the 30 months immediately preceeding the merger. Asquith 1983 
examined the abnormal returns for both bidders and targets. Over the period 
of 480 days prior to the announcement date to 120 days after the effective date, 
bidders had cumulative average returns of 12.3%, with a peak of 14. 5% on the 
30th day after the effective date. By the effective date, targets achieved CARs 
of 8.5%, all occurring subsequent to the announcement date. Elgers and Clark 
; 1980j noted that a sample of 337 acquiring firms exhibited a rise in CARs of 
10% throughout most of the pre-merger period and these did not decline notice¬ 
ably in the two years after the merger. They also disaggregated their sample 
into conglomerate and nonconglomerate mergers to test for merger motivation. 
Their results indicate that conglomerate mergers garner larger (although not 
statistically significant) returns to the bidder’s shareholders than do the noncon¬ 
glomerate mergers. 
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There may also be different motives behind the use of pooling of interests 
or purchase accounting, where one method gives more favorable results. For ex¬ 
ample, a bidder may favor asset growth over earnings growth and the purchase 
method would enhance asset growth due to recording the assets at fair market 
value. Or, the amount of potential goodwill to be recorded and its incremental 
effect on income might be a consideration. Specific firm characteristics (either 
bidders or targets) may differ across a sample of acquisitions where the purchase 
method is used compared to a sample where the pooling method is used. For 
example, growth rates of bidders who pool may be significantly different from 
bidders who use the purchase method. Finally, planned subsequent transactions, 
such as capital restructuring or disposition of a major segment of the business, 
can prohibit use of the pooling of interests method under the rules of APB 16. 
In summary, there may be recurring and identifiable motivations and/or charac¬ 
teristics of the firms involved that will be associated with either of the two ac¬ 
counting methods. 
With these possibilities in mind, the scope of this study is twofold. First, 
using a different sample and time period than HKM, the stock market’s reaction 
to merger accounting method is investigated. Second, attempts are made to 
identify motivations and firm characteristics that are correlated with the ac¬ 
counting method used. To facilitate comparison of the results of this study to 
HKM and to merger literature in general, residuals and CAR analyses are used. 
In addition, several methodological improvements are incorporated to strengthen 
the interpretability of the results. 
Methodological Improvements Over Other Merger Studies 
Several studies have documented that acquired firms earn large significant 
9 
excess returns during the merger process. However, most studies, including 
HKM, only examine the acquiring firms. In order to measure the total wealth 
effects of (he merger, this study analyzes both parties whenever the data is 
available. 
Secondly, most merger studies use only one period to accumulate the ab¬ 
normal returns. As there is no empirical method to determine the “correct” 
period, one runs the risk of either using too long a period, which allows con¬ 
founding events to impact the estimation of CARs, or using too short a period 
and missing part, of the reaction. To alleviate these problems, this study uses 
various periods to accumulate CARs. This approach also allows for determina¬ 
tion of when the bulk of the reaction, if any, occurs. 
Finally, a number of previous studies have documented empirical anomalies 
which suggest that either the simple one-period capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) is misspecified or that capital markets are inefficient. Reinganum 
1981, 1982! finds that portfolios based on firm size experience average returns 
systematically different from those predicted by CAPM. Basu 1977. 1978. 
1983] notes similiar results using firm price-earnings (P/E) ratios. Watts 1978j 
and Morse [ 1981 j document abnormal returns after earnings announcements. 
Most merger studies make no attempt to control for the potentially confounding 
impact of these variables, which limits the amount of confidence that can be 
placed in their results. The primary approach used in this study to control for 
these variables is to match each purchase method acquiring firm with a pooling 
method acquiring firm, using t he anomalous and other variables. I he matching 
process, the additional variables used and the reasons for selecting them are 
described in Chapter III. 
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Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter 11 surveys the major empirical studies in the accounting change 
literature, the anomalous variables literature and the corporate acquisitions 
literature. Studies that evaluate accounting changes or manipulations not ac¬ 
companied by real economic impact are reviewed to summarize their findings 
and extend their conclusions to the current study. Studies that document em¬ 
pirical anomalies with the CAPM are reviewed to illustrate their potential im¬ 
pact on this study and the necessity to control for them to prevent confounding 
of the results. The corporate acquisitions literature is reviewed to help provide 
motivation for the study. Finally, HKM is reviewed to generate the hypotheses 
to be tested in this study. 
Chapter III describes the methodology employed in this study. The 
hypotheses generated in Chapter 11 are operationalized by explicitly defining all 
variables and describing the statistical tests used. 
Chapter IV contains the results of the analyses. The firms used (both 
bidders and targets) in each sample are identified along with the results of the 
matching process. The results of the tests of the research hypotheses and the 
sensitivity of those results are also presented. 
Chapter V includes conclusions reached based upon the results described in 
Chapter IV, comparison to the results of other similiar studies, limitations of 
this study and suggestions for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of relevant literature is broken clown into four sections: 
economic consequences of accounting changes, anomalous variables with CAPM 
research, wealth effects of corporate acquisitions, and the Hong, Kaplan and 
Mandelker (HKM) paper. Finally, the hypotheses tested in this study are 
developed. 
Economic Consequences of Accounting Changes 
Considerable evidence has demonstrated that most accounting changes or 
manipulations not accompanied by real economic impact have no statistically 
significant effects on stock prices. The first comprehensive inquiry, Archibald 
1967, I972j, examined stock prices of firms that switched from accelerated to 
straight-line depreciation without a corresponding change in their tax accounting 
method. In spite of the fact that reported earnings increased by about 10 per¬ 
cent, no significant price reaction occurred during the month of the earnings an¬ 
nouncement. Beaver and Dukes |1972{ examined this issue by theorizing that 
differences in P/E ratios should reflect the different effects of depreciation 
methods on earnings. Using samples matched on systematic risk and earnings 
growth, they found that once the earnings of straight-line depreciation firms 
were adjusted to accelerated depreciation, the average P/E ratios of the two 
samples were almost identical. Additionally, Good and Meyer 197.1) confirmed 
that differences between firms with high and low P/E ratios diminish when 
earnings are adjusted for differences in depreciation accounting methods. 
Kaplan and Roll 1972 examined companies that changed their accounting 
II 
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treatment of the investment tax credit. For firms switching to the flow-through 
method from the deferral method, a temporary increase in price occurred at the 
earnings announcement date. However, during the subsequent 30 weeks, the 
switching firms’ stocks fared worse than those of firms that did not switch. 
Using a different methodology and data, Cassidy 1976] found basically the same 
results, noting that switching firms generated significant positive price reactions 
during the announcement month but “corrected” downward in the second and 
third months after the announcement. Eskew 1975) reported that investors in 
oil and gas stocks were able to adjust for differences between the “full-cost” and 
“successful-efforts” methods of accounting for explorations. Patz and Boatsman 
[1972] examined price behavior of oil and gas stocks surrounding the 1971 APB 
proposal to mandate the use of the “successful-efforts” method for unsuccessful 
oil and gas explorations. They found no statistically significant differences be¬ 
tween the returns of firms using the “full-cost” method and those using the 
“successful-efforts” method. Studying the market reaction to the July 1977 
FASB exposure draft on oil and gas accounting, Dyckman and Smith j 1979 
concluded that their results did not support the existence of a “substantial 
market effect, even though they noted a negative impact around the exposure 
draft date on the residual returns of “full-cost” firms. Haworth, Mathews and 
Tuck [1978] observed that “full-cost” firms were initially adversely affected by 
the exposure draft release but that there was a subsequent price recovery. 
Finally, Ball 11972] examined 130 cases of accounting changes, some of 
which had cash-flow effects and others that, did not, and concluded that inves¬ 
tors were able to distinguish between the real and the “cosmetic” effects of ac¬ 
counting changes on earnings. 
The research cited thus far is generally supportive of informationally ef- 
ficient capital markets. However, for several of (lie accounting change areas dis¬ 
cussed above, there is empirical research that comes to conclusions contrary to 
what is theoretically expected. In the area of alternative depreciation policies, 
Kaplan and Roll j!972j examined firms that switched from accelerated to 
straight-line depreciation, which caused reported earnings to increase, but had no 
direct tax consequences and, therefore, no direct effect on cash flows. They 
found that the returns of these firms fared worse than the market average 
during the 30 weeks after the earnings announcement. Research in the oil and 
gas accounting area also reaches contradictory results. Collins and Dent 1979 
and Lev [1979] both reported a permanent risk-adjusted decline in the stock 
prices of “full-cost’1 firms close to the exposure draft disclosure date. 
Finally, Harrison [1977, 1978] compared the market performance of firms 
making discretionary as well as nondiscretionary accounting changes with the 
performance of similiar firms that made no accounting changes. He observed 
that firms which made discretionary changes resulting in earnings, but not cash¬ 
flow, experienced returns below those of a control group, and these persisted 
beyond the disclosure date of the accounting change. 
A related and substantial body of knowledge is developing that examines 
management’s motives in selecting accounting techniques. Two distinct ques¬ 
tions are addressed using the same methodological approach. First, if differences 
in alternative accounting methods have no direct economic impact, why do firms 
adopt particular accounting methods? A related issue is why standard-setting 
bodies, such as the FASB, adopt or mandate particular standards in these types 
of situations. Second, if there is a direct economic effect, what is the cause? 
The theoretical justification for the first question is that there may not be such 
a thing as a “cosmetic” change. Although an accounting method change, man- 
II 
dated or not, may have no immediate effect on cash flows, other subtler and in¬ 
direct determinants of cash flows could be affected. For example, management 
compensation plans may be a function of reported income and therefore, sen¬ 
sitive to managerially controlled accounting methods. Or, bond-indenture agree¬ 
ments may include covenants that impose restrictions on the activities of bor¬ 
rowers, such as the ability to pay dividends, issue new debt, or consummate 
mergers, and these restrictions may be based on reported income. 
Both questions have been examined empirically by statistically testing the 
relationship between a 0-1 dummy dependent variable representing the income 
effect of a particular accounting method (increasing or decreasing) and various 
Firm characteristics. Watts [1974, 1977) and especially Watts and Zimmerman 
[19781 were the first to provide empirical evidence on these issues. Watts and 
Zimmerman [1978] explored the factors influencing management’s attitudes on 
accounting standards, which are likely to affect corporate lobbying on those 
standards. Using Firms’ position papers in response to the FASB’s discussion 
memorandum, “Reporting the Effects of General Price-Level Changes in Finan¬ 
cial Statements,” they classified Firms as either advocating or opposing GPL A. 
They identified taxes, regulation, management compensation plans, bookkeeping 
costs and political costs as possible explanatory variables. Using several statis¬ 
tical techniques, they found that Firm size and political costs were significant. 
Hagerman and Zmijewski [1979) and Zmijewski and Hagerman 11981 investigate 
whether or not Firm size, risk, capital intensity, leverage, existence of incentive 
compensation plans and industry concentration affect, the choice of one-to-all of 
the following accounting methods: depreciation policy, inventory measurement, 
investment tax credit and pension cost amortization. Their First study tested 
each accounting method separately, whereas the second study combined the 
methods into portfolios of firm income strategies. The earlier paper found sig¬ 
nificant explanatory variables, but these were not consistent across the four ac¬ 
counting methods. The second paper found that firm size, leverage, incentive 
compensation and industry concentration ratio to be consistently significant. 
Holthausen 1981 attempted to explain the market reaction to firms that 
switched from accelerated to straight-line depreciation using bond-indenture 
provisions and management incentive contracts as possible managerial motives 
for the change. The switch would increase reported earnings and decrease the 
book value of leverage, since net assets would increase. Consequently, restrictive 
provisions based on income or leverage would be lessened, providing more leeway 
to pay dividends, issue debt or consummate mergers. The results were dis¬ 
appointing. No statistical relationship was found between unexpected stock-price 
changes and management compensation plans or deviation from dividend con¬ 
straints. However, a significant negative relationship to leverage was noted, in¬ 
dicating that bond provisions regarding leverage requirements may have in¬ 
fluenced the switch in methods. 
Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal 1981 , in the oil and gas industry, and 
Leftwich 1981 , in the purchase-pooling of interests area, investigated the 
relationship between significant negative market reaction associated with the ac¬ 
counting change and various contractual arrangements. Results of both studies 
were mixed, but a weak association between possible consequences of loan 
covenant violation and the negative market reaction was found. 
In summary, the evidence to date is not consistent, making it difficult to 
predict the outcome for a given accounting policy decision. The approach taken 
by this study is to hypothesize that the choice of merger accounting method 
will not impact share price and. if that is rejected, attempt to determine pos- 
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sible firm explanatory variables. 
Anomalous Variables and Capital Markets Research 
Tests utilizing the CAPM are tests of the joint hypothesis that capital 
markets are efficient and the CAPM adequately describes the return generating 
process. Numerous studies, however, have not been particularly supportive of ei¬ 
ther part of the hypothesis. Market efficiency began to be questioned when 
results started accumulating that indicated the existence of persistent price ad¬ 
justments after earnings announcements were made. The more prominent 
studies include Jones and Litzenberger [1970], Brown and Kennedy 1972, 
Latane and Jones [1977], Joy, Litzenberger and McEnally [1977], Watts 1978 , 
Brown [1978], and Joy and Jones j 19791. The Watts study suggested that some 
of the apparent inefficiencies are period specific, but Nichols and Brown 1981 
do not find a change over time in this particular reported inefficiency. Taken 
together, these studies provide evidence that new information is not always im¬ 
pounded in prices instantaneously. 
Additional research in this area has revealed a statistically significant as¬ 
sociation between unexpected earnings (or earnings surprises) and residual 
returns. Ball and Brown [1968] were the first to show that unexpected annual 
earnings changes (using only the sign of the change) were correlated with 
residual stock returns. Beaver [1974] extended Ball and Brown's study by incor¬ 
porating the magnitude of the change and found that the most extreme 
portfolios, those with the largest positive or negative unexpected earnings, had 
residual returns larger than portfolios of firms with moderate unexpected earn¬ 
ings. Patell [1976] used a different procedure to estimate expected earnings, yet 
found similiar results. Beaver, Clarke and Wright [1979:, using yet another ap- 
proach, reported that the ranking of 25 NYSE portfolios on the basis of per¬ 
centage change in unexpected annual EPS was highly correlated with the rank¬ 
ing of the portfolios on the basis of residual returns. Hagerman, Zmijewski and 
Shah 11984! extented that study by using quarterly earnings and, again, found a 
strong correlation with the residuals. 
Numerous other studies have provided evidence that the CAPM is 
misspecified. Basu [1977] was the first to document that portfolios comprising 
low P/E ratio stocks, after adjustment for risk, earned excess returns. Banz 
[1981] noted a “size effect” during the period 1936-1975 in which the common 
stocks of small firms had, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than the 
stocks of large firms. Reinganum j 1981 ] challenged Basu’s findings by showing 
that the P/E effect was not significant after controlling for size, thus speculat¬ 
ing that the P/E anomaly is a “surrogate” for the size anomaly. However, 
Basu [1983] documents both a size and P/E ratio effect, and finds that, after 
controlling for P/E ratio, the size effect virtually disappears. 
The evidence reviewed in this section is indicative of potentially confound¬ 
ing variables in this line of research. Significant residuals using this methodol¬ 
ogy could be indicative of a market reaction to the issue under study or simply 
be further unintended documentation of the anomalies noted above. It is essen¬ 
tial that future studies take steps to control for the influence of these variables. 
Several steps, which are discussed later in the chapter, are taken in this study. 
Wealth Effects of Corporate Acquisitions 
The literature on corporate acquisitions is replete with studies which 
evaluate the impact of acquisitions on the participants. Some focus on tender 
offers,” (also called takeovers), which are offers to purchase a proportion of the 
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outstanding shares of the target firm at specified terms on or before a specified 
date. Those shareholders not tendering their shares retain an ownership interest 
in the firm. The consideration given by the acquiring firm is cash and/or 
securities. Other studies focus on “mergers,11 which occur when a bidder and a 
target firm agree to combine under legal procedures established in the states in 
which the merger participants are incorporated. Normally, the owners of the 
two separate firms continue as the owners of the one combined firm. Under 
both types of acquisitions, a premium must normally be paid to the target 
firm’s shareholders to induce them to accept, the offer. 
Regardless of which type of acquisition is studied, two classes of acquisi¬ 
tion theories compete to explain the motivation behind mergers and takeovers. 
The first refers to non-value maximizing behavior by management of the acquir¬ 
ing firm. The goal is to maximize growth in sales or assets or to control a 
larger empire. These types of acquisitions are not expected to generate 
economic gains, and it is likely there would be an overall economic loss, given 
the cost of negotiation and the potential problems of coordination of the ex¬ 
panding corporate empire. Any positive gains to the target’s shareholders would 
be offset by a loss to the acquiring firm’s shareholders. 
The second general class of theories deals with value maximization motiva¬ 
tions in which the acquisition should meet the same criteria as any other invest¬ 
ment choice. There should be a positive expected economic gain to the parties 
involved, some portion of which will accrue to the target firm’s shareholders. 
Four types of value maximization strategies are thought to exist: 1) 
Financial motivations: An acquisition may permit a redeployment of excess 
cash held either by the acquiror or the target. Or, the diversification benefits 
provided by the acquisition can reduce the probability of default, which reduces 
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expected bankruptcy costs and increases the debt capacity of the new entity. 2) 
Synergy: The acquisition results in an increase in the expected cash flows over 
their sum as independent firms. These gains can occur from economies of scale 
in horizontal acquisitions or economies of scope in vertical acquisitions. 5) 
Asymmetry in information: The acquiror has information not available to the 
general market and is not reflected in the current share price. An example 
would be knowledge of more efficient operating strategies that could be imple¬ 
mented by the target’s management. 4) Obtaining control of the 
target/managerial incompetence: The bidder desires to replace incompetent 
management or force the existing management to follow a profit maximizing 
strategy. Each of the four strategies is expected to increase the market value 
of one or both firms and these increases are termed the ‘‘wealth effects” of 
mergers. 
The empirical research has attempted to find support for each of the 
above hypotheses by examining acquiring firms. Analysis of target firm returns 
is generally not helpful since their shareholders must be given an enticement to 
accept the acquisition. In fact, the one consistent finding of studies that in¬ 
clude the target firms is that they enjoy large and significant positive abnormal 
residuals regardless of the motivation investigated. 
The evidence on which strategy prevails is broadly supportive of the value 
maximizing theory. Using the effective merger date as the event date, Man- 
delker 1974] notes a CAR of 2% to the bidder in the period -20 months to 
+ ]0 months after the effective date and 15% to the target in the period -20 
months to -1 month, with most of the reaction coming in months -6 to -1. 
However, no statistical tests were presented for these results. Ellert 1970 
documented CARs to the acquiror of 21%, but was hesitant to attribute this 
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gain to specific mergers because a major portion of the gain (17%) predates the 
merger by a year or more. CARs during the year prior to the event date were 
not significant. Langetieg 11978j, finds positive CARs for bidders from -24 to -7 
months, although he does observe negative residuals from -7 to -1 months. 
One significant problem that exists in the studies cited above is that the 
measurement of CARs is centered around the merger date and subsequent 
research has shown that much of the statistically significant reaction occurs 
around the announcement date, so that these studies may have incorrectly cap¬ 
tured the market reaction. Studies that use the announcement date as the 
primary reference date are now reviewed. 
Franks, Broyles and Hecht [ 1977j studied mergers in the United Kingdom 
and observed a modest gain of 5% to bidders through the announcement month, 
which disappeared during the nine months after the merger. However, targets 
obtained CARs of 26% during the four months prior to the completion of the 
merger. The main drawback to their study is that no statistical tests were 
provided. Dodd [1980] studied both cancelled and completed mergers and, using 
daily data, found positive CARs of 34% accruing to the target’s shareholders of 
successful mergers over the period 10 days prior to the first public announce¬ 
ment through 10 days after approval by target shareholders. Positive CARs of 
6% to the bidders were observed, although there was a significant negative reac¬ 
tion on the announcement date. Focusing on successful horizontal or vertical 
mergers, Eckbo j 1983j also observed significant positive abnormal returns of 5% 
to bidders and 25% to targets in the period 20 days prior to 10 days after the 
first public announcement date. Schipper and Thompson 1983aj observe that 
announcements that companies are undertaking acquisition programs generate 
significant positive CARs of 20% from month -24 to the announcement month, 
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in spite of the costs of setting up an acquisitions department. Schipper and 
Thompson [1983b! note a negative abnormal return to shareholders of merger 
active firms upon the announcement of certain acquisition related regulatory 
changes which delay the completion of the acquisitions and reduce their poten¬ 
tial profitability. This finding potentially impacts the current study if such 
regulatory changes occur in the sample period. As dicusssed in Chapter IV, 
though, the major regulatory changes that did occur did not affect any of the 
sampled firms. 
Asquith and Kim 11982 investigate the impact of merger bids on the 
wealth of participating firms’ bondholders and stockholders. They find that 
shareholders of target firms garner significant CARs of 20% during the period -2 
months prior to the announcement through the announcement month, and that 
no other securityholders gain or lose. Asquith j 1983] is another study that ex¬ 
amines successful and unsuccessful merger bids. Using excess returns, he es¬ 
timates cumulative excess returns (CERs) for bidders for the period 480 trading 
days prior to the announcement date to 240 trading days after the announce¬ 
ment date in an attempt to capture the market's complete reaction to the bid. 
Targets are tracked from -480 days to the merger date. His results are impor¬ 
tant because they document abnormal returns during each phase of the merger, 
as does this study, and are summarized in Table 1. To facilitate comparison, 
the CERs during the pre-press period are only for the 140 days prior (rather 
than the full 480) to the press date, which is 28 weeks, or two more than used 
here. Basically, he shows an overall loss to successful bidders of -1.2% and a 
gain of 21.6% to targets. The overall negative CERs for the bidders is due to 
negative CERs of 2.9% during the post-outcome period. Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins [1983] is the most in-depth examination of bidding firms to date and 
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provides support for the value-maximization theory. Following a sample of 70 
bidders through their first one-to-four merger bids during 1963-1979, they find 
that bidders generate significant CERs of 3% during the period 20 days prior to 
and including the announcement date across the one-to-four mergers. Larger 
CERs are observed after controlling for the target’s size, the eventual outcome 
and for the time period in which the merger bid occurs. The main drawback of 
this study, however, is that it measures CERs only over the period -20 to 4-20 
days around the announcement, so that the “staying power” of the CERs is un¬ 
known. Finally, Malatesta 1983: uses abnormal dollar returns to examine the 
wealth effects to bidders and targets and provides the chief contradictory results 
to all the studies previously cited. He notes that targets generate cumulative 
abnormal dollar returns (CADRs) of 20 million dollars over a five month inter¬ 
val ending with the approval announcement, but -9 million dollars over the 61 
months prior to and including the approval announcement. Bidders, over the 
same two intervals, had CADRs of -28 million dollars and -117 million dollars, 
respectively. All but the -9 million dollars were statistically significant. He 
also notes a -2% (not statistically significant) average abnormal portfolio rate of 
return in the six months after the announcement of merger approval. This in¬ 
creases to a statistically significant -8% for a subset of mergers occurring after 
1970, in support of Schipper and Thompson’s [ 1983b] hypothesis of regulatory 
changes having a negative impact. 
In spite of the fairly consistent results of studies using the announcement 
date as the reference point, each one has potentially serious methodological 
weaknesses. As noted by the authors, the Franks, Broyles and llecht [197* 
paper contains a significant non-synchronous trading effect because as few a 
“half the transactions which take place are actually “marked , i.e. recorded 
stockbrokers on a voluntary basis for purposes of publication in the Daily Of¬ 
ficial List...Thus a “monthly” price may reflect a transaction recorded days and 
sometimes months before the end of the month in question” (p. 1519). Dodd 
1980j has no statistical tests for his CARs nor does he screen his firms in any 
way, allowing for confounding variables to possibly influence his results. Eckbo 
[1983] has only a size screen, which also allows for the possibility of confound¬ 
ing variables, such as other mergers during the beta estimation or CAR obser¬ 
vation periods, to affect his results. The Schipper and Thompson 1983a, b 
studies suffer from small sample sizes, difficulty in determining the event month 
and lack of evidence that their sample firms were still engaged in acquisition 
programs during the merger regulations time period that they used to measure 
CARs. Asquith 1983j does not screen out firms that may have had other 
mergers during the beta estimation or CER observation period. Finally, none of 
the studies controlled for the potential influence of the three anomalous vari¬ 
ables, bidder size, P/E ratio, and earnings surprises, noted above. 
The HKM Study 
This study falls into the same category of anomalous results as the Kaplan 
and Roll [1972], Collins and Dent [1979], Lev [1979] and Harrison [1977, 1978; 
studies because there was a statistically significant market reaction to the pur¬ 
chase method firms but not to the pooling method firms. HKM do not provide 
actual CAR values but do provide t-values for the CARs for months -12 to +11 
around the merger month and plots of the CARs for months -00 to H 60 around 
the merger month. Inspection of f igures 2A and 2B (p. 42) yields a range of 
pooling method CARs of about -3% in month -23 to +3% in month +4. The 
largest absolute t-value is .777. The purchase method CARs range from about 
-5% in month -21 to +11% in month +7, and show a fairly steady increase 
during this interval. During months +8 to +18, these CARs decline to zero, 
but then fluctuate between 0 and 6% through month +60. The CARs are posi¬ 
tive and significant at the .05 or .10 level during months -10 to -6 and -2 to 
~b8. 
However, the HKM study contains several methodological weaknesses that 
limit the amount of confidence that can be placed on the results. First, HKM 
used the merger effective date and the first post-merger earnings announcement 
date as the events of import, when numerous studies have shown that most of 
the reaction occurs around the announcement date. Although no reaction was 
observed for the pooling method sample around the earnings announcement 
date,6 had there been one it would have been difficult to determine what por¬ 
tion was due to merger accounting method and what portion was due to other 
unexpected earnings. Second, monthly data was used, effectively blurring any 
significant reaction around the event dates; studies using daily or weekly data 
note that the bulk of the abnormal activity occurs in the month surrounding 
the announcement. Third, beta was estimated during the period surrounding 
the event date, after excluding the CAR observation period. This is necessary 
because Mandelker [1973], among others, has noted that mergers may lead to 
important changes in the riskiness of the firm. However, similiar to many 
studies, HKM did not require that their entire beta estimation period be free of 
other mergers. As their test period coincided with the conglomerate merger 
wave of the late 1950s and 1960s, it is likely that some of their sample firms 
experienced other mergers during the beta estimation period. If so, the beta es- 
6 
No analysis was performed on the purchase method sample at this date. 
timates would have been conditioned on the effect of those mergers. 
Fourth, it is well documented that estimates of systematic risk obtained 
from ordinary least squares regressions are considerably biased (Blume 1971, 
1975;). However, HKM provide no evidence that any correction was made in 
their study. Fifth, HKM only selected mergers that would have resulted in 
positive goodwill, hypothesizing that the market might react to the potential 
difference in earnings caused by the amortization of goodwill. However, the real 
potential income effect is amortization of the difference in the value of the con¬ 
sideration given minus the book value of the target, some of which may be al¬ 
locable to specific assets and/or liabilities and the difference going to goodwill. 
If the purchase method is used and the merger is tax-free, none of the extra 
amortizations are deductible. Focusing only on goodwill leaves open the pos¬ 
sibility that adjustments to specific assets and/or liabilities could result in amor¬ 
tizations that might offset (due to book values exceeding market values) the 
amortization of goodwill. In addition, the purchase method might be favored if 
the purchase price was less than book value because amortization of the dif¬ 
ferences would increase income, so that a complete examination should poten¬ 
tially include all tax-free mergers. In addition, the magnitude of the impact on 
earnings may be an explanatory variable in the choice of accounting method. 
Unfortunately, HKM did not investigate this possibility. 
Sixth, HKM used a minimum size screen on the target of 3% of the bid¬ 
ders market value. While it is clear that insignificant, acquisitions can dilute 
the impact, if any, of merger events on share prices, the value for a reasonable 
threshold is not so obvious. For their sample of 122 pooling of interests firms, 
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20% were in the 3-5% category and 20% were in the 5-10% category." As their 
results indicated no statistically significant CARs for the pooling sample, it 
could be that the large number of small mergers prevented observation of a 
measurable impact. Seventh, as noted previously, HKM’s purchase sample was 
quite small (21 portfolios of firms) and composed mostly of mergers occurring 
during the first four years of the eleven year test period. However, they did 
note a statistically significant positive reaction to this sample, which implies 
that the market was responding differently to the purchase method firms. 
However, no statistical tests were performed on the difference, probably because, 
as the authors noted, “the small sample of firms...cautions us against drawing 
too strong an inference from this peculiar price behavior" (p. 41). 
Finally, HKM rightly suggest that the post-merger beta may be sig¬ 
nificantly different from the pre-merger beta, due possibly to the addition of the 
acquired firm's assets to those of the surviving firm's and also by a change in 
the debt-to-equity ratio of the acquiring firm. Therefore, they estimated 
separate parameters for the pre- and post-merger periods and found a slight, but 
statistically insignificant decrease in average beta. However, they continued 
using separate betas to estimate the pre- and post-event residuals and the im¬ 
pact of this is noted in somewhat contradictory comments on p. 42: 
Finally, the importance of using different pre-merger and post-merger 
estimates of a firm’s beta was highlighted by a CAR analysis when the 
parameters of the market model were estimated from observations run¬ 
ning from month -40 to -13 and 4 12 to +39. The cumulative 
residuals and the portfolio /-statistics were much higher than those 
previously displayed. Thus, if we had not captured the nonstationarity 
in relative risk of merging firms by estimating separate pre- and post¬ 
merger betas, our /-statistics would have been biased upward toward 
7 
Similiar statistics were not provided for the purchase method sample. 
27 
significance. 
Capturing and controlling for the nonstationarity of beta is methodologi¬ 
cally sound when it exists. Yet, no evidence of a significant shift, either on a 
firm or sample-wide basis, was provided, so that using separate estimates is 
questionable, in light of the different outcome. The resolution of this issue is 
important because most studies have shown a significant negative reaction by 
bidders, without regard to accounting method, during the period after the an¬ 
nouncement date, yet HKM show' no significant reaction by the pooling of inter¬ 
ests method firms, or nearly significant positive CARs, depending on which beta 
estimates are used. In addition, it was noted previously that the purchase 
method sample had statistically significant positive CARs during this same 
period. 
Methodological Improvements Over Previous Studies 
The following methodological improvements over the HKM paper are incor¬ 
porated into this study, and are summarized in Table 2. The stock market's 
reaction to the merger is estimated around the merger announcement and effec¬ 
tive dates rather than the effective and first post-merger earnings announcement 
dates. To capture the reaction on a more timely basis, weekly data is used in¬ 
stead of monthly data. The entire beta estimation period is examined for other 
mergers and bidders with a merger or combination of mergers larger than 25(o 
of the sample merger are eliminated. Vasicek’s 1973 Bayesian adjustment is 
used to correct for biased beta estimates. The minimum size screen for ac¬ 
quired firms is increased to 5%. After meeting these screens, all tax-free 
mergers are included, regardless of the direction of goodwill or other amortiza¬ 
tions, so that this variable can be included as a possible explanatory variable if 
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a difference in reaction to the accounting method is noted. The purchase 
method sample is much larger and well distributed throughout the test, period. 
Beta is tested for nonstationarity at both the firm and sample levels. Finally, 
a subset of target firms, for which there is sufficient data, is examined using 
the same tests as those applied to the bidders to determine the entire wealth ef¬ 
fects of the merger. 
Methodological improvements over merger studies in general are as follows. 
Many studies use no screens in selecting their sample. The screens used here 
diminish the probability of significant influence from confounding variables. In 
addition, few studies attempt to control for documented anomalous variables, 
leaving open the possibility that their results have either been confounded or 
caused by those variables. This study uses two approaches, a matching process 
and a regression procedure, to control for their potential influence, and these are 
described more fully in Chapter III. Finally, weekly returns are used instead of 
daily returns to reduce the non-synchronous trading and autocorrelation 
problems inherent with daily returns. 
Hypotheses 
The general question to be examined by the proposed research is whether 
the choice of purchase verses pooling of interests accounting causes a stock 
market reaction. Because of the significant body of research that documents ab¬ 
normal returns to merger participants without regard to accounting method 
employed, answering the general question implies testing two hypotheses: 
H(l): No abnormal residuals will be observed for the merger par¬ 
ticipants. 
It is expected that H(l) will be rejected so that the second hypothesis be- 
comes: 
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H(2): No differential reaction will be observed between the sample of 
purchase method firms and the sample of pooling of interests method 
firms. 
It is expected that H(2) will not be rejected. If it is, tests will be con¬ 
ducted to try and find explanatory variables. 
As documented previously, researchers have noted additional significant 
variables when using the CAPM framework, which implies misspecification of 
the two parameter model. This research incorporates three of these variables, 
firm size, P/E ratio and earnings surprises. As a test of the CAPM, the fol¬ 
lowing hypothesis is tested: 
H(3): Inclusion of additional variables in the two parameter model 
will not add additional explanatory power. 
Rejection of H(3) is expected, so that part of the tests conducted include 
matching of purchase and pooling of interests firms on their values for these 
anomalous variables to control for their influence. Finally, the results are tested 
for sensitivity to market index selected, giving rise to: 
H(4): Estimation of the residuals will be unaffected by the choice of 
market index. 
The expected outcome of H(4) is not known because research results in 
this area are mixed. 
The following chapter operationalizes the above hypotheses and describes 




Two sources were employed to identify tax-free mergers: 1) Mergers and 
Acquisitions magazine and 2) Moody's manuals. Mergers and Acquisitions was 
the primary source because it contains a section documenting mergers of at least 
$1 million in value that were consummated in the preceding quarter. Moody's 
manuals were occasionally the original source when a review of a company’s his¬ 
tory revealed an acquisition that was not listed in Mergers and Acquisitions. 
To be included in the purchase or pooling of interests method sample, the 
merger had to meet the following criteria: 
1. The target had to be at least 5% of the acquiring firm, computed as 
the ratio of the number of shares issued in the acquisition (or equivalent shares 
issued if common stock was not used) to the number of acquiring firm shares 
outstanding prior to the merger. In a few instances, nonconvertible securities 
were used, so the ratio used was the market value of the securities to the 
market value of the common stock outstanding. 
2. No other merger or combination of mergers larger than 25% of the one 
under study were consummated during the period 52 weeks prior to the an¬ 
nouncement week to 52 weeks after the effective week. T his allowed for estima¬ 
tion of the model parameters without undue influence from competing events. 
This was determined by reviewing the firm’s history in the Moody's manuals. 
3. Merger discussions began after October 31, 1970 (the effective date of 
APB 16), so that if the pooling of interests method was to be used, the require¬ 
ments of ABP 16 had to be met. To avoid market reaction to the ABP 16 
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approval process, mergers initiated prior to this date were excluded from the 
sample. The proxy used for the initiation date was the first public announce¬ 
ment of the proposed merger. Although this date is not likely to be equivalent 
to the merger initiation date, only one firm out of both samples had an an¬ 
nouncement date in 1970, and it, occurred December 18, a full one and one-half 
months after the effective date of ABP 16. 
4. The merger had to qualify as a tax-free reorganization under the Inter¬ 
nal Revenue Code. This was necessary to insure that there would be no direct 
cash flow differences between the two accounting methods. The tax treatment 
was obtained from Mergers and Acquisitions, the Moody’s manuals, the proxy 
statement issued in connection with the merger, or the first annual report after 
consummation of the merger. 
5. The announcement and effective dates were available. The announce¬ 
ment date was obtained from the Wall Street Journal, whereas the effective date 
was obtained either from Mergers and Acquisitions, the Moody's manuals or the 
Annual Report. Several firms had to be discarded because no announcement 
date could be found. 
6. The acquiring firm was listed on the NYSE or ASE and their returns 
available for at least 52 weeks prior to the announcement date to 52 weeks 
after the effective date. 
7. The accounting method used, the market value of the consideration 
given and the book value of the target, were available. These were necessary to 
classify the merger and determine the potential impact on the income statement, 
and were obtained from the proxy or Annual Report. 
At the time of sample selection, returns data was available through 
December 31, 1983. In order to allow for beta estimation, mergers announced 
after October 31, 1970 arid consummated by December 31, 1982 were subjected 
to tlie above criteria, resulting in 119 firms using the pooling of interests 
method and 94 using the purchase method. 
Methodology 
Two models are utilized in this study, a residuals model and a returns 
model. Each is described below. 
MODEL 1 - The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): The CAPM can 
be stated as follows: 
E(tf,) = R{ + [E(RJ - Rf1/3, 
where E(J?.,) = the expected return on security i in period t. 
Rj — the risk free rate 
E(Rmt) — the expected return on the market 
portfolio in period t 
/L = the systematic risk of security i 
Two assumptions underly this model: 1) market equilibrium can be stated 
in terms of expected returns and 2) equilibrium expected returns fully reflect 
publicly available information. If these hold, trading systems based solely on 
publicly available information cannot result in expected returns different from 
equilibrium expected returns. More formally, let 
= Ru ■ E(K,« / *) 
and E(e(<) = 0 
where 0 = the information set available at time M 
If e is observed to depart from its expected value of zero, it is an indica¬ 
tion that the market has become aware of significant new information that 
necessitates a new equilibrium price. 
1 he CAPM implies that the residuals must have zero mean. Yet, 
numerous studies suggest that the CAPM is misspecified, so that many event 
studies use the less restrictive market model, and it is used here. Operationally, 
the natural log form of the market model developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll 1969J is used because it generates continuously compounded residuals. 
The model is as follows: 
R. = a + 0-R , + e . 
it i i ml it 
where R — the continuously compounded rate of return 
on security i in time period / 
R 
mt 




the continuously compounded rate of return 
on the market portfolio in time period t 
regression coefficients estimated by 
ordinary least squares; alternatively, the 
intercept and slope coefficients of the 
linear relationship between the return on 
stock i during period t and the market 
portfolio during period t 
a stochastic residual term that satisfies 
the OLS assumptions. 
This form of the market model was selected for two reasons. First, it has 
enjoyed widespread use in the merger literature, including HKM, and will make 
for easier comparison of the results of this study to those cited. Second, Collins 
and McKeown |1979j have shown that this form of the market model is rela¬ 
tively free of specification error. 
The model is estimated on a set of data observed relative to the defined 
event date and observations surrounding that date are excluded. Failure to ex¬ 
clude this data could result in biased estimates of the parameters. Some studies 
estimate the market parameters using only data prior to the event date, exclud- 
ing observations near the event date. Other studies, including HKM, exclude 
observations on both sides of the event, date and estimate the model parameters 
using a specified data period on both sides of the excluded period. This is the 
method used here because it allows for a check on the stability of the 
parameter estimates by testing for a significant change in the pre- and post- 
event, estimates. The stability check is important because Galai and Masulis 
11976) have demonstrated that a merger may alter the underlying risk of the as¬ 
sets and this may impact the systematic risk of both the bond and stockholders 
of the firm. As noted previously, HKM tested for stability and did not find a 
statistically significant shift. However, Mandelker 11974i notes a 10% decrease 
in beta during months -20 to +40 around the event date and observed a 50% 
reduction in abnormal returns using the lower beta. Dodd and Ruback 1977 
test for shifts in beta and observe 34 out of 184 cases in which there was a sig¬ 
nificant change in pre-beta verses post-beta. The Chow test is normally used; 
however, it tends to be a weak test when there is low /?, which many event 
studies have. This research uses several methods to supplement the Chow test 
results. First, post-beta is regressed on pre-beta to determine the extent of the 
relationship. Low RJ would suggest using separate pre- and post-betas. Second, 
post-beta is plotted against pre-beta. Wide distribution would indicate the use 
of separately estimated parameters for the two observation periods. Agreement 
of the three tests would also strengthen the final decision. 
Another important issue is the length of the time period to be excluded. 
Many earlier studies, including HKM, excluded 12 months of data on one or 
both sides of the event date. However, in a recent study, Keown and Pinkerton 
11981 j, omitted only 25 trading days prior to the event date. I he choice is 
substantially arbitrary, but the intent is to have a period which is free of the 
potential impact of the event. Assuming that the market is informationally ef¬ 
ficient, or nearly so, long periods are not necessary. Both the announcement 
and effective dates are important events for merging firms, as the former begins 
the somewhat lengthy and uncertain process, whereas the latter is conclusive 
evidence that all uncertainty regarding success of the offer has been resolved. 
Because the interim period between the two dates involves resolution of the un¬ 
certainty, any adjustment in the firm’s systematic risk may not be finalized un¬ 
til the merger is completed. Therefore, this paper excludes the period of 26 
weeks prior to the announcement to 26 weeks after the effective date. As 
previously discussed, the entire estimation and observation period for the sample 
firms is “clean” of any other mergers, either singly or combined, exceeding 25% 
of the sample merger. 
Several issues relating to parameter estimation are also of concern. First, 
the period used to estimate the market model parameters varies widely across 
studies. Many older studies used monthly data so that a minimum estimation 
period of 48 months was necessary to provide a reasonable number of obser¬ 
vations. With the availability of daily data, a large number of observations can 
come from a relatively short calendar time period. Keown and Pinkerton [1981 j 
used 100 trading days prior to the event date. A check on the stability of beta 
indicated no significant change from the first 40 and last 40 days of the 100 
day period. In this study, a 26 week period, both prior to the announcement 
date and after the effective date, is used. This was felt to be adequate due to 
the screens applied to the firms selected for inclusion in one of the two groups. 
Second, there is a choice of which index to use to represent the market 
portfolio. Many exist, but evidence from Elgers and Murray 11982j and Abdel- 
khalik and Mckeown 1978j indicates that results differ depending on the index 
used. Most merger studies use either the CRSP equal-weighted or CRSP value- 
weighted index. This study uses the CRSP value-weighted index, but repeats 
the major analysis using the equal weighted index to test for sensitivity to that 
variable. 
Third, the estimation of beta has been the subject of numerous studies 
(Vasicek [1973], Blume [1971, 1975], and Eskew il979| for example) which docu¬ 
ment that estimates of systematic risk obtained from OLS regressions are con¬ 
siderably biased. A common procedure is to use Vasicek’s [1973 Bayesian ad¬ 
justment, which Eubank and Zumwalt 1979[ show performs as well as other 
techniques for event-type studies. Accordingly, all OLS betas are adjusted using 
Vasicek’s procedure, which is as follows: 
6 / Va r (b) + b J Va r () 
v ijVar[b)-\r\/Var[b^\ 
where bv — the Vasicek adjusted beta 
6 = the cross-sectional mean of the 
OLS betas 
Var(b) ~ the variance of the cross-sectional 
distribution of the OLS betas 
b. — the specific firm’s OLS beta 
Var(bJ — the specific firm’s squared standard 
error of the OLS beta. 
Finally, Dimson j 1979! notes a nonsynchronous trading problem for small 
firms which can introduce bias in the parameter estimates. Hie sample firms in 
this study either had virtually no missing data or large blocks due to suspended 
trading. Those with large blocks were dropped from the sample. A few firms 
had data missing on a random basis, but this was not considered to be a 
serious problem because weekly data is used is this study. 
A residual is calculated for each firm for each week / of the observation 
period as follows: 
e — R - (a. + flR ,) 
it it v i r i ml' 
where rq and /f equal the estimated market model coefficients. 
The observation (test) period consists of the 26 weeks prior to the an¬ 
nouncement date to 26 weeks after the effective date. The choice of observation 
period is essentially arbitrary, but the objective is to select the period that cap¬ 
tures the market’s reaction, if any, to the event,. Picking a period that starts 
or ends too far away from the event, date increases the probability of measuring 
a reaction to some other event. Because of the screening process utilized in 
selecting firms, the selected test period should be adequate. Various subsets of 
this period are also examined to allow' for the possibility that too lengthy a 
period was chosen and to examine in depth the reaction around the two event 
dates. 
For each subsample of purchase and pooling method firms, average 
residuals (ARs) and CARs are calculated as follows: 
M 
ARt = (1/A7)y>„ 
i- 1 
where M — the number of firms in the group, and 
T 
CAR.,. = Y.AR< 
t-a 
where a = the first, week of the observation period 
T — the last week of the observation period 
and the event date is somewhere in between. If there are no unusual pri<e 
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movements around the event date, both the AH and the CAR are expected to 
fluctuate randomly about zero. However, if the event does provide useful infor¬ 
mation to the market, it should show up in one or both measures. In addition, 
the reaction may be observed prior to the event date if the market anticipates 
the event or there is leakage of information. 
This model is used to calculate ARs and CARs for the following groups 
and according to the listed specifications: 
Acquiring firms: 
1. Value weighted beta, all firms. This is the primary model for acquir¬ 
ing firms. 
2. Equal weighted beta, all firms. 
3. Value weighted beta, only firms with a positive difference between the 
value of the consideration given and the book value of the acquired firm. In 
these situations, the purchase method firms will always have lower income com¬ 
pared to pooling of interests method. 
4. Value weighted beta, matched sample, with differences in ARs and 
CARs calculated. The matching process is discussed in the Statistical Analyses 
section of this chapter. 
Acquired firms: 
1. Value weighted beta, all firms with sufficient data. This is the 
primary model for acquired firms. 
MODEL 2 - Market Adjusted Returns Model: This model assumes that 
ei ante expected returns are equal across securities, but not necessarily constant 
for a given security. Since the market portfolio is a linear combination of all 
securities, the model can be stated as follows: 
E(«„) = E(*J 
.‘59 
and e. — R.-R. 
it it mi 
This model is identical to the CAPM if all securities have systematic risk 
of unity, which is unlikely. Brown and Warner il980j empirically examined the 
behavior of alternative return models, including the two used in this study. 
They find that the market model performs well under a wide variety of con¬ 
ditions. In some situations, however, models such as the Market Adjusted 
Returns Model perform no worse than the market model even though there is 
no explicit adjustment for market wide factors or risk. It is used in this study 
as one way to avoid dependence on the CAPM, since numerous studies have in¬ 
dicated it may be misspecified. Average weekly returns and cumulative abnor¬ 
mal returns (CRETs) are calculated in the same manner as ARs and CARs. 
To allow for the importance (if any) of systematic risk, statistical tests per¬ 
formed on the average weekly returns and CRETs are done so after removing 
any linear association between them and the beta estimates. 
The observation period used is the same as for Model 1. The CRSP 
value-weighted index is used as the proxy for the market portfolio. The natural 
log form of the model is used to calculate average weekly returns and CRETs 
for the subsamples of purchase and pooling of interests method acquirors. An 
attempt was made to match firms using a similar procedure as used in Model 
1. However, no statistically significant matching variables emerged. 
Statistical Analyses 
Separate analysis is conducted on the results of each of the various refine¬ 
ments of the two models discussed previously. The primary test statistic for 
the ARs, CARs, average weekly returns and the CRETs is the mean standar¬ 




To compute the statistic, the residual, e{r is standardized 
standard deviation, s.t, as follows: 
Se. = e.Js.. 
it it> it 
where Se{ — standardized residual for firm i in 
week t 
eit = residual for firm i in week t 
by its es- 
The value of s.t is calculated as: 
D l 
+ (/? - R )2 / y (R -R )2)|>/2 
v mt m' ' / ^ v rnv m’ 
v=\ 
2 
where s — residual variance for firm i from the 
X 
market model regression 
D = number of observations during the 
estimation period for firm i 
Rmt — rate of return on the market index during 
week t of the observation period 
R = mean rate of return on the market index m 
during the estimation period 
R — rate of return on the market index during 
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D 
The standardized cumulative residual, SCett, over any interval t = 
T 2t 
SCctl - £ (ScuHt2> - Tu + 1) 
l~T, 
It 
If the residuals cjt are normal and independent across t, then the standar¬ 
dized cumulative residual SCeit is distributed Student’s t with (Z) - 2) degrees 
of freedom. Brown and Warner 1985; find that daily data is more sensitive to 
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violations of these assumptions than is monthly data, but note that standard 
parametric tests are typically well specified under a variety of conditions. Since 
this study uses weekly data, the same should hold true here. 
The test statistic for a sample of M firms is 
M 
2 = E SCtJy/M. 
t=l 
Each SCe, is assumed to be distributed unit normal in the absence of abnormal it 
performance. Under this assumption, Z is also unit normal. 
To test for a difference in CARs between the two accounting methods, a 
two-sample Ctest is used as follows: 
M2 
— V SCe .-— V SCe 
M ^ it A A j 




where M; = number of firms in the purchase sample 
Ms ~ number of firms in the pooling of interests 
sample 
SCe„ = standardized cumulative residual for firm it 
i in the purchase sample at week t 
SCe. — standardized cumulative residual for firm 
jt 
j in the pooling of interests sample at 
week t 
s . = estimated variance for firm i at week t 
it 
s~ = estimated variance for firm j at week t 
jt 
One of the tests of Model 1 involves using a matched sample to eliminate 
the effects of the potentially confounding variables discussed in Chapter II. 
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Normally, the matching process is used to form a “non-treatment” control group 
as a reference point for the “treatment’’ group. In this study, there is no non¬ 
treatment group available because the focus is not on merger (treatment) versus 
non-merger (non-treatment) firms, but on purchase method mergers versus pool¬ 
ing of interests method mergers. Stated another way, the comparison is treat¬ 
ment 1 (purchase method) versus treatment 2 (pooling of interests method). 
Eight variables were initially considered and matching was done on the fol- 
v 
low'ing five: earnings surprises, firm size, average leverage, systematic risk and 
the intercept term from the market model regression. All eight variables are 
defined below and justification as a potential matching variable is presented. 
The matching procedure, including reduction to the five variables noted above, 
is also described. 
Given the 1971-1982 time period of the study, it is difficult to hypothesize 
whether certain variables could potentially be confounding or explanatory. For 
example, the non-value maximizing theory of mergers suggests management’s 
goal is to maximize growth in sales or assets to control a larger empire. Yet, 
in high inflation periods, firms tend to lever themselves to acquire assets at 
lower prices, which usually results in higher sales. The test period in this study 
includes some high inflation years, so that it would be impossible to disentangle 
the two effects, or even determine if one or both are present. Therefore, these 
types of variables were used as potential matching variables, and are as follows: 
leverage, growth in assets and growth in sales. 
Leverage could be an explanatory variable because it could impact whether 
stock or debt instruments are used for the merger, and only stock can be used 
in a pooling of interests. However, Bloom, Llgers and Haltiner 11980 inves¬ 
tigated the wealth effects accruing to debtors and creditors during periods of un- 
anticipated inflation and noted that net monetary creditors experienced positive 
CARs while net monetary debtors experienced losses. This is persuasive 
evidence that a firm’s stock price activity can be conditioned by the joint effect 
of unanticipated inflation and the firm's leverage, so that is it important to 
control for this impact. In this study, leverage is defined as the debt to equity 
ratio, where debt is the book value of long term debt and equity is defined as 
the market value of the firm’s common stockholders’ equity. This particular 
measure of leverage is used due to its wide usage and general acceptance as a 
measure of net debtor position8 . 
Growth in assets and sales were also chosen because several studies have 
shown a high correlation of these two variables with leverage. As noted 
previously, they could be explanatory variables but their potential association 
with leverage eliminates any chance of determining if they are correlated with 
leverage or merger accounting method or both. Both variables are defined as 
the average growth over the five years preceding the announcement date and 
are calculated as : 
Growth in assets — 
Total assets year ^ — Total assets year ^ 
Total assets year } 
Growth in sales 
Net sales year — Net sales year _5 
Net sales year , 
where year j equals the year prior to the announcement date and year 5 equals 
the year five years prior to the announcement date. 
^Bowman f1980| provides evidence that measuring debt at market value is not superior to measuring 
it at book value. 
h 
The three anomalous variables noted in Chapter II are also included as 
potential matching variables and are defined as follows: Firm size is the 
market value of the firm’s common stock at the end of the year preceding the 
year of the announcement. Banz [1981] has demonstrated that the size effect is 
not linear in the market proportion but is nearly so with the natural log of 
size. As this study uses a regression procedure to assist in the actual matching 
of firms, the natural log of the size variable will be used. 
Earnings yield (the inverse of the P/E ratio) is defined as the earnings 
available for common shareholders divided by the market value of common stock 
outstanding at the end of the year. This was calculated for each of the five 
years prior to the announcement year. Each was then inverted and an average 
obtained for the five years. Only one firm’s ratio had to be constrained. The 
actual value was -5438.0 and was arbitrarily set to -200.0. 
Defining earnings surprises is difficult because of the many earnings expec¬ 
tation models that can serve as a proxy for the market’s anticipation of a 
firm’s earnings. The research in this area has primarily investigated the time- 
series properties of earnings. Early studies (e.g., Ball and Watts [1972 ) noted 
that earnings appear to follow a random walk or a random walk with drift. 
Watts and Leftwich [1977] compared these two models to Box-Jenkens models 
fitted on a firm-by-firm basis and found that the three compare favorably in 
predictability. Albrecht, Lookabill and McKeown [1977], performed similar tests 
on a different sample and noted that the random walk model performed sub¬ 
stantially worse than the other two. A major shortcoming of both studies, 
however, is that they employed small sample sizes of 25 and 40 firms, respec¬ 
tively, and this could have accounted for the difference in results. 
Recent research findings provide additional evidence to support the use of 
the simple random walk model. Ruland !l98(h compared the predictability of 
the two random walk models (and four others) and found that the random walk 
dominated the other models tested. Ricks jl982: and Biddle and Lindahl 1982 
found their results to be relatively insensitive to the choice between the random 
walk without drift model and the random walk with drift model. Two studies 
(Bathke and Lorek ! 1984j and Hagerman, Zmijewski and Shah [1984]) investigate 
the relationship between quarterly earnings announcements and security prices 
using a variety of time-series models. However, neither includes the random 
walk without drift model so that it is impossible to conclude that the more 
sophisticated models perform any better. Finally, numerous studies have inves¬ 
tigated the relationship between financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings and 
security prices (for example, see Givoly and Lakonishok 1979], Abdel-khalik and 
Espejo [1978], Brown et. al. [1978, 1979, 1980j and Fried and Givoly (1982]). 
Fried and Givoly [1982] evaluate the quality of analysts’ forecasts as surrogates 
for the market expectation of earnings and compare the results to two time- 
series models. They find that the analysts’ forecasts provide a better surrogate 
for market expectations. However, neither of the time-series models was the 
simple random walk without drift. In addition, one of the main problems w'ith 
these types of studies is deciding which analyst’s forecast to use, because as 
Givoly and Lakonishok [ 1979j point out, three to five forecasters are actively 
engaged in forecasting the earnings of a given company. And for a widely 
traded stock, as many as fifteen different forecasts might simultaneously be 
available. Therefore, the random walk without drift, model will serve as the 
earnings expectation model in this study. Earnings surprise is defined simply as 
the change in EPS and is calculated by taking EPS in the announcement year 
(EPS{) and subtracting FIPS in the year prior to the announcement {EPSt ;). 
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This is deflated by share price at the beginning of the announcement year, 
rather than E!*S . to avoid the small or negative denominator problem. 
Beta was also selected as a potential matching variable for two reasons. 
First, it is well documented that systematic risk bears a close relationship to 
leverage (e.g.. Bowman 1979 ] and leverage, as previously discussed, is a poten¬ 
tial matching variable. Second, Black. Jensen and Scholes 1972 have docu¬ 
mented that firms with different market risk levels do riot generate the same 
magnitude of risk-adjusted rates of return. They note that firms with higher 
risk exhibit lower levels of risk-adjusted rates of return than firms with lower 
risk. Matching on this variable will eliminate this potentially confounding cause 
of differences in CARs between the two groups. 
Finally, the intercept term from the market model regression was also con¬ 
sidered since it varies from firm to firm and is not expected to be a ex¬ 
planatory variable. Therefore, its influence in generating CARs will be con¬ 
trolled. 
One variable used in previous studies, industry classification, was not 
chosen because there were not always sufficient firms in a given industry for 
both subsamples. However, both subsamples contained representation from a 
wide variety of industries, so that any potential industry effect should be ran¬ 
domized away. 
Two matching procedures were considered. Murray 1983 used the 
Mahalanobis distance measure, which is a univariate measure of multidimen¬ 
sional differences. It is an extension of a Euclidean distance measure used by 
Martin. Scott and Varidell 1979 but preferable to it because it considers the 
covariance structure among the matching variables. However, there are two 
serious drawbacks to its use. first, it requires the researcher to specif), a 
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priori, the matching variables, which implies that important variables are known 
and included and unimportant variables are known and excluded. Second, the 
distance calculated is a squared distance so that variables with relatively large 
values that, are not indicative of their relative importance must be deflated, 
usually in an arbitrary manner. An example would be market value of firms, 
which is measured in millions, versus leverage, which ranges between 0 and 1. 
The variance of the market values would easily dominate the distance calcula¬ 
tion. However, the deflation procedure assumes knowledge of the variable’s rela¬ 
tive importance. Deflating without that knowledge will likely result in a 
misstatement of the variable’s relative importance. 
In event studies such as this one, the proper matching variables can only 
be hypothesized. There is no guarantee that all relevant variables are included, 
nor can their relative importance be estimated with any certainty. An alter¬ 
native method, which allows the data to determine which variables should be in¬ 
cluded and their relative importance, is stepwise regression analysis. This proce¬ 
dure still requires that the predictor variables be specified in advance, but they 
are not automatically included in the analysis. This allows for more freedom in 
selecting variables since the regression procedure eliminates those that show little 
correlation with the dependent variable. 
Because stepwise regression analysis overcomes the variable importance is¬ 
sue and provides more freedom in selecting explanatory variables, it is used in 
this study. The dependent variable is the CAR for the period -26 weeks prior 
to the announcement week through the announcement week. The eight poten¬ 
tial matching variables discussed above were included as predictors and the 
analysis produced the five significant variables noted previously. A score was 
obtained for each firm using the coefficients from the stepwise regression analysis 
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and the firm's specific value for each of the five variables. The scores for the 
two subsamples were arranged in ascending order (which by observation, ap¬ 
peared to result in closer matches than using descending order) and the firms 
paired off. Differences in ARs and CARs were then calculated and a matched 
sample Mest, employed to test for significance. 
Because a regression procedure is used to match firms, it could be argued 
that including alpha and beta as predictors is unwarranted since there should be 
no correlation between abnormal performance and the parameters of the market 
model. However, evidence from Elgers and Strock [1985 indicates there is a 
strong negative relationship, reflecting parameter misestimation. Controlling for 
the effects of these errors on the cross-sectional CARs should, therefore, improve 
the efficiency of the statistical tests. 
The matching procedure outlined above is only one way to control for con¬ 
founding variables. Because the procedure is ad hoc at best, an alternative ap¬ 
proach is also used which excludes the matching process, but controls for the 
anomalous variables and tests for significance of the accounting method. First, 
the two samples are combined into one. Then, using stepwise regression again, 
CARs are regressed on firm values for each of the eight potential predictors dis¬ 
cussed previously, and on a 0-1 dummy variable representing merger method 
used (0 for purchase, 1 for pooling of interests). Significance of the coefficient 
for the dummy variable would indicate discriminatory power after controlling for 
the impact of any of the eight variables. 
Several recent studies have attempted to explain their abnormal results by 
regressing the CARs (or their equivalent measure of abnormal performance) on 
particular merger characteristics. Hite and Owers 1983 investigated security 
price reactions to spin-off announcements and hypothesized that larger percent- 
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age spin-offs should be associated with larger percentage abnormal returns. 
Regressing CARs against the size of the spun off segment (measured as a per¬ 
centage of the combined entities prior to the spin-off), they find a positive and 
significant association. Asquith. Bruner and Mullins 1983 examined the gains 
to bidding firms in mergers and hypothesized that the target’s size, the success 
of the bid, the time period of the bid and the number of the mergers completed 
by the bidder could influence the abnormal performance. Using dummy vari¬ 
ables to represent the last three variables, all but the last variable was statis¬ 
tically significant. 
Similar analysis is performed in this study. Besides target size, one other 
variable, as described below, is used. The main impact of the two accounting 
methods is reflected in the income statements of the purchase method firms in 
the form of amortization of the difference between the value of the consideration 
given and the book value of the target. Whether it shows up in the form of 
cost of goods sold, depreciation or amortization is irrelevant: the impact on the 
calculation of earnings is the same. It could be that the magnitude of the im¬ 
pact, if the market is “fooled,’’ is correlated with the magnitude of abnormal 
performance. Therefore, for each subsample, CARs are also regressed on a 
proxy for the potential impact of the amortizations on the firm’s earnings. The 
proxy used is 
%Diff — Total diff/EarningSj ; 
where %Diff — the size of the Total diff expressed 
as a percentage of earnings in the 
year prior to the announcement date 
Total diff = market value of the consideration given 
minus the book value of the target firm 
Earnings^ — earnings for the year prior to the 
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announcement.9 
This proxy relates the entire difference to only one year’s earnings, when 
in fact it will he amortized, if the purchase method is used, over one-to-40 
years, depending on the cause of the difference. If part of it is due to under¬ 
valued inventory which is subsequently sold during the next year, that portion 
of the difference is effectively ‘‘amortized” in one year. Lastly, if part of the 
difference is due to undervalued fixed assets, it is amortized over the remaining 
life of those assets. If part of it is recorded as goodwill, it must be amortized, 
per ABP 17, over a period not less than 10 years, but not exceeding 40 years. 
Since the composition and useful life of the difference is not readily determin¬ 
able, the above proxy was felt to be adequate. 
Another body of research has emerged that attempts to explain why firms 
lobby for or choose certain accounting methods (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 
1978j, Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979], Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981 . Dalev 
and Vigeland 11983] and Holthausen and Leftwich 1983 ). The basic premise 
throughout these studies is that management may lobby for or pick accounting 
methods, either singly or in concert, to minimize or maximize reported earnings. 
The rationale is that certain firm characteristics related to earnings may either 
jeopardize the firm or benefit management in some way. For example, Watts 
and Zimmerman 1978] show that the magnitude of political costs (e.g., anti¬ 
trust, regulation) is highly dependent on firm size, so that larger firms will tend 
to lobby for accounting standards that reduce income. Zmijewski and Hagerman 
1981] find a significant positive relationship between income inflating policies 
9This variable was not constrained in any way as no sample firms had earnings near zero. 
and the existence of a management compensation plan based on reported earn¬ 
ings. Since the choice of merger accounting method could imply managerial in¬ 
tent to income maximize or minimize, a similar analysis is performed in this 
study. The methodology most often used is probit analysis because of a 
dichotomous dependent variable. Complete information is not available for the 
actual income impact, so a 0-1 dummy is used (0 for income decreasing and 1 
for income increasing). OLS is inappropriate because, as Hagerman and 
Zmijewski show, regression estimates will predict values from -oo to -too when 
the model requires that they range from 0 to 1. In addition, the disturbance 
terms are heteroskedastic, resulting in parameter estimates that are unbiased but 
inefficient, and the usual tests of statistical inference are not applicable. 
The list of variables used as predictors in the literature is extensive, so 
that only those relevant to this study are discussed and defined. 
Size: As noted previously, size is related to the magnitude of political 
costs. Firms have a variety of tactics to try to reduce these costs, such as lob¬ 
bying, advertising against proposed governmental action, and reducing reported 
income to avoid drawing attention to the firm. In this analysis, size is defined 
in two ways, either total assets or total sales, and the model is estimated twice, 
once using total assets and once using total sales. 
Beta: In equilibrium, the expected return on capital is positively related 
to systematic risk. Thus, firms with higher systematic risk, on average, should 
have higher accounting returns. If the public and politicians fail to make ad¬ 
justments for risk, riskier firms will appear to make excessive profits and pos¬ 
sibly be subject to negative wealth transfers. In addition, riskier firms tend to 
have more variable earning streams, which may appear to be abnormal, increas¬ 
ing the exposure of the firm to higher political costs. Thus, these firms have 
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incentive to reduce the mean of their reported earnings by choosing income 
deflating policies. 
Leverage: As discussed previously, leverage is highly correlated with beta 
so that the discussion regarding beta is equally applicable here. For this 
analysis, leverage is defined as the book value of debt divided by total assets. 
Capital intensity: Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979 suggest that capital in¬ 
tensive firms do not include the opportunity cost of capital in computing net in¬ 
come, so that, on average, a capital intensive firm will report higher profits 
than a labor intensive' firm even though the economic income of the two firms 
is the same. Therefore, firms that are capital intensive and subject to political 
costs have an incentive to select income reducing policies. Capital intensity is 
defined as fixed assets divided by net sales. 
Competition: Managers will want to hamper additional competition be¬ 
cause it will reduce the value of the firm, their salaries and their perks. Ac¬ 
counting income can increase competition in one of two ways. First, higher 
reported profits can be indicative of abnormal profits, encouraging other firms to 
enter the industry. Second, there is the possibility of anti-trust action which 
could lead to a forced break up. Therefore, firms with abnormal profits have 
an incentive to reduce reported earnings. It is suggested that abnormal profits 
accrue to large firms in industries where a few firms account for roost of the 
sales, so that the variable of interest is the industry concentration ratio, which 
is defined as the sales of the top eight firms in the industry divided by the 
sales of all firms in that industry. Four digit, SIC codes are used to define an 
industry. 
Incentive plans: Many firms have management incentive plans partially or 
wholly related to accounting earnings, so that management has an incentive to 
us(* accounting principles to increase earnings if all or part of their income is 
derived from the incentive plan. 
Information on the existence of incentive plans was not available for the 
sample firms in this study, so that this variable is not included in the analysis. 
The results of model estimation using the remaining variables are evaluated 
using an asymptotic ^-statistic and a \2 test statistic. 
In addition to the primary tests outlined above, additional tests are per¬ 
formed on an individual firm basis to assess the stability of beta. This was ac¬ 
complished using the Chow test, regression of post-beta on pre-beta and plots of 
pre-beta versus post-beta. The Chow test, (see Johnston j 19721) is designed to 
detect shifts in regression parameters by examining the sums of squared error 
terms from three regressions: one based on data in period 1, one based on data 
from period 2 and one based on the combined periods. In this study period I 
is the period 52 weeks to 27 weeks prior to the announcement week. Period 2 
is the period 27 weeks to 52 weeks after the effective week. The test statistic, 
which follows the F distribution, is as follows: 
srs2 
F v< N~*) 
where S = the sum of the squared error terms from the 
regression fitted on the data from both 
periods combined 
S0 = the sum of the squared error terms from the 
two separately fitted regressions 
As the Chow test is a weak 
sion of post-beta on pre-beta and 
test in situations where the 
plotting of pre-beta versus 
R2 is low. regres- 
post-beta is per¬ 
formed to evaluate the extent of any beta shift,. 
Finally, there is some evidence that returns may be cross-sectionally corre- 
lated (King [19661). In generating CARs for <*aeh subsample, the residuals are 
added across firms. If there is cross-sectional dependence, the residuals might 
not be independent drawings and the statistical tests discussed above could be 
inappropriate. However, cross-sectional correlation should not, be a problem in 
this study for several reasons. First, residuals, not returns, are used. The com¬ 
mon market factor is removed from the return, which reduces the correlation 
(Beaver [1981 j). In addition, the sample firms are distributed across many in¬ 
dustries and over a thirteen year test period, increasing the probability that the 
cross-sectional dependence problem is minor. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter is organized as follows: Characteristics of the acquiring 
acquired firms are discussed first, using Tables .3 through 6 and Figures I 
2. Tests of the hypotheses are discussed next, using Tables 7 through 38 





As noted in Chapter ill, 213 mergers met the sample selection criteria, of 
which 1 19 were pooling method mergers and 91 were purchase method mergers. 
Appendix C lists each acquiring firm and the firm they acquired. Also in¬ 
dicated are the 31 pooling method and 30 purchase method acquired firms for 
which there was sufficient data to be included in the analysis of acquired firms. 
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of the sample by announcement date and 
shows that both types of mergers are well represented throughout the test 
period10, unlike the HKM study where the purchase method mergers were highly 
concentrated in the first four years of the eleven year test period. The largest 
number of poolings occurred in 1971, but there were also a large number in 
197(5 and 1977. The largest number of purchase method mergers occurred in 
1981, with only one fewer in 1977 and 1978. The average elapsed time between 
the announcement and effective dates is si mi liar to Dodd 1980. who reported 
102 trading days, or about 143 calendar days. The industry composition of the 
sample is summarized in Appendix 1) and shows that nearly equal numbers of 
10Only one merger is included for 1970. However, one of the sample selection criteria was that the 
merger had to be initiated after October 31, 1970. so that only the last two months of 19(0 are part 
of the test period. 
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industries are represented by the acquiring firms, while the subset of acquired 
firms for which there is data on Compustat and the CUSP tapes lias the same 
number of industries represented. In addition, the two subsamples of acquiring 
firms have a nearly equal balance between common industries represented (46%) 
and those unique to each group (54%), providing evidence that industry clas¬ 
sification has little impact on the accounting method used. No industry appears 
to be over-represented in either group, as the largest number of mergers in one 
industry is seven (Radio and TV Transmitting Equipment, SIC Code 3062). 
Due to the wide industry dispersion and the moderate sample sizes in this 
study, no additional controls for industry were considered necessary. 
Table 4 summarizes characteristics about the sample of acquiring firms and 
provides evidence that the two groups differ along several dimensions. First, 
systematic risk, which is not significantly different prior to the announcement 
date, increases for the pooling method sample and decreases for the purchase 
method sample, so that after the merger, a significant difference exists between 
the two groups. Apparently, firms that use the purchase method are making 
acquisitions that are lowering the overall riskiness of the combined entity, 
whereas those using the pooling method are acquiring firms that increase the 
combined entity's sensitivity to systematic movement of the market. Second, 
the purchase method firms are more highly leveraged than those that use the 
pooling method. Third, pooling method firms have a significantly higher P/E 
ratio, indicating that they may be high growth, low earnings-type firms. 
Finally, the purchase method firms tend to acquire larger firms, both in dollar 
value and as a percentage of the acquiring firm. However, those acquisitions 
result in less of a potential impact on future income statements because the 
amount paid over book value is less in terms of dollars and percent of the [ire- 
vious years earnings. Alternatively, the potential impact on the pooling method 
firm's income statement is larger, suggesting that this method may be used to 
avoid a significant negative impact on future earnings. 
Table 5 summarizes the characteristics of the acquired firms. Systematic 
risk is not significantly different but both leverage and P/E ratio are. and the 
relationship between the two groups is the same as for the acquiring firms: the 
purchase method acquired firms have higher leverage and lower P/E ratios than 
the pooling method firms. In addition, the pooling method acquired firms show 
higher average asset, and sales growth over t ho previous five years, although t In¬ 
differences are not significant, due to the large standard deviations. Taken 
together, it appears that, both types of acquirors are acquiring firms similiar to 
themselves, with the combined pooling method entity becoming more sensitive to 
overall market movements. This may be due to the higher growth and P E 
ratios, since high growth rates are difficult to maintain over the long run. If 
the growth rates cannot be maintained, recovery of the premium over book 
value, which is much higher for the pooling method mergers, becomes question¬ 
able. 
Table 6 provides summary statistics on unadjusted betas from the market 
model regressions and results of the beta stability tests. The Rss are in line 
with prior studies. Comparison of the unadjusted betas with the Vasicek- 
adjusted betas shown in Table 3 indicates that the adjustment reduced both the 
estimate and variability, as expected. The Chow test indicates that the slope 
and/or intercept of the pooling sample differs in the two estimation periods. 
The regression of post-beta on pre-beta results in significant coefficients, but the 
Rss are low. At the firm level, several firms do show significant changes in 
systematic risk. Figures 1 and 2, which plot pre-beta versus post-beta, also in- 
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dicat e a relationship, but, not a strong one. Taken together, these tests imply 
that beta is different in the two estimation periods, so that subsequent analysis 
uses pre-beta for residual estimation during the pre-announcement period and 
post-beta for all periods after the announcement date. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
To facilitate analysis of the market’s reaction to the merger bid and sub¬ 
sequent completion, Table 7 summarizes the various time periods investigated. 
For each time period, two analyses are provided: 1) week-by-week summaries of 
average residuals or returns, and 2) week-bv-week summaries of CARs or 
CRETs. In addition, one additional table summarizes accrual of the CARs or 
CRETs over various time periods to facilitate determination of when the major 
part of the reaction, if any, occurs, and in what magnitude. 
Primary Model - Acquiring Firms. Table 8 summarizes average weekly 
residuals for acquiring firms over the entire observation period and shows only 
one significant residual for the pooling method firms during the entire merger 
process. Only during the interim period does the residual exceed 1.0%. The 
purchase method firms, however, show significant residuals during 14 weekly 
periods, with six of them coming in the eleven weeks before the merger is an¬ 
nounced. Of those six, five are positive and included among them is the largest 
weekly residual of 1.98%), which occurs in the eleventh week prior to the an¬ 
nouncement. Three of the four weeks prior to the announcement are sig¬ 
nificantly positive, indicating that the market, is anticipating the upcoming an¬ 
nouncement or that some type of information leakage is occurring. Lack of a 
significant reaction during the announcement week also supports this contention. 
The significant reactions after the effective date are largely offsetting, implying 
that the market is incorporating most of the impact of the proposed merger by 
the announcement date. Looking at the difference in reaction, only three of tin* 
weekly residuals are significantly different, with two of them occurring in the 
eleven week period prior to the announcement. However, it does appear that 
the market is reacting strongly to the purchase method mergers, and that the 
bulk of the reaction begins eleven weeks prior to the announcement. The pool¬ 
ing method mergers, on the other hand, do not appear to generate any sig¬ 
nificant reaction. Table 9, which presents the CARs for the same period, and 
Figure 3, which plots the CARs, reinforce these findings. The purchase method 
CARs start out statistically significant and remain so for all but two weeks of 
the observation period. The highest CAR of 10.37% comes in the announce¬ 
ment week, declines only moderately by the effective week, and ends at 8.60%. 
which is significant at the .01 level. The number of purchase method firms 
with positive CARs never declines below 50.0% and reaches a maximum of 
63.8%> in weeks 17. 18 and 20 after the effective date. The pooling method 
CARs are in stark contrast to these results as they reach a maximum of only 
4.91% (in the ninth week after the effective date) and are never statistically dif¬ 
ferent from zero. The CARs however, do trend upward from the eighteenth 
week prior to the announcement through the interim period. The number of 
firms with positive CARs ranges between 44.5 and 56.3%. Due to the strong 
reaction of the purchase method firms, the CARs for the two groups are nearly 
always significantly different from eleven weeks prior to the announcement to 
the end of the observation period, which, again, suggests that the bulk of the 
reaction begins eleven weeks prior to the announcement. It also appears that, 
before the eleventh week, the purchase method firms are doing well, similiar to 
the results for HKM's purchase method sample. It may be that a self-selection 
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bias is operating, as suggested in previous studies (Kaplan and Roll 1972 . 
Sunder 1973 ). in that firms that use the purchase method can “afford" to 
report the lower earnings caused by this method. 
The evidence thus far is similiar to HKM. as their pooling method sample 
showed no significant response, while their small purchase method sample 
showed significant upward movement in the CARs from month -10 to +8. 
However, their measurement was centered around the effective date. To gain 
further insight into the reaction around the announcement and effective dates. 
Tables 10 and ll11 summarize the- weekly residuals and CARs around the an¬ 
nouncement date, and Tables 12 arid 13 summarize the residuals and CARs 
around the effective date. Figures 3 and 4 plot the CARs for these same two 
time spans. Table 10 shows some positive response by the pooling method 
firms in weeks —6 and -14, but this is largely offset in subsequent weeks. The 
purchase method firms continue to evidence significant market reaction after the* 
announcement, yet no clear direction of that reaction emerges, as four of the six 
significant weekly residuals are postive. while the other two are negative. This 
may reflect revision of expectations as to the eventual outcome, as some of the 
mergers were completed within 26 weeks of the announcement date. The per¬ 
cent of positive weekly residuals does not yield any insights as it drops below' 
40% for both groups and only goes above 60% one time. Table 11 shows that 
the purchase method CARs increase a bit after the announcement week, reach¬ 
ing 10.62% in the second week after the announcement, which provides evidence 
that the market is impounding most of the impart of the proposed merger by 
nThe top halves of Tables 10 and 11 are the same as Tables 8 and 9. except that they also show 
the percent of positive weekly residuals. 
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the announcement date. The CARs decline only moderately by the 20th week. 
In addition, they stay significant, at a .01 or .05 level, during all of the 20 
week post-announcement week period. The pooling method firms, as before, 
show no significant reaction, but the CARs do increase to 1.52% by week +20 
and the percent of positive CARs stays above 50.0%,. However, the CARs for 
the two groups remain significantly different during most of the post¬ 
announcement period. 
The outcome of the merger bid is no longer in doubt at the effective date, 
but it may be forecasted by the market. In addition, if the market is infor¬ 
mationally efficient with respect to mergers, there should not be any abnormal 
reaction past the effective date. Tables 12 and 13 provide evidence on both of 
these issues. The average residuals are calculated and the CARs accumulated 
starting three weeks prior to the effective date. A longer period prior to the ef¬ 
fective date was not used because neither group evidences much reaction during 
the interim period, which would bias the ^-statistics for the CARs toward zero. 
Table 12 shows that the purchase method sample generates significantly positive 
residuals in the two weeks prior to the effective date, substantiating the 
forecasting speculation or providing additional evidence for information leakage. 
Very little reaction occurs from the effective week through the end of the obser¬ 
vation period, indicating that the market is incorporating the impact of the 
merger in an efficient manner. The pooling method sample, consistent with pre¬ 
vious results, shows virtually no reaction to completion of the merger. I he 
largo react ion by the purchase method sample in the* weeks prior to the effective 
date also causes the difference in reaction between the two samples to be sig¬ 
nificant. Table 13 shows that the large weekly residuals for the purchase 
method firms creates CARs that stay significant through the seventh week after 
the merger is completed and are significantly different from the pooling method 
firin'- for much of that period. In addition, the C'ARs finish at 2-09*7. which is 
i;ii!f changed from the effective week. The number of [positive OARs also <-ta\s 
high during this entire period. The pooling firms, on the other hand, show 
f ARs that are trending downward, although they are not significant. In ad¬ 
dition. the number of positive CAKs is below 50*7 for most of the period. If 
does appear, however, that the significant difference in reaction between the two 
groups solely a result of the abnormal residual- for the purchase method 
firms ii the two weeks prior to the effective dale. 
Table H summarizes the results for the primary model by accumulating 
the CAKs for both groups over various intervals. It reinforces the findings that 
I there is no significant reaction to the pooling method mergers. 2) there is a 
strong, significant!} positive reaction to the purchase method mergers, and 7) 
tr - reaction is significantly different from the pooling method mergers. Focusing 
on specific intervals, it appears that most of the reaction to the purchase 
method mergers occurs in the eleven weeks prior to the merger announcement, 
but in addition, significant activity occurs around the effective date. 
Given the screens applied to *he samp.e firms, these findings are surpris¬ 
ing. When contrasted against other merger research, the reactions to the pur- 
cha-e method sample are e%eri more anomalous: the largest CAR for si miliar 
rnea-u re> for acquiring firms over a si miliar time span is the 7°c reported by 
Asquith 19*3 . Vet. his observation pernxi- prior to the announcement and 
after the effective dates were much longer, and when reduced to equivalent 
periods used here, the abnormal return drops to -1.2*7. Many other studies 
used shorter periods, and the largest GAR reported was 6.1 • over the perir>d 
-40 days to -40 days after the announcement I Dodd 1980). Obviously, the 
use of different observation periods makes comparison difficult. In addition, as 
discussed in Chapter II. no other study other than 11 KM controlled for merger 
accounting method, so that the resulting abnormal returns in those studies are 
actually a weighted average of the two types of mergers. The simple average of 
the CARs for the entire period for the two groups analyzed here is 5.9%, which 
is in line with other merger literature and suggests that disregarding merger ac¬ 
counting method may be suppressing its impact. 
Primary Model - Acquired Firms. Table 15 summarizes the average 
weekly residuals through the entire merger process for the acquired firms. Al¬ 
though the sample sizes are small, the reaction of the purchase method firms is 
larger and more pronounced from three weeks prior to the announcement 
through the announcement week. The reaction in the announcement week is 
large for both groups, which is expected. Both groups have large CARs in the 
announcement week and interim period, similiar to Asquith [ 1983J. Although 
the reaction of the purchase method firms during the announcement week is sig¬ 
nificantly different than the pooling method firms, both groups show similiar 
CARs for the announcement and interim periods combined. It does appear, 
though, that the pooling method firms are reacting more slowly. Table 16, 
which summarizes the CARs for the entire period, and Figure 6, which plots 
the CARs, seem to confirm this, as both groups end w'ith fairly similiar CARs. 
Table 16 also indicates that both groups were generating negative CARs prior 
to the announcement, with the pooling method acquired firms doing worse and 
showing the largest negative CAR of -9.73% in week -16. In addition, prior to 
week -4, the number of firms with positive CARs is rarely above 50%. 1 hese 
findings suggest that the targets in this sample are firms that are not perform¬ 
ing well prior to the merger. The overall gains of 31.50% to the purchase 
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method targets and 28.44% to the pooling method targets, however, is in line 
with previous research. 
Table 17 shows the weekly residuals that occur after the announcement. 
Some weeks are significant, but it appears that the bulk of the reaction has oc¬ 
curred by the announcement date. Table 18, which shows the CARs for this 
period, and Figure 7, which plots them, provide a little more insight. The pur¬ 
chase method CARs drop a bit through week +9, but then climb steadily, 
reaching a maximum of 32.09% in week -(20 (per Table 16. they end at 
31.50%), whereas the pooling method CARs climb steadily during the entire 
post-announcement period and reach 31.74% in week +24 (they end at 28.44%). 
This indicates that the total response by the target firms is very similiar, which 
is not surprising, since the amount of securities exchanged in a merger is based 
on market value, irregardless of the accounting method used to record the 
merger. Table 19 provides a summary of CARs for the target firms over 
various time intervals and serves to reinforce the expected abnormal gains made 
by those firms. 
The results thus far indicate that both bidder and target enjoy significant 
positive abnormal returns when the purchase method is used, whereas only the 
target firms gain when the pooling of interests method is used. Additionally, 
the difference in reaction is significant for both bidders and targets, although 
the difference noted with the-bidders is considered to be the more significant 
finding. Finally, the CARs for the purchase method acquiring firms are larger 
than any previously reported for a similiar accumulation period. I he next sec¬ 
tion reviews the results of a matched sample of firms to help determine if other 
variables could be causing the results. 
Matched Sample. Acquiring company CARs from the primary model for 
the period -26 weeks through the announcement week were regressed on firm 
values for the eight variables defined in Chapter III as follows: 
CAR. - a f 6;(«) f bs(/3) -+ b^n(Size) + b^( Avlvg) 
+ b5(Slsgr) i b/Assgr) + b/Er usurp) -f b/P/E) 
where a, (3 - regression coefficients from the market model 
ln(5«2e) — natural log of the market value of the firm’s 
common stock at the beginning of the 
announcement date year 
Avlvg — average leverage during the five years 
preceding the announcement date year 
Slsgr — average sales growth during the five years 
preceding the announcement date year 
Assgr = average growth in total assets during the 
five years preceding the announcement date 
year 
Ernsurp = earnings surprise for the announcement 
date year 
P/E — price-earnings ratio 
Stepwise regression was performed on the above equation using a minimum 
F-to-enter of 1.0, which resulted in the estimated coefficients and /-statistics 
shown in Table 20. Five variables survived the analysis, a, /3, Size, Avlvg, and 
Ernsurp1 and all except Avlvg have large /-values. In addition, the Rs is 
surprisingly high at .5692. The market model regression coefficients have the 
expected sign and partially capture parameter misestimation from the market 
model regressions. The size and earnings surprise variables are significant and 
have the expected sign. However, P/E ratio did not enter and may have been 
subsumed by the size variable, as documented by Reinganum 1981!. I he 
average leverage variable was not significant, yet the sign is as expected. Since 
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leverage may be correlated with growth in sales and assets, and these two vari¬ 
ables did not enter the equation, it is considered important to continue to use 
leverage as a matching variable, despite its low /-statistic. 
Using the coefficients from the stepwise regression, scores were calculated 
for each firm and arranged in ascending order, "fable 21 summarizes the scores 
for both groups of firms. Five purchase method firms had negative scores, 
whereas none of the pooling method firms’ scores were less than zero. There¬ 
fore, these firms were not considered in the matching process, resulting in a 
matched sample of 89 firms. The resulting mean and median for the two 
groups are similiar, suggesting that the matching process was successful. 
However, given the somewhat limited range of scores and the wide diversity of 
firms, it is difficult to evaluate the closeness of the pairs. The purchase firms 
and their matched pair are summarized in Appendix E. 
Average weekly residuals and CARs were calculated by subtracting the 
pooling method firm's value from the purchase method firm's value and then 
using the same methodology as before. Table 22 summarizes the results for the 
entire period and Figure 8 plots the CARs. Only six weeks show significant 
differences in the residuals, and only the first three weeks of CARs are sig¬ 
nificant. However, two of the significant weekly residuals occur in the eleven 
week period prior to the announcement, and are positive, corresponding to ear¬ 
lier results. Although the CARs are not significant after the first three weeks 
of the observation period, they show a steady upward trend, indicating that the 
purchase method firms are generating larger CARs than the pooling method 
firms. The difference in CARs peaks at 8.34% in the announcement week and 
then trends downward, ending at 3.19%. The number of matched pairs with a 
positive difference in CARs is above 50% most of the time. I able 23 shows 
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the; differences in residuals and CARs around the announcement week. Three of 
the weekly residuals in the post-announcement period are significant and nega¬ 
tive, implying that the pooling method firms are generating the larger residuals. 
This is verified by examining the CARs, which increase to 9.95% by week -f3, 
but then decline gradually bv week <26. However, the difference in CARs be¬ 
comes significant (at the .10 level) for several weeks during the post- 
announcement period, providing further evidence that the reaction to the two 
groups is different. Table 24 summarizes the difference in residuals and CARs 
around the effective week. As noted previously, there is a strong difference in 
reaction just prior to the effective date, yet this is largely offset in the following 
weeks. The difference in CARs is negative during most of the post-effective 
week period, implying either that the pooling method firms are doing relatively 
better than their matched pair during this time or that the purchase method 
firms are losing some of the abnormal gains from the pre-announcement period. 
Table 25 summarizes the differences in CARs over various periods and provides 
additional evidence that the two groups of firms are reacting differently. The 
eleven and four week periods prior to the announcement are significant, similiar 
to results with the primary model. In summary, the evidence from the matched 
sample suggests that, after controlling for anomalous variables, parameter mises- 
timation, earnings surprises, leverage and related factors, the tw'o groups of 
firms are still reacting differently, primarily during the eleven weeks leading up 
to the announcement of the proposed merger. 
Returns Model. Table 26 shows the average weekly returns for the entire 
period. The main difference between the results on Table 26 and those on 
Table 8 (which shows average w'eekly residuals) is that more of the pooling 
method firms’ returns are significant. However, nine of the weekly returns are 
significantly different, with three of them occurring in the eleven week period 
prior to the announcement week which corresponds to earlier findings. Table 
27. which summarizes the CRETs for the entire period, and Figure 9, which 
plots them, indicate that the groups behave in a similiar manner, with most of 
the increase occurring in the period leading up to the announcement week. At 
the end of the observation period, the CRETs are virtually unchanged from 
their value in the announcement week, although there is some movement up and 
down during the post-effective week period. None of the ^-statistics for the dif¬ 
ference in CRETs are significant, indicating that, without controlling for sys¬ 
tematic risk, there is no difference in reaction between the two groups. 
The weekly returns and CRETs were also accumulated around the an¬ 
nouncement and effective weeks as in previous analyses. However, only the 
period around the effective date showed any useful insights. Tables 28 and 29 
summarize these weekly returns and CRETs, respectively, and are remarkably 
similiar to the weekly residuals and CARs in Tables 12 and 13. Weeks -2 and 
-1 show significant postive weekly returns for the purchase method group, which 
causes the reaction between the two groups to be significantly different. This 
reaction is, as noted previously, probably indicative of the resolution of uncer¬ 
tainty regarding the outcome of the purchase method merger bid. After the ef¬ 
fective date, very few returns are significant for either group. In addition, the 
number of firms with positive returns is usually below 50%. The significant 
returns for the purchase method firms also causes significant CRETs and a sig¬ 
nificant, difference in CRETs through week 4 5, because, as in "fable 13, the 
pooling method firms are evidencing no reaction around the effective date. I he 
purchase method CRETs reach 4.48% in week 44, but are not stable, as they 
decline to -.37% in week 4-15 and climb back to 3.14% by the last week. 
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Table 30 provides a summary of CRETs over various intervals and shows the 
similarity of response for the two groups iri the pre-announcement period, 
regardless of interval, and the significant difference in response in the period 
surrounding the effective date. 
Using returns avoids dependence on the CAPM. However, the evidence 
from this analysis suggests that there is no difference in response between the 
two methods, except for the period around the effective week. To allow for the 
importance of systematic risk, the CRETs were stepwise regressed on f3 and the 
same variables, except for a, used in the matching procedure. However, no 
variables entered the equation, so no further analysis was conducted using 
returns. 
In summary, the evidence using returns is not nearly as supportive of a 
differential market reaction, yet the difference around the effective date agrees 
with the previous analysis. The similarity in returns for the two groups in the 
pre-announcement date period only reinforces the need to control for differences 
in systematic risk. 
Partitioning of the Samples. The firms selected for inclusion in the two 
acquiring firm groups were chosen without regard for the sign of the difference 
between the market value of the consideration given and the book value of the 
acquired firm (hereafter referred to as the udifferencer). If the difference is 
positive, the purchase method results in lower earnings compared to the pooling 
method. However, if the difference is negative, the opposite happens, because 
the resulting amortizations either reduce expenses or increase revenues. 1 here- 
fore, the extent of the differential reaction between the two methods can be 
clouded if mergers with both types of differences are included in each group. 
To investigate this possibility, the ARs and CARs were re-estimated using the 
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primary model and only mergers that generated a positive difference. This 
resulted in a sample of 09 purchase method and 108 pooling method mergers. 
The ARs for the entire period are summarized in Table 31, which can be com¬ 
pared to Table 8. More of the purchase method residuals in the post-effective 
date period are significant, which also results in more significant differences in 
weekly residuals, because none of the pooling method residuals are significant. 
Si mi liar to results in Table 8, six of the significant weekly residuals for the pur¬ 
chase method firms occur in the eleven week period prior to the announcement. 
However, the reaction in the four weeks prior to the announcement is not quite 
as strong. The CARs are shown in Table 32 (and are compared to those in 
Table 9) and are plotted in Figure 10. The CARs for both groups are little 
changed in the pre-announcement period, but during the interim and post¬ 
effective date period, the purchase method CARs increase, w'hereas before they 
decreased slightly. They reach a maximum of 13.56% (3.19% higher than in 
the previous analysis), and this occurs in the final week of the observation 
period. The percentage of firms with positive CARs is also higher in every 
period after the announcement week. The pooling method’s maximum CAR, 
however, is only minimally higher at 5.13% (versus 4.91%), and the percentage 
of firms with postive CARs is often lower than before. 
The interpretation of these results, when compared to those from the 
primary model, is difficult. It could have been argued that the difference in 
CARs, when all firms w'ere included, might have been due to factors other that 
the choice of accounting method, such as plans to dispose of part of the ac¬ 
quired firm, which would negate use of the pooling method. However, by using 
only mergers with positive differences, the gap has widened, with the purchase 
method firms achieving higher CARs than before. Since the direction of the dif- 
ference has no impact on the purchase method firms’ cash flows, it should have 
no impact on what the firm does after the merger. Iri other words, plans to 
sell off part of the acquired firm should be independent of the direction of the 
difference. Yet, the CARs increase when firms with a negative difference are 
removed, which implies that purchase method mergers with positive differences 
(which decrease future earnings) earn larger CARs than purchase method 
mergers with negative differences (which increase future earnings). 
Table 33 summarizes the CARs for various periods and can be compared 
to 'Fable 11. Overall, the purchase method CARs are higher, but in the inter¬ 
vals prior to the announcement date, they are a bit lower. In the period 
around the effective date, the CARs reach 4.27%, whereas before they were 
3.12%. The pooling method CARs are not significant and relatively unchanged 
from the prior analysis, so that the significant differences in CARs are nearly 
identical to those in Table 14. Due to the similarity in the results, the ARs 
and CARs were not analyzed in detail around the announcement and effective 
dates, as was done in previous analyses. 
Sensitivity of the Results. The measurement of ARs and CARs is depend¬ 
ent on selection of the proper index to represent market movements. In ad¬ 
dition, the matched sample approach is only one way to control for the in¬ 
fluence of anomalous and other confounding variables. To investigate the sen¬ 
sitivity of the results to variations in market index and anomalous variable con¬ 
trol. ARs and CARs were re-estimated as follows. 
Primary Model Using CRSP Equal Weighted Index: 1 able 34 provides a 
summary of CARs over various intervals using the equal weighted index in 
place of the value weighted index, and can be compared to the results in Table 
14. Figure 11 plots these CARs for these entire observation period. Results 
72 
using the two indices are virtually identical, except (hat the equal weighted in¬ 
dex CARs are a little lower for both groups in nearly every interval, with the 
greatest difference in the 26 week period prior to the announcement week 
(purchase method firms: 8.46% versus 10.37%; pooling method firms: 2.15% 
versus 3.53%). However, the same intervals of CARs for the purchase method 
firms are significant, as are the differences in CARs for the two groups. There¬ 
fore, choice of market index does not seem to be important here. 
Alternate Procedure to Control for Anomalous and Other Variables: As 
the success of the matching procedure is difficult to evaluate, the control of 
anomalous and other potentially confounding variables is also difficult to 
evaluate, so that the differences in ARs and CARs may be due to a difference 
in reaction to the two accounting methods or may still be confounded with the 
impact from anomalous and other variables. Rather than matching firms to 
control for their impact, the two samples of firms were pooled and their CARs 
at various intervals were regressed, using stepwise regression, on firm values for 
the same variables used in the matching process. In addition, a 0-1 dummy 
variable (1 for purchase, 0 for pooling) was included as an explanatory variable. 
Significance of the coefficients for the control variables would validate the con¬ 
cern over their potential confounding of the results. Significance of the dummy 
variable would lend further support to the existence of a differential market 
reaction to merger accounting method used. Since the purchase firms have been 
shown to achieve larger CARs, the coefficient should be positive. 
In addition to controlling for extraneous influences, the regression proce¬ 
dure was also used as a first step in determining potential explanatory variables 
for the differential reaction documented thus far. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins 
1983i regressed the CARs on several potential explanatory variables and found 
a positive and statistically significant relationship with the size of the acquired 
firm. Hite and Owers [1983] note the same result with spin-offs. Therefore, a 
similiar variable is used here. Because the main difference between the two ac¬ 
counting methods is due to the amortizations required with the purchase 
method, the potential impact on the income statement could also be correlated 
with the CARs. However, the impact in any given year is difficult to estimate 
prior to the first release of post-merger earnings. Therefore, the proxy used is 
the amount of the difference (positive or negative) between the consideration 
given and the book value of the acquired firm, divided by the previous year's 
earnings. In other words, this measure is simply the difference as a percentage 
of the prior year’s income. This obviously overstates the immediate impact, yet 
it is a reasonable way to judge the potential effect. 
The regressions were run 1) using CARs from all acquiring firms and, 2) 
using only those firms where a positive difference was calculated. Table 35 
summarizes the results of these regressions using all the firms and shows that 
some of the anomalous and potentially confounding variables have an impact, 
which is usually significant, in every interval. In the longest pre-announcement 
period. Alpha and Beta have a strong negative influence, similiar to results 
reported by Elgers and Strock [1985]. Variables for buyer size and earnings 
surprises are also significant and with the expected sign. Two of the potential 
explanatory variables, target size and the earnings impact variable, are sig¬ 
nificant. However, as the period prior to the announcement date shortens, the 
anomalous and potentially confounding variables become less important, and ac¬ 
counting method becomes the sole significant, variable by the fourth week prior 
to the merger announcement. The reaction to target size, which is significant 
in the eleven weeks prior to the announcement, is not in the four week period 
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prior to the announcement, and so, may have been impounded into share price 
by the fourth week. Merger accounting method is also the only significant vari¬ 
able in the interval surrounding the effective date. In the last interval, which 
covers the entire observation period, only the P/E ratio variable is significant. 
The accounting method variable is probably not significant because of the in¬ 
fluence of other variables in the pre-announcement period. As the accounting 
method variable shows up in four of the five regressions, starting with the 
eleventh week prior to the announcement, and this corresponds to results from 
prior analyses, this is further evidence that the results are not due solely to 
anomalous or confounding variables, but are due to a differential response by 
the market to merger accounting method. 
Table 36 provides the same kind of summary for the positive difference 
firms. The anomalous and other potentially confounding variables appear to 
have a bigger impact, as they are significant more often. The target size vari¬ 
able is again positive and significant in the eleven weeks prior to the announce¬ 
ment. However, merger accounting method is significant in only one interval, 
whereas the earnings impact variable shows up in all five and is significant in 
four of them. This may be evidence that the earnings impact variable is proxy- 
ing for the accounting method, since the only interval where the earnings im¬ 
pact, variable is not significant, accounting method is, and the two variables 
have the same sign. If it is not proxying, though, the sign implies that, as the 
impact on earnings increases (which implies earnings decrease more), the GARs 
increase. 
The conclusion from this analysis is that the same anomalous and con¬ 
founding variables documented in prior research exist here as well. Yet, they 
do not fully explain away the differential in CARs, as merger type is still sig- 
riificant, around both event dates. In addition, there is preliminary evidence 
that acquisition size and impact on earnings are also correlated with the CARs, 
and this is investigated further in the next section. 
Investigation of Possible Explanations for the Difference in CARs. Two 
types of analyses were used in an attempt to explain the differential market 
reaction. First, the CARs were regressed on the two potential explanatory vari¬ 
ables noted above, after controlling for merger accounting method, which was 
not done in the preceeding analysis. Second, probit analysis was used to deter¬ 
mine if firms are attempting to income minimize or maximize through judicious 
use of merger accounting method. 
The additional regressions were performed by keeping the two groups of 
firms separate, effectively controlling for merger accounting method. The pur¬ 
pose was to determine if acquisition size or impact on earnings had more of an 
impact on either group. A priori, acquisition size should favor neither. The 
direction of the earnings impact variable is difficult to predict, since 1) the 
pooling method firms would be favored if the market is fooled by the higher 
earnings, 2) neither would be favored if the market is informationally efficient 
and, 3) the purchase method firms could be favored if the market reacts to the 
Uqualityr of earnings, as has been suggested. Table 37 shows the results using 
all firms and the smaller subset of positive difference firms. When using all 
firms, only two variables are significant during any of the intervals. I he earn¬ 
ings impact variable (PD) is significant at the .10 level for the pooling method 
firms during the 26 weeks prior to the announcement week, \shile acquisition 
size (AS) is significant at the same level for the purchase method firms during 
the eleven weeks prior to the announcement. In addition, the for these two 
intervals is not very large. Focusing only on firms with a positive difference. 
however, yields a clearer picture for the purchase method firms. Acquisition 
size is again significant in the eleven weeks prior to the announcement. 
However, the earnings impact variable appears in all intervals and is significant 
at the .01 level during two of them and significant at the .10 level in two 
others. The R2s for the th ree intervals prior to the announcement are also 
much higher, indicating a statistically significant relationship. These results are 
very similiar to those reported in Table 36, which suggests that the earnings 
impact variable was proxying for accounting method in the earlier analysis. 
While it appears that acquisition size and impact on future earnings help 
explain the magnitude of CARs for positive difference purchase method firms, 
the sign for the earnings impact variable is still difficult to explain. A positive 
difference implies a negative impact on earnings, yet the positive sign for the 
coefficient indicates a positive correlation with the CARs. The sign for this 
variable is also positive for the pooling method firms, but it is not significant. 
One possible explanation for this outcome is the quality of earnings issue, in 
that the market “sees through” the potentially heavy impact of the amortiza¬ 
tions on the firm's future earnings stream. 
Probit analysis was also performed on all firms and on the subset of firms 
with a positive difference to determine if management attempts to income min¬ 
imize or maximize, depending on various firm characteristics that have been 
documented to have an influence in certain accounting policy decisions. Two 
proxies for firm size, total assets and total sales, are used and I able 38 sum¬ 
marizes the results. No variable is statistically significant for either grouping of 
firms, nor are any of the \c statistics significant, implying that management is 
not using merger accounting method to maximize or minimize earnings. 
However, the signs are almost always as expected. 
Summary of the Results. The CARs from the primary model, and espe¬ 
cially from the analysis using only firms with a positive difference, are higher 
than any previously reported, when a similiar accumulation period is used. The 
CARs for the pooling method firms are not significant over any measurement 
period and are of the same magnitude as previous studies which did not control 
for merger accounting method. The results hold up under a variety of alter¬ 
native analyses, providing strong evidence that the differential reaction noted is, 
in fact, due to merger accounting method. 
Applying these results to the four hypotheses in Chapter 11 yields the fol¬ 
lowing outcomes: 
H(l), regarding abnormal residuals to merger participants: Rejected, as 
expected. 
11(2), regarding a significant differential impact between the two groups: 
Rejected, which was not expected. 
H(3), regarding inclusion of additional explanatory variables in the two 
parameter model: Rejected, as expected. 




Objective. This study investigates the differential market reaction to 
merger accounting method for a sample of 213 mergers during the period 1971 
to 1982. The sample of acquiring firms is divided into two subsets based on 
whether pooling of interests or purchase method accounting was used. The two 
subsets are also partitioned based on whether t Ik* difference between the market 
value of the consideration given and the book value of the acquired firm is posi¬ 
tive or negative, and further analysis is performed on the positive difference 
firms. The acquired firms for which there is sufficient data are also divided 
into two subsets based on merger accounting method. Abnormal returns for 
two events, the merger announcement date and the merger effective date, are es¬ 
timated for significance, as are the periods prior to, between and after the 
events. The results are tested for sensitivity to index used to represent overall 
market movements, influence of anomalous variables and use of the CAPM. 
Finally, attempts are made to explain the differential market reaction noted in 
the analysis. 
Results and Implications. Table 39 summarizes the results in a manner 
similiar to Asquith j 19831 to facilitate comparison to his results. During the 
pre-announcement period, the purchase met hod firms showed CARs of 10.3* 0 
(significant at the .01 level), while the CARs for the pooling method firms were 
3.26% (not significant). The simple average of the two groups is 6. <8% and is 
much higher than Asquith’s 1.8%. The reaction at the announcement date, in 
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the interim and at the outcome date1' does not appear to differ between the 
two studies. However, the mean CAR of -.80% in the post-effective date period 
is less than the -2.9% reported by Asquith. Additionally, the total abnormal 
ret urn of I 8.00% for the purchase method firms and 43.17% for the pooling 
method firms is much higher than Asquith’s -1.2%. Dodd [1980! uses a similiar 
methodology as used here, but only accumulates the CARs for forty days on ei¬ 
ther side of the announcement date and the stockholder approval date (which is 
probably the day prior to publication in the Wall Street Journal, therefore, one 
day earlier than that used by Asquith), lie shows CARs of 5.99% in the forty 
days (eight weeks) prior to the announcement day, similiar to the simple mean 
reported here, and 2.71% in the forty days after the stockholder approval date, 
larger than those in this study. However, no statistical tests are reported for 
these amounts. 
It is difficult to compare results, as Asquith used a different time period 
and methodology, and Dodd used much shorter observation periods. In ad¬ 
dition, neither was concerned with the tax status or merger accounting method. 
However, the CARs for the purchase method firms in the pre-announcement 
period and for the entire observation period are higher than any previously 
reported for a comparable observation period, and are significant at the .01 
level. Furthermore, Table 39 shows that the CARs for the positive difference 
purchase method firms reach 13.56%, and reference to Table 33 shows that this 
occurs during the last week of the observation period, indicating that the abnor¬ 
mal returns do not dissipate. In fact, the CARs have increased 2.42% during 
the interim and 2.22% in the post-effective week period. I hese results suggest 
12 
This date may or may not differ from the effective date. 
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that the tax status and merger accounting method are significant explanatory 
variables when estimating CARs for acquiring firms. 
'Hie CARs for the acquired firms are large, as expected. Both are larger 
than the 21.6% reported by Asquith, but similiar to the 29.25% reported by 
Dodd. The difference in CARs is significant, yet, given the small sample sizes, 
it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions, other than the fact that 
shareholders of acquired firms do enjoy large abnormal returns, and these are 
primarily due to the merger and not outstanding performance in the period 
prior to the merger announcement. 
Table 40 summarizes the CARs for two periods around the two event 
dates and shows that very little reaction occurs in the five weeks after the an¬ 
nouncement week, indicating that the market is efficient in evaluating the im¬ 
pact, of the potential merger. The positive significant CARs for the purchase 
firms around the effective date are unusual. Asquith reports -.8% in the 15 day 
(three weeks) period prior to the outcome day and -.1% through the 15th day 
after the outcome day. Dodd shows -1.88% in the 20 days (four weeks) prior 
to the shareholder approval date and -1.31% through the 20th day after that 
date. Although the effective date used in this study may differ slightly from 
the dates used by Asquith and Dodd, it is unlikely to explain such a large dif¬ 
ference. If revisions in expectations as to the final outcome of the merger are 
occurring during this time, why would the revision for tax-free purchase method 
firms be positive and so different from other firms* As the statistical sig¬ 
nificance of the difference between the results here and those in Asquith and 
Dodd are unknown, it is difficult to speculate on the reasons. 
Tables 39 and 40 do, however, provide convincing evidence that there is 
no abnormal reaction to the pooling method firms. I hroughout the entire ol>- 
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servation period, t,he CARs are never significantly different from zero, regardless 
of the interval used to accumulate them. The maximum value is the 5.13% 
achieved by the positive difference sample, which is sirniliar to CARs reported 
in other studies that give no regard to merger accounting method. Although 
HKM did not report CARs, interpretation of their Figure 2A, page 42, shows a 
maximum CAR to the pooling method Firms during the 60 months on either 
side of the effective date of about 3.0%. As their time period was pre-ABP 16, 
whereas the time period used here is post-APB 16, it appears that the only 
result of APB 16 was to reduce the number of poolings. Using more refined 
statistical techniques and better event dates around which to measure the reac¬ 
tion seems to have only reinforced HKMs conclusions of no abnormal reaction to 
the pooling method and provided further evidence that the market is infor¬ 
mationally efficient regarding the potential effect of the pooling method on earn¬ 
ings determination. 
Yet, there are some puzzling results to this study. As noted above, the 
purchase method firms generate large CARs in the pre-announcement period and 
around the effective date. The pre-announcement gains may indicate that they 
were doing well in the period prior to the announcement. Alternatively, they 
may be further evidence for the value-maximization theory since the pre- 
announcement, period is rather short compared to many studies. If this is the 
case, it is difficult to speculate why the purchase method acquirors would be 
better value-maximizers than the pooling method firms, or why the pooling 
method firms are not value-maximizers. It could be that since income will be 
lower under the purchase method, there are motivational incentives to bring it 
up.” Or, as noted earlier in the study, the purchase method firms may be 
planning to dispose of part of the acquired firm to raise cash, and the market 
This would, may be impounding this possibility early in the merger process, 
however, prevent use of the pooling method. This issue is unresolved and needs 
to be investigated further. 
Secondly, when the acquiring firms were partitioned into positive and nega¬ 
tive difference subsets, it was noted that the CARs for the purchase method 
firms for the entire observation period were 4.96% higher (13.56% versus 8.60%) 
when only firms with a positive difference were analyzed. A positive difference 
for the purchase method implies positive amortizations so that income will be 
lower compared to income with negative amortizations. Yet, the CARs are 
higher, in spite of the fact that the amortizations and, therefore, the differences, 
are not tax-deductible, nor do they affect cash flows. 
Lastly, the sign of the earnings impact variable from the regression of 
CARs on potential explanatory variables was unexpected. When only positive 
difference firms were analyzed, the sign of the coefficient for purchase method 
firms was positive, implying that as the negative impact of the future amortiza¬ 
tions increased, so did the CARs. Unless motivational differences based on in¬ 
come enter the picture, it is difficult to justify this outcome. 
In summary, it is still not clear why there is a differential reaction be¬ 
tween the two accounting methods and the two types of purchase method 
mergers. If not due to merger accounting method, what is the cause? 
The implications of the results from this study are as follows: 
1. The need for APB 16 is in doubt. Combining the results here with 
those of HKM, there is no evidence of the market being "fooled by pooling of 
interests accounting, either in the free-wheeling period before or the more tightly 
regulated period after APB 16. In fact, using the pooling method appears to be 
detrimental in the market’s eyes since abnormal returns are higher with the pur- 
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chase method. A major justification for using the pooling method is higher in¬ 
come and retained earnings from which to pay higher dividends, yet the market 
seems unconvinced of this possibility. 
2. It appears that abnormal returns for tax-free purchase method mergers 
are higher than for other types since CARs reported here are higher than any 
previously reported over a similiar time span. Since continuity of ownership in 
the combined firm is more prevalent in tax-free mergers due to the use of 
securities rather than cash, it could be that this is an important determinant of 
future success of the merger, possibly by causing the acquiring firm to be more 
careful in operating or restructuring the acquired firm. 
3. Smaller, but still significant, abnormal returns can be made by invest¬ 
ing in a portfolio of nearly completed purchase method mergers where the dif¬ 
ference between the market value of the consideration given exceeds the book 
value of the firm to be acquired. Given the magnitude of abnormal returns, it 
appears that they would exceed reasonable transaction costs. In the weeks just 
prior to the effective date, information on the sign and extent of the difference 
is easily obtainable, so that the only unknown is the actual outcome of the 
merger bid. 
Limitations 
There are many limitations in event-type studies such as this. Primary 
among them is the low Rs in the market model regressions. Although the R2 
here is similiar to other studies, « and ft are not capturing a large part of the 
variability in returns. Inclusion of the anomalous variables noted in the litera¬ 
ture helps, yet there is still much unexplained variation. 
The matching process used here is difficult to evaluate and it is likely that 
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CARs from a different accumulation period would result in a different matching 
of firms with a resulting different, difference in CARs. The period used to es¬ 
timate the market model parameters is arbitrary and resulting changes in CARs 
from using different periods are difficult to interpret, since there is no empirical 
way to identify the proper period. In addition, tests used to evaluate beta 
stability were not conclusive. An additional procedure, which was not per¬ 
formed in this study, would be to estimate CARs using only the pre-event beta 
and compare the results to CARs estimated using only post-event beta. 
Changes in the CAR estimates would then evaluated. The index used to 
represent movements of the market cannot really be substantiated since there 
are many candidates, all incorporating a different definition of the umarket.r 
The period used to observe the CARs is also arbitrary, and the difference in 
CARs between studies is evidence of the arbitraryness. Finally, the inisspecifica- 
tion of the CAPM has been the subject of numerous studies. Although the 
market model was used here and other variables were introduced to measure the 
sensitivity of the results, the interpretation of abnormal returns is more difficult 
if the CAPM is not valid. 
Directions for Future Research 
There are several important extensions that can be made to this study. 
First, the reasons for the differential reaction between the two accounting 
methods needs to be investigated further. A preliminary attempt was made 
here using regression and probit analysis. Examination of subsequent events 
would identify whether or not purchase method acquirors were indeed selling off 
portions of the acquired firm to raise rash or whether pooling method firms 
were paying higher dividends. Subsequent growth rates may differ for the two 
groups and may indicate greater synergy for one of them. Or. merger account¬ 
ing method may be part of an overall income minimizing or maximizing 
strategy and methodology similiar to Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981 could be 
used to identify firm characteristics associated with one of the two strategies. 
Second, tax-free purchase method mergers could be compared to taxable 
purchase method mergers and any differential reaction investigated. Because 
most merger studies use samples that are selected without regard to tax status 
or accounting method used, their results are actually a weighted average of 
three different types of mergers: tax-free purchase method mergers, tax-free 
pooling method mergers, and taxable purchase method mergers. Since these 
studies document abnormal returns to acquiring firms of about 2 - 6%, the 
CARs of 13.56% accruing to the tax-free purchase method firms in this study 
imply that abnormal returns to taxable purchase method mergers would have to 
be lower than tax-free purchase method mergers, in spite of the deductabilitv of 
the amortizations and the resulting increase in cash flows. 
Third, the lower CARs for the purchase method negative difference firms 
suggest that the market is wary of the potential increase in income even though 
there is no direct cash flow impact. Further investigation may find that these 
types of acquisitions are made to hide current or imminent declines in the 
acquiror’s financial position. 
Finally, an alternative examination of the reaction to pooling of interests 
versus purchase method accounting could be conducted using mergers in the 
savings and loan industry during the 1981 - 1982 period when the purchase 
method was used because of the resulting negative amortizations which increased 
income compared to the pooling of interests method. Lack of a differential 
reaction would provide further evidence that the market is not fooled by these 
types of income manipulation techniques. 
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Statistics on Announcement and Effective Dates 
A. Distribution of Announcement Dates 
Year Pools (N=l19) Purchases (N=94) 
l % l % 
19701 0 0 1 1 
1971 22 18 9 10 
1972 17 14 7 7 
1973 6 5 5 5 
1974 2 2 9 10 
1975 8 7 5 5 
1976 13 11 5 5 
1977 17 14 12 13 
1978 7 6 12 13 
1979 9 8 5 5 
1980 7 6 8 9 
1981 6 5 13 14 
1982 5 4 3 3 
Total 119 100% 94 100% 
B. Elapsed Time Between Announcement and Effective Dates 
Calendar Days 
Mean Range Std. Dev 
Pooling Firms 134 0 - 469 90.7 
Purchase Firms 156 0 - 562 107.9 
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Beta^ Statistics and Stability Tests—Acquirors 
A. General Statistics—Market Model Regressions 
Pooling of Interests _Purchases 




B. Stability Tests 
1.15 .73 .227 1.14 
1.22 .65 .274 1.06 
1.23 .62 .259 1.13 





1. Chow Test 5.498 .791 
(.004)2 (.453) 
2. Average Post-Beta = a + 3 (Average Pre-Beta) 
Coefficient .403 .213 
t-statistic (5.422) (2.160) 
R2 .201 .048 
3. Firm Level Analysis (Pre-Beta Vs. Post-Beta) 
4 signif. diff. @5% 2 signif. diff. @ 5% 
1 signif. diff. @1% 1 signif. diff. @ 1% 




p-values in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7 
Periods of Analysis 
A. The Entire Period: 
-26 Weeks 
From ANN Week 





After EFF Week 




ANN Week Week 
(Event) Period 
-26 Weeks 
Prior to ANN Week 
+26 Weeks 
After ANN Week 
C. Around the Effective (EFF) Week: 
Pre-EFF Week EFF Week 






After EFF Week 
*As this period varies from merger to merger, it is treated as a single week in this 
analysis. Observation periods B and C above, however, investigate this period. 
TABLE 0 
summary of average meekly residuals ipercenti 
PRIMARY MODEL - ENTIRE PERIOD 
MEEK 
PRCH 
AVE RES T-STAT 
POOL 







-2b 1.20 2.66** -.30 -.75 2.60** 96 119 
-25 .79 .06 .67 1.03 -.06 96 119 
-26 .57 1.29 -.15 .00 .96 96 119 
-23 -.61 -1.70* .35 .16 -1.66 96 119 
-22 .GO 1.00 -.29 -.63 1.10 96 119 
-21 .20 .51 -.22 - • 30 .63 96 119 
-20 .Ob .50 -.05 -.15 .67 96 119 
-19 -.66 -.60 .01 .29 -.70 96 119 
-10 1.22 2.30** .70 1.57 .76 96 119 
-17 1.13 1.92* .07 .03 1.61 96 119 
-16 -.63 -.66 .67 .56 • • 96 119 
-15 .20 .69 .36 1.20 -.60 96 119 
-16 .13 -.57 .00 .07 -.60 96 119 
-13 -.17 — . bb .29 -.29 -.30 96 119 
-12 .55 .91 . 60 1.11 -.Ob 96 119 
-11 1.90 3.63*** -.21 -.01 3.60*** 96 119 
-10 -.65 -.02 .63 1.26 -1.65 96 119 
-9 1.37 2.56** -.70 -1.56 2.93*** 96 119 
-0 -.27 -.61 .62 .11 -.30 96 119 
-7 -1.07 -2.07** -.23 -.32 -1.33 96 119 
-b .19 .71 .09 .50 .20 96 119 
-5 .19 .69 .56 1.66 -.66 96 119 
-6 1. 09 2.53** .22 1.10 1.11 96 119 
-3 1.10 1.96* .00 . 09 1.30 96 119 
-2 * G1 .92 .20 .56 .33 96 119 
-1 1.00 2.11** .37 .60 1.31 96 119 
ANN MK .63 .20 .26 -.11 .22 96 119 
INTERIM -.07 .66 1.01 -.37 .72 90 112 
EFF MK -.67 -.50 -.00 -.66 -.00 92 116 
1 .59 .69 -.16 .55 .15 96 119 
2 .19 .76 .13 .53 .20 96 119 
3 -.17 -.60 — . 30 -1.53 .72 96 119 
6 .20 .20 .55 1.63 -.00 96 119 
5 -.03 • 66 -.13 -.11 .62 96 119 
6 -.05 -1.52 .17 .27 -1.32 96 119 
7 .00 .30 .17 -.37 .67 96 119 
0 -1.67 -2.32** -.60 -1.00 -1.07 96 119 
9 .36 1.26 .79 1.16 .17 96 119 
10 -.70 -1.10 -.69 -1.59 .26 96 119 
11 -.19 -.30 -.01 .10 -.60 96 119 
12 .76 1.01 -.10 -.71 1.23 96 119 
13 -.39 -.20 -.30 -.97 .50 96 119 
1G -1.03 -.90 .30 .70 -1.19 96 119 
15 -.63 -1.22 -.29 -.65 -.61 96 119 
lb .06 2.17** .11 .63 1.21 96 119 
17 .70 1.66 .29 .33 .07 96 119 
10 -.65 -1.53 -.60 -2.06** .21 96 119 
19 .92 1.00 -.02 -.05 1.31 96 119 
20 .13 -.03 .15 .01 -.56 96 119 
21 .37 .90 -.15 -.61 1.00 96 119 
22 -.76 -.72 -.63 -.91 .07 96 119 
23 • 66 .95 .06 . .61 .66 96 119 
2G -1.31 -1.00* -.21 -.10 -1.20 96 119 
25 .03 1.37 -.05 .19 .90 96 119 
26 1.00 2.69*** .00 .13 1.92* 96 119 
• * SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
•* « SIGNIFICANT AT .OS 
« SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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I AbLE 9 
CARS (PERCENT) - ENTIRE PERIOD 
PRIMARY MODEL 
PRCM PCT I POOL PCT T OIF T • PRCM • POOL 
MEEK CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-2b 1.20 59. b 2.bb** — .36 45.4 -.75 2.48** 94 119 
-25 1.98 54.3 2.47** .09 4b.2 .20 1.71* 94 119 
-25 2.55 57.4 2.7b*** -.06 52.1 . 16 1.95* 94 119 
-23 1.74 53.2 1.50 .29 52.1 .22 .97 94 119 
-22 2.14 54.3 1.83* .00 45.4 . 01 1.36 94 119 
-21 2.43 5b.4 1.68* -.23 50.4 -.15 1.50 94 119 
-20 2.48 59. b 1.93* -.27 49.6 -.19 1.57 94 119 
-19 1.83 52.1 1.5b -.26 46.2 -.08 1.22 94 119 
-18 3.04 55.3 2.27** .44 44.5 .45 1.40 94 119 
-17 4.17 54.3 2.7b*** .50 48.7 .43 1.77* 94 119 
-lb 3.74 53.2 2.44** .97 49.6 .58 1.43 94 119 
-15 4.01 55.3 2.47** 1.33 54.6 .93 1.23 94 119 
-14 4. 14 52.1 2.22** 1. 33 53.6 .91 1.05 94 119 
-13 3.97 50.0 1.9b* 1.63 56.3 . 80 .94 94 119 
-12 4.52 50.0 2.13** 2.11 54. b 1. Ob .69 94 119 
-11 b.50 55.3 3.02*** 1.90 49.6 .82 1.71* 94 119 
-10 5.85 54.3 2.73*** 2.33 54.6 1.11 1.31 94 119 
-9 7.22 54.3 3.25*** 1.56 54.6 . 71 1.96** 94 119 
-8 b. 95 58.5 3.07*** 1.97 52.9 .71 1.62* 94 119 
-7 5.88 52.1 2.53** 1.74 54.6 . b2 1.46 94 119 
-b b. 0 7 58.5 2.b2** 1.63 53.8 . 72 1.45 94 119 
-5 b. 2b 58.5 2.71*** 2.39 52.1 1.01 1.36 94 119 
-4 7.35 58.5 3.18*** 2.61 52.9 1.23 1.5b 94 119 
-3 8.45 59. b 3.51*** 2.69 54.6 1.22 1.81* 94 119 
-2 8.8b 58.5 3.62*** 2.89 54.6 1.31 1.84* 94 119 
-1 9.94 b 1.7 3.97*** 3.2b 54.6 1.3b 2.06** 94 119 
ANN MK 10.37 bO.b 3.93*** 3.53 54. b 1.31 2.07** 94 119 
INTERIM 9.50 b2.2 3.41*** 4.54 51.8 . 98 1.86* 90 112 
EFF MK 9.04 59.8 3.09*** 4.45 55.3 . 91 1.69* 92 114 
1 9.b2 bO. b 3.2b*** 4.29 50.4 . 75 1.94* 94 119 
2 9.81 60.b 3.36*** 4.42 52.9 . 82 1.9b** 94 119 
3 9. bS 59. b 3.26*** 4.04 53.8 .63 2.02** 94 119 
4 9.93 bO.b 3.26*** 4.59 53.8 . 84 1.88* 94 119 
5 9.90 59. b 3.25*** 4.46 54.6 . 82 1.69* 94 119 
b 9.0b bO.b 3.02*** 4.b3 53.8 .83 1.71* 94 119 
7 9.13 bO.b 3.03*** 4.80 54.6 . 74 1.77* 94 119 
8 7.bb 58.5 2.71*** 4.12 53.8 .59 1.63 94 119 
9 8.02 bO.b 2.87*** 4.91 52.9 . 74 1.65* 94 119 
10 7.31 59. b 2.71*** 4.22 53.8 .50 1.69* 94 119 
11 7.12 58.5 2.b4*• 4.21 52.9 .51 1.63 94 119 
12 7.87 59. b 2.75*** 4.03 53.6 .41 1.76* 94 119 
13 7.47 59. b 2.71*** 3. 73 52. 1 .26 1.84* 94 119 
14 b. 44 58.5 2.57** 4.03 52.9 . 40 1.66* 94 119 
15 5.81 57.4 2.39** 3.74 52.9 .34 1.57 94 119 
lb b.b5 b2.8 2.66** 3.65 53.8 . 41 1.71* 94 119 
17 7.3b b3.8 2.87*** 4.14 52.9 .45 1.65* 94 119 
18 b. 7 1 63.8 2.65** 3. 74 52.9 .22 1.83* 94 119 
19 7 . b 3 bO.b 2.73*** 3.72 52.1 . 09 1.98** 94 119 
20 7.75 b3.8 2.72*** 3.67 52.1 .20 1.89* 94 119 
21 8.13 b 1.7 2.81*** 3.72 51.3 .13 2.01** 94 119 
22 7.37 b2.8 2.70*** 3.29 51.3 . 02 2.00** 94 119 
23 8.01 62.6 2.81*** 3.35 50.4 . 06 2.0b** 94 119 
24 b.b9 bO.b 2.56** 3.14 50.4 . 05 1.89* 94 119 
25 7.52 bO.b 2.71*** 3.09 48.7 . 07 1.98** 94 119 
2b 8.b0 bl.7 3.00*** 3.17 47.1 . 06 2.19** 94 119 
• = significant at .10 
•• • SIGNIFICANT AT .09 
••• = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 10 
AVERAGE MEEKLY RESIDUALS (PERCENT) 
PRIMARY MODEL - AROUND ANN OAIE 
PRCrt PC T T POOL PCI T OIF T *PRCH •POOL 
MEEK AYE RES POS STAT AVE RES POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-2b 1.20 59. b 2.bb** - .38 45.4 -.75 2.46** 94 119 
-25 .79 52.1 .84 .47 51.3 1.03 -.06 94 119 
-24 .57 50.0 1.29 -.15 47.1 .00 .96 94 119 
-23 -.ai 35.1 -1.78* .35 51.3 .16 -1.44 94 119 
-22 .40 47.9 1.08 -.29 45. 4 -.43 1.10 94 119 
-21 .2a 45.7 .51 -.22 46.7 -.38 .63 94 119 
-20 .Ob 50.0 .50 -.05 48.7 -.15 .47 94 119 
— IS) -.bb 44.7 -.66 .01 46.7 .29 -. 70 94 119 
-ia 1.22 59. b 2.38** .70 47.9 1.57 .74 94 119 
-17 1.13 55.3 1.92* .07 46.2 .03 1.41 94 119 
-lb -.43 4«>. a - .64 .47 54.6 .56 -.84 94 119 
-15 .2a 47.9 .49 .36 52.1 1.26 -.48 94 119 
-14 .13 47.9 -.57 .00 47.1 .07 -.4a 94 119 
-13 -.17 41.5 - • bb .29 49.6 -.29 -.30 94 119 
-12 .55 54.3 .91 .48 52.9 1.11 -.06 94 119 
-11 l.9a 51.1 3.83*** -.21 47.1 -.81 3.40*** 94 119 
-10 - • b5 44.7 -.82 .43 55.5 1.26 -1.45 94 119 
-9 1.37 52.1 2.54** -.78 42.9 -1.5b 2.93*** 94 119 
-a -.27 41.5 -.41 .42 48.7 .11 -.36 94 119 
-7 -1.07 44. 7 -2.07** -.23 44.5 -.32 -1.33 94 119 
-b .19 50.0 .71 .09 52.9 .50 .20 94 119 
-5 .19 54.3 .69 .56 51.3 1.44 -.44 94 119 
— 4 1.09 58.5 2.53** .22 52.1 l.ia 1.11 94 119 
-3 1.10 5a.5 1.94* . 06 52.9 .09 1.38 94 119 
-2 .41 5b.4 .92 .20 49.b .54 .33 94 119 
-1 l.oa 55.3 2.11** .37 56.8 .40 1.31 94 119 
ANN MK .43 4b.a .20 .26 40.2 -.11 .22 94 119 
1 - . b7 48.9 -1.41 -.14 47.1 -.75 -.56 94 119 
2 .92 54.3 1.84* -.12 46.7 .06 1.34 94 119 
3 -.13 4b.a .67 -.29 42.9 -1.22 1.31 94 119 
4 .05 48.9 .36 .33 44.5 .35 .04 94 119 
5 -.29 48.9 -.25 -.25 46.2 -1.03 .49 94 119 
b -. 14 47.9 -.32 1.1b 63.0 3.07*** -2.28** 94 119 
7 -.13 42.6 -.65 -.25 50.4 -1.42 .46 94 119 
a -.23 45.7 . Ob -.91 3*.5 -2.69*** 1.83* 94 119 
9 -1.05 39.4 -2.55** -.02 47.1 -.11 -1.63* 94 119 
10 .59 59. b 1.63* .05 50.4 .54 1.01 94 119 
11 .40 57.4 .68 -.43 46.2 -1 .34 1.40 94 119 
12 -.13 50.0 -.38 .30 46.7 .85 -.85 94 119 
13 -.22 43 • b -.40 .02 55.5 -.33 -.08 94 119 
14 -1.2a 42. b -1.83* .51 54.6 1.94* -2.65*** 94 119 
15 -.74 38.3 -1.56 -.37 42.9 -1.59 -.11 94 119 
lb 1.01 54.3 2.28** .15 50.4 .31 1.50 94 119 
17 -.51 43.6 -.97 .33 52.1 .85 -1.28 94 119 
ia -.54 44.7 -.92 .23 47.9 .85 -1.25 94 119 
19 .7b 52.1 1.37 .14 52.9 .17 .91 94 119 
20 -.03 52.1 .25 .15 43.7 .11 .12 94 119 
21 1.25 51.1 2.61** .23 51.3 .51 1.61 94 119 
22 .51 44.7 .49 -.02 50.4 .34 .14 94 119 
23 -.bb 40.4 -.50 .09 47.1 -.11 -.30 94 119 
24 -.4b 45.7 -.43 -.39 40.3 -1.41 .bl 94 119 
25 .15 50.0 1.30 .10 48.7 .10 .90 94 119 
2b -.54 43.6 -.88 .19 47.9 .93 -1.28 94 119 
• = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
** = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
=■ SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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lAbLE 11 
CARS (PERCENT) AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
PRIMARY MODEL 
PRCH PCI T POOL PCT T OIF T IPRCH 8P00L 
MEEK CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-26 1.20 59.6 2.66** -.38 45.4 -.75 2.48** 94 119 
-25 1.9a 54.3 2.47** .09 46.2 .20 1.71* 94 119 
-c4 2.55 57.4 2.76*** -.Ob 52.1 . 16 1.95* 94 119 
-23 1.74 53.2 1.50 .29 52.1 .22 .97 94 119 
-22 2.14 54.3 1.63* .00 45.4 . 01 1.36 94 119 
-21 2.43 56.4 1.88* -.23 50.4 -.15 1.50 94 119 
-20 2.46 59.6 1.93* -.27 49.6 -.19 1.57 94 119 
-19 1.83 52.1 1.56 -.26 46.2 -.08 1.22 94 119 
-ia 3.04 55.3 2.27** .44 44.5 .45 1.40 94 119 
-17 4.17 54.3 2.76*** .50 46.7 .43 1.77* 94 119 
-16 3.74 53.2 2.44** .97 49.6 . 58 1.43 94 119 
-15 4.01 55.3 2.47** 1.33 54.6 .93 1.23 94 119 
-14 4. 14 52.1 2.22** 1.33 53.8 .91 1.05 94 119 
-13 3.97 50.0 1.96* 1.63 56.3 . 80 .94 94 119 
-12 4.52 50.0 2.13** 2.11 54.6 1.06 .89 94 119 
-11 6.50 55.3 3.02*** 1.90 49.6 .82 1.71* 94 119 
-10 5.85 54.3 2.73*** 2.33 54.6 1.11 1.31 94 119 
-9 7.22 54.3 3.25*** 1.56 54.6 .71 1.96** 94 119 
-a 6.95 56.5 3.07*** 1.97 52.9 . 71 1.82* 94 119 
-7 5.aa 52.1 2.53** 1.74 54.6 .62 1.48 94 119 
-6 6.07 56.5 2.62** 1.83 53.8 . 72 1.49 94 119 
-5 6. 26 58.5 2.71*** 2.39 52.1 1.01 1.36 94 119 
-4 7.35 58.5 3.18*** 2.61 52.9 1.23 1.56 94 119 
-3 a • 45 59.6 3.51*** 2.69 54.6 1.22 1.81* 94 119 
-2 8.86 56.5 3.62*** 2.69 54.6 1.31 1.84* 94 119 
-1 9.94 61.7 3.97*** 3.26 54.6 1.36 2.0b** 94 119 
ANN HK 10.37 60.6 3.93*** 3.53 54.6 1.31 2.07** 94 119 
1 9.70 57.4 3.59*** 3.39 55.5 1.15 1.92* 94 119 
2 10.62 60.6 3.87*** 3.27 55.5 1.14 2.14** 94 119 
3 10.49 62.8 3.93*** 2.96 57.1 .90 2.34** 94 119 
4 10.53 62.6 3.93*** 3.31 55.5 . 94 2.31** 94 119 
5 10.24 63.6 3.82*** 3.06 53.8 .75 2.36** 94 119 
6 10.10 62.8 3.71*** 4.22 55.5 1.27 1.93* 94 119 
7 9.97 63.6 3.54*** 3.97 55.5 1.01 1.98** 94 119 
a 9.74 64.9 3.50*** 3.06 52.9 .54 2.26** 94 119 
9 8.69 58.5 3.03*** 3.04 52.1 .51 1.92* 94 119 
10 9.28 61.7 3.29*** 3.09 53.8 .60 2.06** 94 119 
11 9.68 60.6 3.36*** 2.66 53.8 .37 2.26** 94 119 
12 9.55 59.6 3.25*** 2.96 51.3 .50 2.10** 94 119 
13 9. 33 59.6 3.15*** 2.9B 52.1 . 44 2.0b** 94 119 
14 6.04 54.3 2.62*** 3.46 53.8 . 74 1.62 94 119 
15 7.30 55.3 2.55** 3.11 51.3 .49 1.56 94 119 
16 6.31 56.4 2.87*** 3.26 52.1 .53 1.79* 94 119 
17 7.60 57.4 2.69*** 3.59 53.8 .65 1.56 94 119 
ia 7.26 56.4 2.52** 3.63 56.3 . 77 1.37 94 119 
19 8. 02 56.5 2.69*** 3.97 54.6 .78 1.49 94 119 
20 7.99 57.4 2.70*** 4.11 54.6 .79 1.49 94 119 
21 9.24 56.5 3.05*»* 4.34 55.5 .66 1.71* 94 119 
22 9.75 56.5 3.09*** 4.33 55.5 .90 1.71* 94 119 
23 9.10 56.5 2.99*** 4.42 54.6 . 87 1.65* 94 119 
24 8.64 57.4 2.90*** 4.03 52.1 . of 1.72* 94 119 
25 6.79 56.5 3.05*** 4. 14 53.a .67 1.83* 94 119 
26 8.25 58.5 2.90*** 4.32 55.5 .79 1.64 94 119 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
** = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
♦** = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 12 
AVERAGE WEEKLY RESIDUALS (PERCENT) 
PRIMARY MOOEL - AROUND EFT DATE 
PRCH PC T T POOL per T OIF T iPRCH iPOOL 
WEEK AWE RES PUS STAT AWE RES POS STAT STAT CCMP COMP 
-3 .27 49.4 .49 • 14 47.3 -.37 .61 89 110 
-2 1.22 60.7 2.28** .24 56.3 .70 1.24 89 112 
-1 1.50 55.6 3.12*** -.45 48.2 -1.41 3.26* ** 90 112 
EFF WK -.47 40.2 -.50 -.08 45.6 -.44 -.08 92 114 
1 .59 52.1 .69 -.16 48.7 .55 .15 94 119 
2 .19 55.3 .74 .13 52.9 .53 .20 94 119 
3 -.17 47.9 -.40 — .38 44.5 -1.53 .72 94 119 
4 .28 45.7 .20 .55 58.0 1.43 -. 80 94 119 
5 -.03 47.9 • 46 -.13 45.4 -.11 .42 94 119 
6 -.85 46. 8 -1.52 .17 54.6 .27 -1.32 94 119 
7 .08 45.7 .30 .17 48.7 -.37 .47 94 119 
8 -1.47 4 3.6 -2.32** -.68 47.9 -1.00 -1. 07 94 119 
9 .3b 42.6 1.24 .79 52.9 1.14 .17 94 119 
10 -.70 44.7 -1.10 -.69 39.5 -1.59 .24 94 119 
11 -.19 4 3.6 -.38 -.01 47.9 .18 -.40 94 119 
12 . 74 52.1 1.01 -.18 44.5 -.71 1.23 94 119 
13 -.39 47.9 -.20 -.30 43.7 -.97 .50 94 119 
14 -1.03 43.9 -.90 .30 48.7 .78 -1.19 94 119 
15 -.63 46.8 -1.22 -.29 47.9 -.45 -.61 94 119 
lb . 84 54.3 2.17** .11 48.7 .63 1.21 94 119 
17 .70 44.7 1.46 .29 49.6 .33 .87 94 119 
18 -.65 41.5 -1.53 -.40 41.2 -2.04** .21 94 119 
19 .92 48.9 1.00 -.02 49.6 -.85 1.31 94 119 
20 .13 53.2 -.03 • 15 52.9 .31 -.56 94 119 
21 .37 46.8 .90 -.15 50.4 -.61 1.08 94 119 
22 -.76 39.4 -.72 -.43 44.5 -.91 • 07 94 119 
23 .64 54.3 .95 .06 93.8 .40 .44 94 119 
24 -1.31 44.7 -1.80* -.20 93.1 -.13 -1.25 94 119 
25 • 6 3 50.0 1.37 -.05 96.9 .15 .93 94 119 
26 1.06 53.2 2.69*** • 08 91.1 .18 1.89* 94 119 
* 
* * 
* * * 
SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
TAdLE 13 
CARS (PERCENT) AROUND EFFECTIVE DATE 
PRIMARY MODEL 
PRCH PCI r POOL PCT T OIF T #PRC H #POOL 
WEEK CAR POS SIAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-3 .27 49.4 .49 .14 47.3 -.37 .61 89 110 
-2 1.50 61.6 1.95* .38 50.0 . 19 1.33 89 112 
-1 3.00 64.4 3.38*** -.08 52.7 -.66 2.95** * 90 112 
EFF WK 2.53 58.7 2.68*** -.16 52.6 -.74 2.49** 92 114 
1 3.12 6 0 • 6 2.73*** -.32 49.6 - . 64 2.47** 94 119 
2 3.30 63.8 2.77*** -.19 49.6 -.31 2.28** 94 119 
3 3.14 59.6 2.42** -.57 47.9 -.85 2.37** 94 119 
4 3.42 63.8 2.32** -.03 52.1 -.24 1. 89* 94 119 
5 3.39 61.7 2.35** -.16 47.9 -.25 1.92* 94 119 
6 2.55 61.7 1.74* • 01 49.6 -.15 1.40 94 119 
7 2.62 55.3 1.76* .19 50.4 -.27 1.49 94 119 
8 1.15 5 6.4 1.02 -.49 47.9 -.55 1.13 94 119 
9 1.51 56.5 1.32 .29 47.1 -.18 1. 11 94 119 
10 .80 56.4 .96 -.40 46.2 -.62 1. 15 94 119 
11 .62 55.3 .85 -.41 47.9 -.55 1.00 94 119 
12 1.36 55.3 1.07 -.58 46.2 -.70 1.27 94 119 
13 .96 57.4 1.01 -.68 46.2 -.91 1. 36 94 119 
14 -.06 61.7 .77 -.58 49.6 -.69 1.03 94 119 
15 -.70 59.6 • 46 -.88 49.6 -.78 .86 94 119 
16 .15 62.8 .94 -.76 48.7 -.62 1. 11 94 119 
17 .65 59.6 1.23 -.47 43.7 -.53 1.27 94 119 
16 .20 56.5 • 66 -.87 44.5 -.94 1.28 94 119 
19 1.12 56.4 1.06 -.89 46.2 -1.11 1.53 94 119 
20 1.25 59.6 1.03 -.74 46.2 -.91 1.38 94 119 
21 1.62 57.4 1.20 -.69 45.4 -1. 01 1.56 94 119 
22 .66 55.3 1.03 -1.32 46.2 -1.17 1.55 94 119 
23 1.50 56.5 1.19 -1.26 43.7 -1. 06 1.59 94 119 
24 . 16 56.4 .62 -1.46 46.2 -1. 06 1.32 94 119 
25 1.01 59.6 1.07 -1.52 44.5 -1.00 1.46 94 119 
2b 2.09 58.5 1.55 -1.43 42.9 -.96 1.79* 94 119 
• = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
♦ - SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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T A8LE 14 
SUMMARY OF CARS C PERCENT I - PRIMARY MOOEL 
OVER VARIOUS INTERVALS 
PRCH PCT T 
interval IN MXS CAR POS STAT 
ANN-2 6 ~ EFF+26 6. 60 61.7 3.00*** 
-26 TO ANN 10.37 60.6 3.93*** 
-11 TO ANN 5.05 59.6 3.51*** 
-4 TO ANN 4. 11 61.7 3.45*** 
-1 TO ANN 1.51 50.0 1.64 
- 1ANN i. oa 55.3 2.11** 
ANN MX .43 4 6.8 .20 
INTERIM -.87 54.4 • 64 
EFF-2 - EFF -1 2.72 64.4 3.80*** 
EFF MX -.47 40.2 -.50 
EFF-2 - EFF MX 2.25 60.9 2.61*** 
EFF-2 - EFF *5 3. 12 63.8 2.32** 
EFF♦i - EFF*26 -.44 54.3 .60 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT . 10 
** = SIGNIFICANT AT . 05 
= significant AT . 01 
POOL PCT r CIF T iPRCH 8POOL 
CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
3.17 47. 1 .08 2.19** 94 119 
3.53 54. 6 1.31 2.07** 94 119 
1.42 46. 2 .79 2.10** 94 119 
1.14 51.3 .94 1.95* 94 119 
• 64 49. 6 .21 1.09 94 119 
.37 58. 8 .40 1.31 94 119 
• 2 6 46. 2 -. 11 .22 94 119 
1.01 50.0 -.37 .72 90 112 
-.22 51. a -.50 3.17*** 90 112 
-.08 45. 6 -.44 -.08 92 114 
-.30 50.9 -.64 2.52** 92 114 
-.30 50.4 -.14 1.62* 94 119 
1.28 45. 4 -.76 .95 94 119 
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TABLE 15 
AVERAGE WEEKLY RESIDUALS (PERCENT) 
ACUUIREO FIRMS - ENTIRE PERIOD 
WEEK 
PRCH 
AVE RES T-STAT 
POOL 
AVE RES T-STAT 




-26 -1.41 -1.44 .37 .57 -1.43 30 
-25 -.61 - • b5 -2.53 -1.89* .86 30 
-24 1. 11 1.54 -.40 . 14 1.00 30 
-23 -2.08 -1.61 -1.40 -1.85* .15 30 
-22 .57 .93 -.07 .35 • 42 30 
-21 .68 .51 -.80 -.75 .89 30 
-20 .73 .74 .57 .63 .08 30 
-15 -.43 - • 9b -2. 11 -2.41** 1.01 30 
-18 .11 .12 .45 .51 -.27 30 
-17 .51 .35 -2.24 -2.69** 2.13** 30 
-lb -1.28 -.19 -1.57 -1.94* 1.23 30 
-15 -.55 -.17 2.50 2.31** -1.75* 30 
-14 -2.07 -1.49 .59 • 64 -1.51 30 
-13 .34 .29 -.16 -.21 .35 30 
-12 2.06 2.12** 1.03 1.60 .39 30 
-11 -1.29 .Ob . 77 .83 -.54 30 
-10 1.07 1.34 -1.34 -.93 1.61 30 
-9 2.12 2.67** .49 -.17 2.02** 30 
-8 -2.46 -3.03*** .01 .09 -2.23** 30 
-7 1.48 1.31 .61 .47 .61 30 
-b -1.59 -1.37 .47 .22 -1.14 30 
-5 .96 .91 1.43 1.81* -.62 30 
-4 .61 .71 1. 11 .93 - .14 30 
-3 2.08 3.02*** 1.20 1. 00 1 .46 30 
-2 4.93 5.67*** .54 .96 3.37*** 30 
-1 3.36 5.91*** 7.66 8.07*** -1 .44 30 
ANN WK 15.88 21.72*** 10.04 11.48*** 7.43*** 30 
INTERIM 6.67 3.97*** 11.21 2.39** 1.15 30 
♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
** = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 












































-26 -1.41 36.7 -1.44 .37 
-25 -2.02 43.3 -1.48 -2.15 
-24 -.91 50.0 -.32 -2.56 
-23 -2.99 43.3 -1.08 -3.96 
-22 -2.42 40.0 -.55 -4.0 3 
-21 -1.74 36.7 -.29 -4.83 
-20 -1.01 43.3 .01 -4.26 
-19 -1.44 40.0 -.33 -6.37 
-ia -1.33 46. 7 -.27 -5.92 
-17 -.82 46.7 -.15 -8.15 
-16 -2.10 46.7 -.20 -9.73 
-15 -2.65 50.0 -.24 -7.23 
-14 -4.72 46.7 -.65 -6.64 
-13 -4.38 43.3 -.55 -6.80 
-12 -2.32 50.0 .02 -5.77 
-11 -3.61 43.3 .03 -5.00 
-10 -2.54 53.3 • 36 -6.34 
-9 -.42 53.3 .98 -5. 85 
-8 -2.88 53.3 • 26 -5.84 
-7 -1.40 53.3 .54 -5.23 
-6 -2.99 53.3 .23 -4.76 
-5 -2.03 50.0 .42 -3.33 
-4 -1.42 46.7 .56 -2.22 
-3 .66 46. 7 1.16 -1.02 
-2 5.60 60.0 2.27** -.48 
-1 8.95 63.3 3.39*** 7.18 
ANN MK 24.83 83.3 7.50*** 17.22 
INTERIM 31.50 73.3 8.49*** 28.44 
PCT T OIF T iPRCH #POOL 
POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
51.6 .57 -1.43 30 31 
35.5 -.94 -.40 30 31 
41.9 -.68 .25 30 31 
41.9 -1.52 .29 30 31 
45.2 -1.20 • 45 30 31 
38.7 -1.40 .77 30 31 
45.2 -1.06 .75 30 31 
35.5 -1.84* 1.05 30 31 
35.5 -1.57 .90 30 31 
35.5 -2.34** 1.53 30 31 
25.8 -2.81*** 1.83* 30 31 
38.7 -2.03* 1.25 30 31 
38.7 -1.77* .78 30 31 
38.7 -1.76* .85 30 31 
41.9 -1.29 .92 30 31 
38.7 -1. 04 .75 30 31 
41.9 -1.23 1.12 30 31 
38.7 -1.24 1.57 30 31 
35.5 -1.18 1.01 30 31 
41.9 -1.05 1.12 30 31 
45.2 -.98 .85 30 31 
48.4 -.57 .70 30 31 
51.6 — . 36 .65 30 31 
54.8 -.15 .93 30 31 
58.1 . 04 1.59 30 31 
61.3 1.63 1.28 30 31 
64.5 3.80*** 2.68*** 30 31 
61.3 4.50*** 2.90*** 30 31 
♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
** = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
*** = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TAdLE 17 
AVERAGE MEEKLY RESIDUALS (PERCENT) - ACQUIRED FIRMS 
AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
PRCH PCT T POOL PUT r OIF T #PRCH •POOL 
MEEK AWE RES POS STAT AVE RES POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-26 -1.41 36.7 -1.44 .37 51.6 .57 -1.43 30 31 
-25 -.61 53.3 -.65 -2.53 35.5 -1.89* . 86 30 31 
-2** 1.11 53.3 1.54 -.40 45.2 .14 1.00 30 31 
-23 -2.08 33.3 -1.61 -1.40 29.0 -1.85* .15 30 31 
-22 .57 60.0 .93 -.07 45.2 .35 .42 30 31 
-21 .68 36.7 .51 -.80 41.9 -.75 .69 30 31 
-20 .73 56.7 .74 .57 54.8 .63 .06 30 31 
-19 -.43 43.3 -.96 -2.11 22.6 -2.41** 1.01 30 31 
-18 .11 50.0 .12 .45 38.7 .51 -.27 30 31 
-17 .51 50.0 .35 -2.24 32.3 -2.69** 2.13** 30 31 
-lb -1.28 43.3 -.19 -1.57 35.5 -1.94* 1.23 30 31 
-15 -.55 53.3 -.17 2.50 71.0 2.31** -1.75* 30 31 
-14 -2.07 40.0 -1.49 .59 56.1 .64 -1.51 30 31 
-13 .34 53.3 .29 -.16 45.2 -.21 .35 30 31 
-12 2.06 60.0 2.12** 1.03 29.0 1.60 .39 30 31 
-11 -1.29 43.3 .06 .77 61.3 .83 -.54 30 31 
-10 1.07 53.3 1.34 -1.34 38.7 -.93 1.61 30 31 
-9 2.12 60.0 2.67** .49 45.2 -.17 2.02** 30 31 
-8 -2.4b 20.0 -3.03*** .01 46.4 .09 -2.23** 30 31 
-7 1.48 46.7 1.31 .61 51.6 .47 .61 30 31 
-fa -1.59 30.0 -1.37 .47 35.5 .22 -1.14 30 31 
-5 .9b 43.3 .91 1.43 56.1 1.81* -.62 30 31 
-4 .61 53.3 .71 1.11 54.8 .93 -.14 30 31 
-3 2.08 70.0 3.02*** 1.20 48.4 1.00 1.46 30 31 
-2 4.93 73.3 5.67*** .54 38.7 .96 3.37*** 30 31 
-1 3.36 60.0 5.91*** 7.66 63.9 8.07*** -1.44 30 31 








74.2 11.48*** 7.43*** 30 31 
1 .54 56.7 1.35 1.86 61.3 2.01* -.45 30 31 
2 -.47 33.3 -.33 .31 46.4 .27 -.43 30 31 
3 -1.15 53.3 -.48 -.50 45.2 - .45 -.03 30 31 
4 -.21 36.7 -.05 -.34 58.1 -.27 .15 30 31 
5 .75 55.2 1.38 -.30 51.6 -.26 1.17 29 31 
fa .01 48.3 .47 1.36 56.1 1.42 -.65 29 31 
7 .38 51.7 1.00 .46 41.9 .34 .46 29 31 
8 -.65 51.7 .47 .04 61.3 .16 .22 29 31 
9 -.72 51.7 -.93 . 21 46.4 .22 -.62 29 31 
10 1.46 62.1 1.95* .20 51.6 -.52 1. 76* 29 31 
11 2.97 71.4 3.55*** .20 61.3 .43 2.27** 28 31 
12 -.61 42.9 -.45 .77 60.0 .88 -.93 28 30 
13 -.21 56.5 .21 .50 44.4 .56 -.23 23 27 
14 -.67 40.0 -.24 -.42 50.0 -.13 -.09 20 26 
15 .46 55.0 .67 -.07 43.5 -.58 .69 20 23 
lb 1.29 57.9 1.53 1.96 76.2 2.11** -.34 19 21 
17 -1.08 42.1 -.16 .72 70.0 .71 -.63 19 20 
18 .67 61.1 1.56 -.23 57.9 -.04 1. 14 18 19 
19 2.99 82.4 3.51*** 2.47 76.5 1.65 1.32 17 17 
20 1.30 fab. 7 1.60 .69 64.3 .26 .91 15 14 
21 -1.50 46.7 -1.19 .12 50.0 .19 -.96 15 14 
22 -.47 36.5 -.68 -.93 45.5 -.70 .06 13 11 
23 -1.91 46.2 -.97 2.71 70.0 1.37 -1.67 13 10 
24 .57 50.0 1.67 2.73 75.0 1.26 . 06 12 6 
25 1.10 41.7 1.03 -3. 72 16.7 -1.24 1.61 12 6 
26 .28 41.7 .23 2.01 60.0 .67 -.44 12 5 
• * SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
*• = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
*•• = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 10 
CARS (PERCENT) - ACQUIRED FIRMS 
AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
PRCH PCT I POOL PCT T OIF T • PRCH •POOL 
MEEK CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-26 -1.41 36.7 -1.44 .37 51.6 .57 -1.43 30 31 
-25 -2.02 43.3 -1.46 -2. 15 35.5 -.94 -.40 30 31 
-24 -.91 50.0 -.32 -2.56 41.9 - . 68 .25 30 31 
-23 -2.99 43.3 -1.08 -3.9b 41.9 -1.52 .29 30 31 
-22 -2.42 40.0 -.55 -4.0 3 45.2 -1.20 .45 30 31 
-21 -1.74 3b.7 -.29 —4.63 38.7 -1.40 .77 30 31 
-20 -1.01 43.3 .01 -4.26 45.2 -1.06 .75 30 31 
-19 -1.44 40.0 -.33 -6.37 35.5 -1.84* 1.05 30 31 
-18 -1.33 46.7 -.27 -5.92 35.5 -1.57 .90 30 31 
-17 -.82 4b.7 -.15 -8.15 35.5 -2.34** 1.53 30 31 
-lb -2. 10 46.7 -.20 -9.73 25.8 -2.81*** 1.63* 30 31 
-15 -2.b5 50.0 -.24 -7.23 38.7 -2.03* 1.25 30 31 
-14 -4.72 46.7 -.65 -6.64 38.7 -1.77* .76 30 31 
-13 -4.38 43.3 -.55 -b .80 36.7 -1.76* .65 30 31 
-12 -2.32 50.0 .02 -5.77 41.9 -1.29 .92 30 31 
-11 -3.bl 43.3 .03 -5. 00 36.7 -1.04 .75 30 31 
-10 -2.54 53.3 .36 -6.34 41.9 -1.23 1.12 30 31 
-9 -.42 53.3 .96 -5.85 38.7 -1.24 1.57 30 31 
-a -2.88 53.3 .26 -5.84 35.5 -1.18 1.01 30 31 
-7 -1.40 53.3 .54 -5.23 41.9 -1. 05 1.12 30 31 
-b -2.99 53.3 .23 -4. 76 45.2 -.98 .85 30 31 
-5 -2.03 50.0 .42 -3.33 48.4 -.57 .70 30 31 
-4 -1.42 46.7 .56 -2.22 51.6 -.36 .65 30 31 
-3 .bb 46.7 1.16 -1.02 54.8 -.15 .93 30 31 
-2 5.60 o 0.0 2.27** -.48 56.1 . 04 1.59 30 31 
-1 6.95 6 3.3 3.39* •* 7.18 61.3 1.63 1.28 30 31 
ANN MK 24.83 63.3 7.50*** 17.22 64.5 3.80*** 2.68** 30 31 
1 25.37 76.7 7.b2*** 19.06 61.3 4.12*** 2.55** 30 31 
2 24.90 80. 0 7.43*** 19.39 58.1 4.10*** 2.42** 30 31 
3 23.74 63.3 7.22*** 18.89 61.3 3.95*** 2.38** 30 31 
4 23.53 73.3 7.09*** 18.54 61.3 3.83*** 2.37** 30 31 
5 24.28 75.9 7.08*** 18.24 58.1 3.73*** 2.50** 29 31 
b 2 4.29 72.4 7.05*** 19.61 56.1 3.92*** 2.35** 29 31 
7 24.67 72.4 7.12*** 20.0 7 61.3 3.92*** 2.39** 29 31 
a 24.03 75.9 7.09*** 20.11 56.1 3.89*** 2.40** 29 31 
9 23.30 75.9 6.64*** 20.32 58.1 3.87*** 2.23** 29 31 
10 24.7b 72.4 7.07*** 20.53 56.1 3.73*** 2.48** 29 31 
11 27. 73 71.5 7.36*** 20.72 58.1 3.75*** 2.75** * 26 31 
12 27.12 67.9 7.19*** 21.49 56.7 3.59*** 2.68** * 28 30 
13 2b. 91 65.2 5.49*** 22.00 63.0 4.06*** 1.28 23 27 
14 26.25 60.0 3.59*** 21.58 6 5 • •* 4.15*** -.04 20 26 
15 2b. 71 60.0 3.65*** 21.51 60.9 3.07*** .57 20 23 
lb 28.00 63.1 3.54*** 23.47 57.1 2.96*** .52 19 21 
17 2b. 93 52.6 3.47*** 24.20 55.0 2.8b*** .49 19 20 
18 27.80 55.6 3.80*** 23.96 57.9 2.92*** .68 18 19 
19 30.79 52.9 3.95*** 2b.43 64.7 3.38*** .41 17 17 
20 32.09 60.0 4.65*** 27.12 64.3 2.81*** 1.35 15 14 
21 30.59 60.0 4.63*** 27.23 64.3 2.81*** 1.19 15 14 
22 30.12 53.8 i.bl*** 26.30 63.6 1.97* .99 13 11 
23 28.20 53.8 3.44*** 29.01 60.0 1.63 1.04 13 10 
24 28.77 58.3 3.96*** 31.74 62.5 1.74* 1.17 12 8 
25 29.67 56.3 4.08*** 26.02 66.7 .98 1.56 12 6 
2b 30.1b 56.3 *».oa*** 30.03 60.0 . 18 2.06** 12 5 
• = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
*» = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
♦♦♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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FABLE 19 
SUMMARY OF CARS (PERCENT) - ACUUIREO FIRMS 
FOR VARIOUS INTERVALS 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T DIF T iPRCH • POOL 
INTERVAL IN WKS CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
A NN-2b -OFF TAPE 31.50 7 J.3 6.49*** 26.44 61.3 4.50*** 2.90*** 30 31 
-26 TO ANN 24.63 63.3 7.50*** 17.22 64. 5 3.60*** 2.68*** 30 31 
-11 TO ANN 27.15 63.3 11.23*** 23.00 77.4 7.15*** 3.00*** 30 31 
-4 TO ANN 26.66 96.7 16.56*** 20.55 90. 3 10.03*** 4.77*** 30 31 
-1 TO ANN 19.23 90.0 19.54*** 17.70 90.3 13.62*** 4.23*** 30 31 
-1 ANN 3.36 60.0 5.91*** 7.66 63. 9 8.07*** -1.44 30 31 
ANN HK 15.66 63.3 21.72*** 10.04 74. 2 11.46*** 7.43*** 30 31 
ANN - OFF TAPE 6.o 7 60.0 3.97*** 11.21 64. 5 2.39** 1.15 30 31 
= SIGNIFICANT A I . 10 
= SIGNIFICANT AT . 05 
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Summary Statistics on Matching Scores 
Pooling Purchase 
Firms Firms 
Range—entire sample .0816 - 14.0705 -17.2895 - 9.0118 
// Firms 119 94 
Range—matched sample .0816 - 6.8881 .1943 - 9.0118 
Mean 1.1818 1.1517 
Median 1.0077 .9658 




AND CARS (PERCENT) 
IN AVERAGE MEEKLY RESIDUALS 
FOR MATCHED SAMPLE - ENTIRE PERIOD 
AVE PCT T 
MEEK RE SID POS STAT 
-26 1.82 50.4 2.30** 
-26 .60 47.2 .27 
-24 1.14 62. 9 1.32 
-23 -.55 41.6 -.57 
-22 .24 51.7 .45 
-21 .72 57.3 .45 
-20 .65 52.8 .77 
-19 -1.4a 44.9 -1.50 
-10 .15 56.2 .21 
-IT .ao 57.3 .60 
-lb -.67 44.9 - .64 
-IS -.24 51.7 — .36 
-19 .11 40.3 -.40 
-13 -.72 52.8 -.52 
-12 -.10 49.4 -.06 
-11 1.05 52.8 2.31** 
-10 -.91 40.4 -.93 
-9 2.49 60.7 2.88*** 
-a -.88 46.1 -.62 
-7 -.94 41.6 -1.46 
-6 .46 48.3 .73 
-5 -.25 52.8 -.25 
-4 .09 52.8 1.03 
-3 1.U1 59.6 1.00 
-2 .81 56.2 1.07 
-1 .77 50.6 1.23 
ANN MK .57 55.1 .63 
INTERIM -2.32 53.8 .35 
tFF MK -2.29 45.1 -1.07 
1 1.29 52.8 .89 
2 -.02 49.4 -.71 
3 1.26 58.4 1.92* 
6 -.99 37.1 -1.72* 
5 .20 50.6 .36 
6 -1.41 42.7 -1.6Q 
7 .01 55.1 .39 
a -.54 48.3 -.45 
9 -.28 48.3 .29 
10 -.*•1 47.2 -.13 
n -.20 47.2 -.55 
12 .53 52.8 .52 
13 -.43 44. 9 -.08 
14 -1.25 47.2 -.09 
IS -.50 47.2 -.46 
lb .19 44.9 .65 
17 -.14 47.2 .12 
ia .36 50.6 .94 
19 .91 56.2 .93 
20 • 2B 50.6 -.22 
21 .13 56.2 .46 
22 . 10 49.4 . 82 
23 .73 5b.2 .54 
24 -1.07 47.2 - 1.21 
2S .42 49.4 .39 
2b 1.07 56.2 1.00* 
PCT T • 
CAR POS STAT COS 
1.02 58.4 2.30** 89 
2.42 56. 2 1.78* 89 
3.56 59.6 1.96* 89 
3.01 52.8 1.29 09 
3.25 53.9 1.36 89 
3.97 56.2 1.35 09 
4.62 53.9 1.44 09 
3.14 52.8 .95 89 
3.20 55.1 .93 09 
4.09 52.8 1.00 09 
3.42 50.6 .83 89 
3.18 48.3 .73 09 
3.29 50.6 .63 89 
2.56 47.2 .40 89 
2.47 49.4 .45 89 
4.31 55.1 .91 89 
3.40 52.8 .71 89 
5.89 52.8 1.14 09 
5.01 50.6 1.01 09 
4.08 48. 3 .76 89 
4.54 51.7 .86 89 
4.29 49.4 .81 89 
5.18 53.9 .93 89 
6.19 57.3 1. C 8 89 
7.00 55.1 1.20 09 
7.77 55.1 1.37 89 
8.34 56.2 1.47 09 
6.02 52. 6 1.40 70 
3.73 52.4 1.25 82 
5.02 50.6 1.34 89 
4.19 53.9 1.35 89 
5.45 52.8 1.44 89 
4.47 51.7 1.24 89 
4.66 53.9 1.20 89 
3.25 52.8 1.08 89 
3.26 49.4 1.07 89 
2.73 46.1 1.05 89 
2.45 48.3 1.12 89 
2.04 50.6 1.06 09 
1.84 50.6 1.02 09 
2.37 51.7 1.02 89 
1.94 48.3 1.03 89 
.69 48.3 .93 89 
.19 47.2 .87 89 
.38 47.2 .94 89 
.25 48.3 .96 89 
.61 50.b .99 89 
1.52 50. 6 1.09 89 
1.80 50.6 1.09 89 
1.93 51.7 1.12 09 
2.03 52. 8 1.20 09 
2.76 56.2 1.25 89 
1.69 49.4 1.09 09 
2.11 50.6 1.11 09 
3.19 50.6 1.21 09 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
= SIGNIFICANT AT .OS 
M * SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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r*dLt 2d 
ULKLHLh CL IN AOEkAuE MEt KL Y RE5I0UALS AnO lAk j (PE RCE NTI 
NATCHEU SAMPLE - AKOUMO ANNOUNCEMEN( GATE 
AOE PCI I PC T T 1 
REEK RESID POS SIAT CAR POS STAT C 09 
-2b 1.82 56.5 2.30** 1.62 56.5 2 • 4 0 * * 69 
-25 .60 57.2 .27 2.52 56.2 1 • 7 6 • 69 
- 25 1.15 62.9 1.32 3.56 59.6 1.96* 69 
-24 -.55 51.6 -.57 3.01 52.6 1.29 69 
-22 .25 51.7 .55 4.25 54.9 1.46 69 
-21 .72 57.4 .55 4.9/ 56.2 1.45 69 
-20 .65 52.6 .77 5.62 54.9 1.55 69 
-15 -1.58 55.9 -1.50 3. 15 52. 6 .95 69 
-18 .15 56.2 .21 4.26 55.1 .93 69 
-12 .60 57.3 .66 5.0 9 52.6 1.00 69 
-lb -.67 55.9 - .65 3.52 50.6 .63 69 
-15 -.25 51.7 -.36 4.16 56.3 .73 89 
-15 .11 56.4 -.50 4.2 9 50.6 .63 69 
-14 -.72 52.6 -.52 2.56 57.2 .56 69 
-12 -.10 59.5 -.06 2.57 59.5 .56 69 
-11 1.65 52.8 2.41** 5.31 55.1 .91 69 
-10 -.91 50.5 -.94 4.50 52.6 .71 69 
-9 2.59 60.7 2.66*** 5.69 52.6 1.15 69 
-8 -.86 56.1 -.62 5.01 50.6 1.01 69 
-7 -.95 51.6 -1.56 5.06 56.4 .76 69 
-6 .56 56.4 .73 5.55 51.7 .66 69 
-5 -.25 52.6 -.25 5.29 59.5 .61 69 
-5 .89 52.6 1.04 5.16 53.9 .93 69 
-4 1.01 59.6 1.00 6.19 57.3 1.06 69 
-2 .61 56.2 1.07 7.00 55.1 1.20 89 
-1 .77 50.6 1.24 7.77 55.1 1.47 69 
ANN KK .57 55.1 .64 6.35 56.2 1.57 69 
1 -.01 56.1 -.07 6.35 57.4 1.5 3 69 
2 1.17 51.7 1.34 9.51 57.3 1.65 69 
4 .55 50.6 1.30 9.95 55.1 1.75* 69 
5 -.52 55.1 .22 9.53 56.2 1.60* 69 
5 -.43 59.5 .15 9.20 56.2 1.65* 69 
b -1.59 54.6 -2.30** 7.71 59.6 1.59 69 
7 .20 59.5 .44 7.91 66.5 1.51 69 
8 .54 54.9 1.46 6.35 56.5 1.66* 69 
9 -l.4a 54.6 -2.05** 6.96 67.3 1.46 69 
10 .65 60.7 1.26 7.60 57.4 1.65 69 
11 .66 57.4 .95 6.29 57.3 1. b5 • 69 
12 “ • 65 57.2 -1.5l 7.55 66.2 1.57 69 
14 -.19 55.9 -.01 7.25 55. 1 1.56 69 
15 -1.97 49.4 -2.13** 5.26 54.9 1.15 69 
15 -.2 5 50.6 -.06 5.05 51.7 1.11 69 
lb .66 51.7 .92 5.70 54.9 1.22 69 
17 -.65 55.9 -.69 5.05 52.6 1.11 69 
18 -.73 51.6 -1.05 5.32 54.9 1.00 69 
19 .45 56.4 .35 5.67 56.1 1.03 69 
20 -.56 57.2 -.22 5.11 56.2 1.00 69 
21 1.00 56.2 1.11 5.11 52. 6 1.13 69 
22 .67 50.6 .12 5.76 54.9 1.12 69 
24 -1.45 36.0 -1.02 5.55 51.7 1.02 69 
25 .35 60.7 1.02 5.79 50.6 1.12 69 
25 -.19 57.2 .69 5.61 50.6 1.16 69 
2b -.75 50.6 -1.05 4.65 51.7 1.0b 69 
• » SIGNIFICANT Af .10 
•• * G1C NI f ICANf AT .05 
••• * S I ONIFICAN I AT .01 
TABLE 24 
DIFFERENCE IN AVERAGE WEEKLY RESIDUALS AND CARS (PERCENT) 
HATCHEO SAMPLE - ARQUNO EFFECTIVE DATE 
AVE PC T T PC T T # 
WEEK RESID POS STAT CAR POS STAT COS 
-2 1.80 59.7 2.02** 1.80 59.7 2.02** 77 
-1 -1.28 46.2 -.93 .51 51.3 .97 78 
EFF WK -2.29 45.1 -1.18 -1.78 56.1 .11 82 
1 1.40 53.9 .86 -.49 52.8 • 54 89 
2 -.82 49.4 -.71 -1.32 58.4 .18 89 
3 1.26 58.4 1.92* -.06 57.3 .86 89 
4 -.99 37.1 -1.72* -1.04 49.4 .25 89 
5 .20 50.6 .36 -.85 50.6 .34 89 
b -1.41 42. 7 -1.60 -2.26 52.8 -.16 89 
7 .01 55.1 .39 -2.25 50.6 -.03 89 
8 -.54 48.3 -.45 -2.78 50.6 -.14 89 
9 -.28 48. 3 .29 -3.06 51. 7 -.06 89 
10 -.41 47.2 -.13 -3.47 53.9 -.08 89 
11 -.20 47.2 -.55 -3.67 47.2 -.20 89 
12 .53 52.8 .52 -3.14 55. 1 -.08 89 
13 -.43 44.9 -.08 -3.57 51.7 -.10 89 
14 -1.25 47.2 -.89 -4.82 53.9 -.29 89 
15 -.50 47.2 - .46 -5.32 53.9 -.38 89 
lb . 19 44.9 .65 -5.03 55. 1 -.22 89 
17 -.14 47.2 .12 -5.26 56.2 -.19 89 
16 ■ 3b 50.6 .94 -4.90 49.4 .01 89 
19 .91 56.2 .93 -3.99 55.1 .20 89 
20 .28 50.6 -.22 -3.71 53.9 • 16 89 
21 .13 56.2 ■ 46 -3.58 53.9 .25 89 
22 .10 49.4 .82 -3.48 52.8 .38 89 
23 .73 56.2 • 54 -2.75 57.3 .47 89 
24 -1.07 47.2 -1.21 -3.82 55.1 .21 89 
25 .42 49.4 .39 -3.40 49.4 .27 89 
2b 1.07 56.2 1.88* -2.33 55. 1 .56 89 
♦ s SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
• ♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
* ♦ ♦ - SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 25 
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES IN CARS CPERCENT) 
MATCHED SAMPLE - OVER VARIOUS INTERVALS 
OIFF PCT # MTCHO 
INTERVAL CAR T-TEST POS FIRMS 
ANN-26 - EFF*26 3.19 1.21 50.6 89 
-26 TO ANN a .34 1.47 56.2 89 
-11 TO ANN 5.88 2.24** 53.9 89 
-4 TO ANN 4.06 2.40** 61.8 89 
-1 TO ANN 1.35 1.46 50.6 89 
-1A NN .77 1.23 50.6 89 
ANN MK .5 7 • 63 55.1 89 
INTERIM -2.32 .35 53.8 78 
EFF-2 - EFF-1 .51 . 97 51.3 78 
EFF WK -2.29 -1.07 45.1 82 
EFF-2 - EFF WK -1. 78 .11 5b. 1 82 
EFF-2 - EFF+5 -.85 • 34 50.6 89 
EFFfrl - EFF*26 -.54 .87 53.2 89 
*♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
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TABLE 26 
AVERA6E MEEKLY RETURNS (PERCENT) 
RETUkNS MOUEL - ENTIRE PERIOD 
MEEK 
PRCM 
AWE RTN T-STAT 
POOL 







-26 1.27 2.29** .13 .28 1.56 94 119 
-26 1.05 1.37 1.25 3.07*** -.23 94 119 
-24 .32 .49 .47 .96 -.19 94 119 
-23 -.61 -.99 .61 1.49 -1.73* 94 119 
-22 .39 .67 .01 . 04 .52 94 119 
-21 .14 .21 .41 .79 -.33 94 119 
-20 -.11 -.18 .19 .34 -.36 94 119 
-19 -.34 - • 46 .21 .45 -.63 94 119 
-16 1.14 1.63 1.00 2.24** .17 94 119 
-IT 1.01 1.61 .13 .26 1.10 94 119 
-16 -.37 -.61 1.16 2.36** -1.98** 94 119 
-15 .25 .44 .57 1.35 -.44 94 119 
-14 .47 .79 .14 .33 • 46 94 119 
-13 -.06 -.11 .90 1.80* -1.26 94 119 
-12 .70 1.09 1.14 2.27** -.54 94 119 
-11 1.63 2.40** -.05 -.12 2.17** 94 119 
-10 -.24 -.42 .65 1.66 -1.28 94 119 
-9 1.20 2.15** -.70 -1.55 2.65*** 94 119 
-8 -.26 -.46 .78 1.87* -1.52 94 119 
-7 -1.19 -2.05** .10 .21 -1.72* 94 119 
-6 .05 .06 .69 1.67* -.90 94 119 
-5 .16 .25 .96 1.85* -.98 94 119 
-4 1.34 1.94* .46 .96 1.00 94 119 
-3 1.16 2.25** .65 1. 17 .70 94 119 
-2 .29 .53 .57 1.26 - .40 94 119 
-1 1.19 1.59 .84 1.63* .40 94 119 
ANN MK .34 .41 .36 .63 -.02 94 119 
INTERIM 1.86 .64 -.25 -.12 .59 90 112 
EFF MK -.65 -.88 -.47 -1.03 -.21 92 114 
1 .60 . 86 -.47 -.91 1.24 94 119 
2 .74 1.12 .11 .24 .76 94 119 
3 -.17 -.32 -.19 -.45 .03 94 119 
4 .49 1.01 .72 1.55 -.35 94 119 
6 -.16 -.26 -.24 -.47 .11 94 119 
6 -1.13 -2.01** .36 .69 -1.94* 94 119 
7 -.18 -.30 .09 .20 - . 36 94 119 
6 -1.84 -2.73*** -.75 -1.55 -1.31 94 119 
9 .05 .06 1.26 2.73*** -1.54 94 119 
10 -.45 -.74 -1.13 -2.55** .92 94 119 
11 -.22 -.42 .06 .17 -.43 94 119 
12 .71 .69 -.13 -.24 .67 94 119 
13 -.15 -.23 -.67 -1.63 .66 94 119 
14 -.85 -1.35 .52 1.26 -1.83* 94 119 
15 -.63 -.90 -.65 -1.29 .01 94 119 
16 1.27 1.97* .41 . 86 1.08 94 119 
1/ .98 1.48 .74 1.47 .29 94 119 
16 -.11 -.18 -.29 -.56 .22 94 119 
19 1.08 1.62 -.02 -.03 1.35 94 119 
20 -.05 -.08 .13 .24 -.21 94 119 
21 .46 .64 -.21 -.45 .93 94 119 
22 -. 84 -1.23 -.33 -.82 - • 64 94 119 
23 .34 .67 .14 .32 .29 94 119 
24 -1.61 -2.67*** -.10 -.21 -2.05** 94 119 
25 1.00 1.80* -.23 -.50 1.71* 94 119 
26 1.16 1.98* .46 1.08 .92 94 119 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
♦» = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
= SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 27 
CRETS (PlKCENT) - RETURNS MODEL 
ENTIRE PERIOO 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T DIF T •PRCH • POOL 
MEEK CRET POS STAT CRET POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-Lb 1.27 52.1 2.29** .13 40.7 . 20 1.56 94 119 
-25 2.33 54.3 2.41** 1.39 54.6 2.EO** .05 94 119 
-24 2.64 55.3 2.10** 1.05 50.0 2.60*** .55 94 119 
-23 2.03 52.1 1.36 2.67 61.3 2.90*** -.36 94 119 
-22 2.42 52.1 1.50 2.60 56.3 2.50** -.14 94 119 
-21 2.55 54.3 1.43 3.09 63.9 2.63*** -.25 94 119 
-20 2.45 55.3 1.24 3.20 57.1 2.37** -.34 94 119 
-19 2.11 40.9 1.04 3.49 54.6 2.39** -.55 94 119 
-10 3.25 57.4 1.51 4.49 59.7 2.07*** -.46 94 119 
-17 4.27 57.4 1.90* 4.62 50.0 2.73*** -.13 94 119 
-16 3.09 50.5 1.62 5.00 60.5 3.32*** - . 64 94 119 
-15 4.14 64.9 1.63 6.37 63.9 3.67*** -.72 94 119 
-15 4.61 60.6 1.06* 6.51 61.3 3.52*** -.61 94 119 
-13 4.55 55.3 1.03* 7.41 63.9 3.69*** -.09 94 119 
-12 5.25 57.4 2.10** 0.55 63.0 4.06*** -1.01 94 119 
-11 7.00 62.0 2.60** 0.50 65.5 3.91*** -.41 94 119 
-10 6. 04 62.0 2.46** 9.14 63.9 4.21*** -.65 94 119 
-9 0.03 61.7 2.77*** 0.45 61.3 3.79*** -.11 94 119 
-6 7.70 62.0 2.50** 9.22 66.4 4.11*** -.39 94 119 
-7 6.59 61.7 2.16** 9.32 65.5 3.93*** -.71 94 119 
-6 6.64 60.6 2.16** 10.01 60.9 4.23*** -.07 94 119 
-5 6.00 50.5 2.25** 10.90 60.1 4.74*** -1.10 94 119 
-4 0.14 60.6 2.56** 11.47 60.1 4.00*** -.04 94 119 
-3 9.32 63.0 3.05*** 12.12 71.4 5.00*** -.72 94 119 
-2 9.60 64.9 3.12*** 12.60 72.3 5.29*** -.79 94 119 
-1 10.79 66.0 3.56*** 13.52 71.4 5.65*** -.71 94 119 
ANN MK 11.13 66 • 0 3.62*** 13.09 72.3 5.76*** -.70 94 119 
INTERIM 13.02 65.6 2.63** 13.64 67.0 4.46*** -.11 90 112 
EFF MK 12.36 67.4 2.41** 13.17 60.4 4.30*** -.13 92 114 
1 12.96 69.1 2.61** 12.70 60.1 4.10*** .05 94 119 
2 13.70 b9.1 2.76*** 12.01 60.9 4.24*** .15 94 119 
3 13.53 60.1 2.b0*** 12.62 6 7.2 4.14*** .15 94 119 
4 14.02 64.9 2.79*** 13.34 60.9 4.29*** .11 94 119 
5 13.06 66.0 2.73*** 13.10 67.2 4.17*** .13 94 119 
6 12.73 64.9 2.44** 13.46 60.1 4.31*** -.12 94 119 
7 12.55 64.9 2.39** 13.55 64.7 4.16*** -.16 94 119 
6 10.71 66.0 1.97* 12.00 66.4 3.03*** -.33 94 119 
9 10.76 66.0 1.96* 14.00 64.7 4.42*** -.52 94 119 
10 10.32 69.1 1.04* 12.94 64.7 3.92*** -.40 94 119 
11 10.09 67.0 1.02* 13.02 65.5 3.72*** -.45 94 119 
12 10.00 69. 1 2.06** 12.09 64.7 3.63*** -.33 94 119 
13 10.65 69.1 2.00** 12.23 63.9 3.40*** -.25 94 119 
14 9. 00 70.2 1.02* 12.75 67.2 3.64*** - .46 94 119 
15 9.17 67.0 l.b7* 12.10 63.9 3.39*** -.45 94 119 
16 10.44 60. 1 1.90* 12.51 63.9 3.54*** -.32 94 119 
17 11.42 71.3 2.07** 13.25 67.2 3.71*** -.20 94 119 
10 11.31 67.0 2.06** 12.96 65.5 3.75*** -.25 94 119 
19 12.39 67.0 2.27** 12.94 62.2 3.74*** -.09 94 119 
20 12.34 67.0 2.24** 13.07 63.0 3.76*** -.11 94 119 
21 12.02 66.0 2.33** 12.07 62.2 3.72*** -.01 94 119 
22 11.90 64. 9 2.10** 12.54 62.2 3.53*** -.00 94 119 
23 12.33 67.0 2.10** 12.60 61.3 3.40*** -.05 94 119 
24 10.52 61.7 1.00* 12.50 60.5 3.44*** -.30 94 119 
25 11.52 66.0 1.99* 12.35 50.0 3.31*** -.12 94 119 
26 12.60 61.7 2.16** 12.03 59.7 3.40*** -.02 94 119 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
♦* = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 





























































I AdLE 28 
AVERAGE MEEKLY RETURNS (PERCENT) - RETURNS MQOEL 
AROUND EFFECTIVE DATE 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T OIF T iPRCH 
VE RTN PUS STAT AVE RTN POS STAT STAT COMP 
.36 47.2 .60 .25 47.3 .51 • 14 89 
1.57 56.2 2.71*** . 02 50.9 .0* 1.96* 89 
1.55 46.9 2.13** -.55 46.2 -1.14 2.40** 90 
-.65 39.1 -.88 -.47 46.5 
o
 • • -.21 92 
.60 47.9 .66 -.47 44.5 -.91 1.24 94 
.74 55.3 1.12 . 11 50.4 .24 .78 94 
-.17 51.1 -.32 -.19 49.6 -.45 .03 94 
.49 46 • 8 1.01 .72 49.6 1.55 -.35 94 
-.16 46.9 -.26 -.24 42.0 -.47 .11 94 
-1.13 42 • 6 -2.01** .36 49.6 .69 -1.94* 94 
-.18 47.9 -.30 .09 47.1 .20 -.36 94 
-1.84 39.4 -2.73*** -.75 42.9 -1.55 -1.31 94 
.05 46.8 .08 1.28 53.8 2.73*** -1.54 94 
-.45 44.7 -.74 -1.13 37. U -2.55** .92 94 
-.22 47.9 -.42 .08 47.9 .17 -.43 94 
.71 45.7 .89 -.13 45.4 -.24 .67 94 
-.15 55.3 -.23 -.67 45.4 -1 .63 .66 94 
-.65 43.6 -1.35 .52 55.5 1.26 -1.83* 94 
-.63 39.4 -.90 -.65 45.4 -1.29 .01 94 
1.27 53.2 1.97* .41 52.9 .88 1.08 94 
.98 46.9 1.46 .74 56.3 1.47 .29 94 
-.11 52.1 -.18 -.29 42.9 - • 56 .22 94 
1.08 51.1 1.62 -.02 46.7 -.03 1.35 94 
-.05 46.9 -.08 . 13 49.6 .24 -.21 94 
.48 45.7 .84 -.21 43.7 - .45 .93 94 
-.64 37.2 -1.23 -.33 47.9 -.82 -.64 94 
.34 53.2 .67 .14 49.6 .32 .29 94 
-1.81 40.4 -2.67*** -.10 47.1 -.21 -2.05** 94 
1.00 52. 1 1.60* -.23 44.5 -.50 1.71* 94 
1.16 55.3 1.96* .48 53.8 1.06 .92 94 
SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 29 
CRETS (PERCENT) - RETURNS MODEL 
AROUND EFFECTIVE DATE 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T □IF T #PRCH #PO OL 
MEEK CRET POS STAT CRET PUS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
-3 • 36 47.2 • 60 .25 47.3 .51 .14 89 110 
-2 1.93 60.7 2.34** .27 50.9 . 36 1.51 69 112 
-1 3.46 61.1 3.28*** -.26 52.7 -.32 2.73*** 90 112 
EFF UK 2.63 56.7 2.18** -.75 45.6 -.77 2.21** 92 114 
1 3.43 56.4 2.39** -1.22 46.2 -1.15 2.61** 94 119 
2 4.17 60.6 2.67*** -1.11 47.1 -.96 2.72*** 94 119 
3 3.99 56.5 2.41** -1.30 49.6 -1. 06 2.57** 94 119 
4 4.48 62.6 2.61** -.58 49.6 -.44 2.34** 94 119 
5 4.33 55.3 2.38** -.82 49.6 - .58 2.23** 94 119 
6 3.19 55.3 1.65 -.46 49.6 -.30 1. 49 94 119 
7 3.02 55.3 1.49 -.37 47.1 -.23 1. 32 94 119 
A 1. 16 47.9 .55 -1. 12 53.6 - .68 .85 94 119 
9 1.23 53.2 .55 . 16 52.9 . 09 .38 94 119 
10 .78 54.3 .34 -.97 50.4 -.55 .60 94 119 
11 .56 53.2 .23 -.90 48.7 -.49 .46 94 119 
12 1.26 54.3 .50 -1.02 49.6 -.54 . 72 94 119 
13 1.11 54.3 .43 -1.69 49.6 -.86 . 66 94 119 
14 .26 51.1 .10 -1.17 49.6 -.59 .43 94 119 
15 -.37 50.0 -.13 -1.82 47.1 -.68 .42 94 119 
16 .90 53.2 .32 -1.40 49.6 - • 66 • 65 94 119 
17 1.66 53.2 • 64 -.66 52.1 -.30 .70 94 119 
18 1.77 53.2 .59 -.96 50.4 -.43 .73 94 119 
19 2.86 54.3 .93 -.97 46.7 -.43 1.00 94 119 
20 2.61 5 6.4 .90 -.84 50.4 -.36 .93 94 119 
21 3.29 55.3 1.04 -1.05 52.1 - .44 1. 09 94 119 
22 2.45 52.1 .75 -1.38 50.4 -.57 . 94 94 119 
23 2.79 50.0 .65 -1.24 46.2 -.50 • 96 94 119 
24 .98 46.9 .29 -1.34 48.7 - . 53 . 55 94 119 
25 1.96 51.1 .58 -1.57 49.6 -.61 .83 94 119 
26 3.14 51.1 .91 -1.09 47.9 -.42 .96 94 119 
♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
*♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
*** = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 30 
SUMMARY OF CRETS (PERCENT! - RETURNS MODEL 
FOR VARIOUS INTERVALS 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T DIF T • PRCH iPOOL 
INTERVAL IN WKS CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
ANN-26 “ EFF *26 12.66 61.7 2.16** 12.63 59.7 3.48*** -.02 94 119 
-26 TO ANN 11.13 66.0 3.62*** 13.89 72. 3 5.76*** -.70 94 119 
-11 TO ANN 5.06 63.6 2.73*** 5.34 63. 9 3.40*** .20 94 119 
-4 TO ANN 4.33 69.1 2.96*** 2.90 61. 3 2.60** .78 94 119 
-1 TO ANN 1.53 51.1 1.37 1.20 52. 1 1.64 .24 94 119 
-1 ANN 1.19 55.3 1.59 .64 56. 0 1.63* • 40 94 119 
ANN HK . 34 4 2.0 .41 . 36 48. 7 .63 -.02 94 119 
INTERIM 1.66 60.3 • 64 -.25 40. 5 -.12 .59 90 112 
EFF-2 - EFF-1 3.12 61.5 3.48*** -.53 43. 5 -.73 3.16* ** 90 112 
EFF HK -.65 41.6 -.86 -.47 39. 1 -1.03 -.21 92 114 
t.FF -2 - EFF HK 2.47 63.6 2.11** -1.00 36. 9 -1.19 2.41** 92 114 
EFF-2 - EFF ♦ 5 3.97 61.1 2.26** -1.07 41. 0 -.60 2.29* * 94 119 
EFF ♦ 1 - EFF *26 .31 50.9 .10 - .34 43. 1 -.14 .16 94 119 
♦ - SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
♦ ♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT . 05 
♦ - SIGNIFICANT AT . 01 
TABLE 31 
AVERAoE RESIDUALS (PERCENT) - ENTIRE PERIOD 
POSITIVE DIFFERENCE FIRMS ONLY 
PKCH pool 
WEEK AWl RES T-STAT AWE RES 
-26 1.33 2.56** -.32 
-25 .50 .35 .38 
-24 .71 1.19 -.30 
-23 -.56 -1.59 .08 
-22 .46 .88 -.18 
-21 -.ia -.4b -.17 
-20 -.24 -.05 -.21 
-19 -.22 .36 -.40 
-is 1.53 2.22** .58 
-1/ .91 1.66 .08 
-16 -.31 -.67 .54 
-15 .50 .59 .22 
-14 .36 -.15 .04 
-13 -.59 -1.07 .18 
-12 .30 .20 .31 
-11 2.40 3.68*** -.22 
-10 -1. 16 -1.75* .61 
-9 1.62 2.60** -.77 
-a -.09 .17 .43 
-7 -1.17 -1.87* -.14 
-6 .55 1.22 .13 
-5 -.61 -.64 .42 
-4 1.03 2.24** .35 
-3 .82 1.12 -.12 
-2 . 04 .18 .15 
-1 1.20 1.73* .52 
ANN MK -.06 -.37 -.02 
INTERIM 2.42 1.27 2.32 
EFF HK -.15 
*0 • 1 -.26 
1 .94 .93 .03 
2 -.18 -.34 .06 
3 -.27 -.67 -. 11 
4 .34 • 2 » .54 
5 -.01 .01 .11 
6 -.67 -1.85* .03 
7 -.21 -.32 . 06 
6 — 1. ^ —1 •(((/* -.41 
9 .84 1.78* .56 
10 -l.oa -1.86* -.71 
11 .30 .35 .17 
12 . 2B .55 .01 
13 -.15 -.07 -.28 
14 -1.57 -l.bb* .29 
15 -.69 -1.09 -.16 
16 1. 12 2.00* -.04 
17 1.31 2.19** .41 
ia -1.26 -2.25** -.16 
19 1.36 1.46 -.27 
20 1.36 1.48 .38 
21 . 18 .80 -.01 
22 -.14 . 04 -.45 
23 .61 .58 -21 
24 -i.6a -1.63 -.60 
25 1.38 1.95* -.13 
2b 1.42 2.51** .14 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
** = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
= SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
DIFF » PRCH • POOL 
T-STAI T-STAT COMP COMP 
-.75 2.h8** 69 108 
.63 - .12 69 106 
-.29 1.11 69 108 
-.65 -.84 69 106 
-.04 .71 69 106 
-.43 -.09 69 108 
-.46 .25 69 108 
-.66 .69 69 106 
1.13 1.03 69 108 
-.02 1.31 69 108 
.59 - .89 69 106 
. 85 -.07 69 106 
.14 -.20 69 106 
-.40 - .59 69 106 
.48 -.14 69 106 
-.75 3.50*** 69 106 
1.55 -2.33** 69 108 
— 1.64 3.05** * 69 106 
.09 .08 69 108 
-.13 -1.38 69 108 
. 36 .71 69 108 
1.04 -1.15 69 108 
1.25 .97 69 108 
-.33 1.06 69 108 
.27 - .03 69 108 
.65 .95 69 108 
-.93 .29 69 108 
-.16 1.09 66 101 
-.81 .24 68 103 
.86 .16 69 106 
. 36 -.51 69 108 
-.73 -.07 69 106 
1.46 -.75 69 108 
.30 -.18 69 106 
-.29 -1.26 69 106 
-.86 .29 69 108 
- . 36 -.93 69 108 
. 94 .80 69 108 
-1.42 -.56 69 108 
.40 .02 69 108 
-.41 .69 69 108 
-.79 .44 69 108 
. 60 -1.61* 69 108 
-.44 -.58 69 106 
.51 1.24 69 106 
.57 1.35 69 108 
-1.63 -.75 69 108 
-1.43 2.03** 69 108 
1.13 • 45 69 108 
-.19 .74 69 106 
-1.01 • 66 69 108 
.56 .10 69 108 
-.92 -.70 69 108 
. 05 1.49 69 108 
.34 1.75* 69 106 
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TAoLE 32 
CARS (PtRCENT) - ENTIRE PERIOD 
POSITIVt. DIFFERENCE PIRNS ONLT 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T OIF T • PRCH • POOL 
MEEK CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP CONP 
-26 1.33 62.3 2.58** -.32 46.3 -.75 2.48** 69 10 8 
-25 1.83 55.1 2.08** . 06 45.4 -.09 1.68* 69 108 
-24 2.54 59.4 2.38** -.24 50.9 -.24 2.01** 69 10 8 
-23 1.98 55.1 1.27 -.16 50.0 -.53 1.32 69 10 8 
-22 2.44 53.6 1.53 -.34 42.6 -.49 1.50 69 108 
-21 2.2b 55.1 1.20 -.51 48.1 -.63 1.33 69 10 8 
-20 2.02 59.4 1.09 -.72 48.1 -.76 1.33 69 10 8 
-19 1.80 53.6 1.15 -1. 12 45.4 -.94 1.49 69 108 
-18 3.32 59.4 1.82* -.54 43.5 -.51 1.74* 69 108 
-17 4.23 55.1 2.25** - . 46 48.1 -.49 2.07** 69 10 8 
-lb 3.92 55.1 1.95* .08 49.1 -.29 1.70* 69 108 
-15 4.42 5o. 5 2.04** .31 53.7 -.04 1.61 69 108 
-14 4.78 53.6 1.91* .34 53.7 . 00 1.49 69 108 
-13 4.19 52.2 1.56 .52 53.7 -.10 1.28 69 108 
-12 4.49 50.7 1.66 .84 51.9 . 03 1. 20 69 10 8 
-11 b. 89 55.1 2.48** .61 47.2 -.16 2.04** 69 10 8 
-10 5.73 53.6 1.98* 1.23 51.9 .22 1.41 69 108 
-9 7.3b 53.6 2.54** .45 51.9 -.18 2.09** 69 108 
-8 7.27 55.1 2.51** .88 50.0 -.15 2.05** 69 10 8 
-7 b.10 49.3 2.03** .74 52.8 -. 18 1.69* 69 108 
-b b . 0 5 6b. 6 2.24** .87 50.9 -.09 1.81* 69 108 
-5 6.04 58.0 2.06** 1.30 49.1 . 13 1.52 69 10 8 
-4 7.07 5b.5 2.48** 1.65 50.0 .39 1.69* 69 108 
-3 7. 89 5b.5 2.bb** 1.53 51.9 . 32 1. 88* 69 10 8 
-2 7.93 t> b. 5 2.64** 1.68 50.9 . 36 1.83* 69 108 
-1 9.13 59.4 2.93*** 2.20 51.9 .48 1.98** 69 108 
ANN MK 9.07 58. 0 2.80*** 2.17 50.9 . 30 2.00** 69 108 
IN T ERIN 11.49 63.6 3.00*** 4.50 50.5 .40 2.08** 66 101 
EPF MK 11.34 b 0.3 2.6b** 4.24 54.4 . 29 1.88* 68 103 
1 12.28 62.3 2.91*** 4.27 49.1 . 19 2.16** 69 108 
2 12.10 59.4 2.85*** 4.35 51.9 .24 2.08** 69 10 8 
3 11.83 59.4 2.71*** 4.24 52.8 . lb 2.02** 69 108 
4 12.17 60.9 2.74*** 4.78 52.8 . 38 1.90* 69 108 
5 12.1b 59.4 2.b9*** 4.89 53.7 .42 1.84* 69 108 
b 11.49 60.9 2.tl** 4.92 52.8 . 37 1.65* 69 10 8 
7 11.28 60.9 2.35** 4.98 53.7 .22 1.70* 69 108 
8 9.9 b 58.0 2.09** 4.57 52.8 . 09 1.58 69 10 8 
9 10.80 60.9 2.33** 5.13 51.9 .23 1.68* 69 108 
10 9.71 b 0.9 2.07** 4.42 52.8 .01 1.62 69 108 
11 10.01 59.4 2.10** 4.59 51.9 . 04 1.61 69 108 
12 10.30 60.9 2.17** 4.60 52.8 - . 02 1.70* 69 108 
13 10. 15 60.9 2.13** 4.32 52.8 -.13 1.74* 69 108 
14 8.58 59.4 1.90* 4.61 52.8 -.02 1.49 69 108 
15 7.89 58.0 1.74* 4.45 52.8 -.07 1.40 69 108 
lb 9.01 62.3 2.00** 4.40 53.7 -.01 1.57 69 108 
17 10.31 63.8 2.30** 4.81 52.8 . 0b 1.7b* 69 108 
18 9.05 65.2 1.99* 4 • b5 52.8 -.12 1.63 69 108 
19 10.42 60.9 2.14** 4.38 51.9 -.32 1.87* 69 108 
20 11.78 65.2 2.31** 4.76 51.9 -.16 1.91* 69 108 
21 11.96 b5.2 2.39** 4.75 50.9 -.19 1.98** 69 108 
22 11.82 65.2 2.38** 4.31 50.9 -.30 2.05** 69 108 
23 12.43 65.2 2.43** 4.52 50.9 -.24 2.05** 69 108 
24 10.76 65.2 2.21** 3.92 50.0 -.35 1.94* 69 108 
25 12.13 66.2 2.43** 3.79 48.1 -.34 2.11** 69 108 
2b 13.6b 66.2 2.70*** 3.93 47.2 -.29 2.29** 69 108 
• = S1GNIFICAN I AT .10 
*• = SIGNIFICANT AT .05 
*** = SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
126 
TABLE 33 
SUMMARY OF OAKS (PERCENT) - POSITIVE DIFFERENCE FIRMS ONLY 
FOR VARIOUS INTERVALS 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T OIF T iPRCH • POOL 
INTERVAL IN HKS CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
ANN-26 - EFF♦26 13.5b 65.2 2.70*** 3.93 47. 2 -.29 2.2 9** 69 106 
-2b TO ANN 9.07 56.0 2.80*** 2.17 50. 9 .30 2.00** 69 106 
-11 TO ANN 4.56 56.0 2.46** 1.34 45. 4 .42 1.66* 69 106 
-4 TO ANN 3.03 56.0 2.19** .68 49. 1 .41 1.46 69 108 
-1 TO ANN 1. 14 47.8 . 9b .50 49. 1 -.20 .87 69 108 
-1 ANN 1.20 52.2 1.73* .52 59. 3 .65 .95 69 106 
ANN MK — .06 43.5 -.37 -.02 45. 4 -.93 .29 69 106 
INTERIM 2.42 57.b 1.27 2.32 51. 5 -.16 1.09 66 101 
LFF-2 - EFF-1 3.60 71.2 4.23*** -.12 51.5 -.33 3.50*** 66 101 
EFF HK -.15 41.2 -.35 -.26 43. 7 -.81 • 24 68 103 
LFF-2 - EFF WK 3.4b bb.2 3.24*** -.39 49. 5 -.71 2.96*** 68 103 
LFF-2 - EFF*5 4.27 65.2 2.02** .27 53. 7 .32 1.36 69 106 
EFF - EFF *26 2.22 56.5 .62 *•3 0 47.2 -.52 .61 69 106 
= SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
= SIGNIFICANT AT . 05 
= SIGNIFICANT AT .01 
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TABLE 34 
SUMMARY OF CARS (PERCENT) - EQUAL WEIGHTED INDEX HOOEL 
FOR VARIOUS PERIODS 
PRCH PCT T POOL PCT T OIF T # PRCH #POOL 
INTERVAL IN MKS CAR POS STAT CAR POS STAT STAT COMP COMP 
ANN-26 - EF F♦26 6.35 66.0 2.67*** 2.34 45.4 .08 1.94* 94 119 
-26 TO ANN 6.4b 59.6 3.19*** 2.15 56. 3 1.11 1.65* 94 119 
-11 TO ANN 5.40 62.6 3.22*** .73 52. 1 .58 2.02* * 94 119 
-4 TO ANN 4.00 6U.6 3.20*** • 36 50. 4 .36 2.15* * 94 119 
-1 TO ANN 1.56 50.0 1.50 .52 47. 9 .13 1.03 94 119 
-1 ANN 1.14 53.2 2.04** • 30 52.1 .26 1.34 94 119 
ANN HK .41 46.6 .06 • 22 47. 9 -.10 .12 94 119 
INTERIM .47 53.3 .88 1.81 50. 0 -.22 .60 90 112 
EFF-2 - EFF-1 3.00 70.0 4.14*** -.14 51.8 -.46 3.39* ** 90 112 
EFF WK -.55 44.6 — .64 -.22 44. 7 -.70 -.01 92 114 
EFF-2 - EFF HK 2.45 65.2 3.01*** — .36 53. 5 -.77 2.75* ** 92 114 
EFF-2 - EFF + 5 3.36 61.7 2.19** -.16 44. 5 -.30 1.84* 94 119 
EF F♦1 - EFF♦26 -.03 50.0 .60 -1.41 39. 5 -.60 .85 94 119 
* = SIGNIFICANT AT .10 
♦ ♦ = SIGNIFICANT AT . 05 
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FIGURE 11 
EQL WTD BETA MODEL - ENTIRE PERIOD 
o 
APPENDIX C 
Pooling of In!(‘rests Sample 
Acquiror 
1. ARA Services 
2. Adams Russell Inc. 
3. Alpha Industries Inc. 
4. American Business Products Inc. 
5. American District Telegraph Co. 
6. American District Telegraph Co. 
7. American Medical Inti. Inc. 
8. Associated Dry Goods Corp. 
9. Automatic Data Processing Inc. 
10. Baker Inti. Corp. 
11. Bank of New York Inc. 
12. Bay State Gas Co. 
13. Bucyrus Erie Go. 
14. California Financial Corp. 
15. Cheseborough Ponds Inc. 
16. Coleman Inc. 
17. Colgate Palmolive Co. 
18. Colt Inds Inc. 
19. Combustion Equip. Assoc. Inc. 
20. Compo lnds. Inc. 
21. Cooper Inds. Inc. 
22. Corroon & Black Corp. 
23. Credithrift Finl. Inc. 
24. Cyprus Mines Corp. 
25. Dexter Corp. 
26. Diamond Shamrock Corp. 
27. Dravo Corp. 
28. Dun & Bradstreet Corp. 
29. Jack Eckerd Corp. 
30. Ennis Business Forms Inc. 
31. Federal Co. 
32. Federal Mogul Corp. 
33. Federated Dept. Stores Inc. 
34. Fidelity Union Bancorp. 
35. First Mortgage Investors 
36. Fischbach Corp. 




















Hart &' Carter 










American Business Equipment 
National Byproducts 
Robert G. Evans 
Rich’s Department Stores 
Colonial First Natl. Bank 
Median Mortgage 
Nat kin & Moore 
Village Packing Co. 
13* Included in the analysis of acquired firms. 
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38. Fruehauf Corp. 
39. C C A Corp. 
40. Garcia Corp. 
41. Gardner Denver Co. 
42. General Electric Co. 
43. Genuine Parts Co. 
44. Genuine Parts Co. 
45. Giddings & Lewis Inc. 
46. Gleason Works 
47. Harris Corp. 
48. Heubline Inc. 
49. High Voltage Engr. Corp. 
50. Houston Nat. Gas Corp. 
51. Houston Nat. Gas Corp. 
52. 1 N A Corp. 
53. Interco Inc. 
54. I tel Corp. 
55. Lenox Inc. 
56. Lone Star lnds. Inc.. 
57. Loral Corp. 
58. Lucky Stores Inc. 
59. M A Com Inc. 
60. Magic Chef Inc. 
61. Mapco Inc. 
62. Mapco Inc. 
63. Maul Technology Corp. 
64. May Dept. Stores 
65. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
66. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. 
67. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. 
68. Motorola Inc. 
69. Motorola Inc. 
70. NCR Corp. 
71. N L Industries Inc. 
72. Nashua Corp. 
73. Nicor Inc. 
74. Norris Industries Inc. 
75. Norton Co. 
76. Norton Simon Inc. 
77. Ogden Corp. 
78. Overhead Door Corp. 
79. Parker Hannifin Corp. 
80. Penn Traffic Co. 
81. Perkin Elmer Corp. 
82. Perkin Elmer Corp. 
83. Pillsbury Co. 
84. Pillsbury Co. 






General Auto Parts 
Motion Industries 
Pressed Steel Tank 
Alliance Tool & Die 
Farinon 













Webster City Coal 
Earth Resources' 
Buehler Corp.1 



















Steak & Ale 
American Beauty Macaroni 
Pizza Corp. of America' 
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80. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. 
87. R T f] Corp. 
88. Raytheon Co. 
89. Raytheon (Jo. 
90. Reliance Electric Co. 
91. Reliance Electric Co. 
92. Republic Airlines Inc. 
93. 1) S Revco Inc. 
94. Richton International Corp. 
95. Earl Scheib Inc. 
96. Scientific Atlanta Inc. 
97. Signal Cos. Inc. 
98. Simmonds Precision Prods. Inc. 
99. Smithkline Beckman Corp. 
100. Smithkline Beckman Corp. 
101. .1 M Smucker Co. 
102. Spector Industries Inc. 
103. Sun Electric Corp. 
104. Sunbeam Corp. 
105. Supermarkets General Corp. 
106. Tech Ops Inc. 
107. Tektronix Inc. 
108. Tidewater Inc. 
109. Trans World Financial Co. 
110. Trico Industries Inc. 
111. U R S Corp 
112. United Financial Corp. 
113. United Foods Inc. 
114. United States Home Corp. 
115. United Telecommunications Inc. 
116. Unocal Corp. 
117. USLife Corp. 
118. VCA Corp. 




Beech Aircraft, Co.' 
Reliable Electric Co. 








Allergan Pharaceut icals' 
Beckman Instruments'1 








Mountain Savings and Loan 
B T W Inc. 
Hewitt &: Roger, 
Forrest & Cotton 





Old Line Life Insurance 
Sterling Seal 
E M W Ventures 
APPENDIX C (continued) 
Purchase Sample 
I 19 
Acquiror Acquired Firm11 
1. Acme Cleveland Corp. 
2. Arntel Inc. 
3. Arvin Industries Inc. 
4. Best Products Inc. 
5. H & R Block Inc. 
0. Brunswick Corp. 
7. Clarkson Industries Inc. 
8. Conagra Inc. 
9. Continental Croup Inc. 
10. Crompton & Knowles Corp. 
11. Crouse Hinds Co. 
12. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 
13. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. 
14. Diamond International Corp. 
15. Diamond International Corp. 
16. Dillard Department Stores Inc. 
17. Dillon Cos Inc. 
18. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc. 
19. Dow Chemical Co. 
20. Dresser Industries Inc. 
21. E I DuPont Nemours & Co. 
22. Duplex Products Inc. 
23. Echlin Inc. 
24. Jack Eckerd Corp. 
25. F D 1 Inc. 
26. Federal Paper Board Inc. 
27. First mark Corp. 
28. Fuqua Industries Inc. 
29. P H Glatfelter Co. 
30. Colden West Financial Corp. 
31. B F Goodrich Co. 
32. Gould Inc. 
33. Great American Industries Inc. 
34. Great American Industries Inc. 
35. Gulf United Corp. 
36. Gulf United Corp. 
37. Gulf United Corp. 
38. Harvey Group Inc. 
39. II J Heinz Co. 
La Salle Machine Tool 










Central American Life Insur. 
Reynolds Securities1 
Brooks Scanlon 
L M F Corp. 
Leonards Department Stores 
Frys Food 
AC L I 
Units of Richardson-Merrill 
Marion Power Shovel 
Conoco1 
Lewis Business Products' 
Units of Borg Warner 






Trans World Financial* 
Continental Conveyor 
I T E Imperial' 
Richford Industries 
Chenango 






- Included in the analysis of acquired firms. 
40. Horn & Hardart Co. 
41. Household Inti. Corp. 
42. Harvey Hubbell Inc. 
42. Huffy Corp. 
44. Indian Head Inc. 
45. Insilco Corp. 
46. Iroquois Brands Ltd. 
47. Jewel Cos. Inc. 
48. Johnson Controls Inc. 
49. Kaneb Services Inc. 
50. Kaufman & Broad Inc. 
51. Kavanau Real Estate Trust 
52. Kysor Industrial Corp. 
53. LTV Corp. 
54. Manhattan National Corp. 
55. Manor Care Inc. 
56. Mark Controls Corp. 
57. Martin Processing Inc. 
58. C H Masland &, Sons 
59. Matrix Corp. 
60. McCrory Corp. 
61. Mercury Savings & Loan Assn. 
62. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. 
63. L E Myers Group Co. 
64. Nortek Inc. 
65. Orion Pictures Corp. 
66. Patagonia Corp. 
67. Peoples Drug Stores Inc. 
68. Pertec Computer Corp. 
69. Pitney Bowes Inc. 
70. Reliance Group Inc. 
71. Rosario Resources Corp. 
72. Schering Plough Corp. 
73. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
74. Sears Roebuck <V Co. 
75. Shearson Loeb Rhoades Inc. 
76. Shearson Loeb Rhoades Inc. 
77. Hayden Stone Inc. 
78. Sheller Globe Corp. 
79. South Carolina Elec & Gas Co. 
80. Sparton Food Systems Inc. 
81. Storage Technology Corp. 
82. Sun Chemical Corp. 
83. Sunshine Mining Co. 
84. Tracor Inc. 
85. Trafalgar Industries Inc. 
86. Trans World Corp. 
87. E N R Industries Inc. 
Bojangles 













Northern National Life Ins. 
Quality Inns' 
Powers Regulator 
H C A 
C A Dawson 
V A S Corp. 
J J Newberry' 




American Inti. Pictures' 
Western American Mortgage 






Louisville & Nashville Railrd 




V L N* 
Carolina Energies' 
Quincy Family Steak Houses 
Documation ' 
Standard Kollsinan* 
Silver Dollar Mines 




88. U N R Industries Inc. 
89. United Technologies 
90. U S Air Group Inc. 
91. Unit rode Corp. 
92. Y iacom International Inc. 
93. Wards Inc. 










Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
1000 Metal Mining 1 1 2 2 
1040 Gold and Silver Ores 1 
1211 Bituminous Coal and 
Lignite Mining 2 1 
1311 Crude Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 1 
1381 Drilling Oil and Gas Wells 1 





2000 Food and Kindred Products 2 1 
2010 Meat Products 2 1 
2030 Canned-Preserved Fruits 
and Vegetables 2 1 
2041 Flour and Other Grain 
Mill Products 1 1 
2085 Distilled Rectif. Blend 
Beverages 1 
2086 Bottled and Canned 
Soft Drinks 1 
2200 Textile Mill Products 1 1 
2270 Floor Covering Mills 2 
2300 Apparel and Other 
Finished Products 1 1 
2600 Paper and Allied Products 
*Those firms for which data was available. 
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Industry Composition (Continued) 
Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
2761 Manifold Business Forms 2 1 1 
2800 Chemicals and Allied 
Products 1 
2830 Drugs 1 1 
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 2 1 
2841 Soap and Other Detergents 1 
2844 Perfume, Cosmetics and 
Toiletry Preparations 2 1 
2860 Industrial Organic Chemicals 1 
2890 Miscellaneous Chemical 
Products 1 1 
2911 Petroleum Refining 5 1 1 1 
3000 Rubber and Miscellaneous 
Plastic Products 1 
3069 Fabricated Rubber Products 2 
3079 Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products 1 1 
3241 Cement Hydraulic 1 
3290 Abrasive Asbestos and 
Miscellaneous Minerals 1 
3310 Blast Furnaces and 
Steel Works 2 
1 
3350 Rolling and Draw. Non- 
ferrous Metals 1 1 
3410 Metal Cans and Shipping 
Containers 1 
3430 Heating Equipment and 
Plumbing Fixtures 1 
3442 Metal Door Frames, Molding 
and Trim 1 
*Those firms for which data was available 
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Industry Composition (Continued) 
Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
3444 Sheet Metal Work 1 
3494 Valve and Pipe Fitting 
Except Brass 1 
3499 Fabricated Metal Products 1 
3510 Engines and Turbines 1 
3531 Construction Machinery and 
Equipment 1 
3533 Oil Field Machinery and 
Equipment 3 1 2 
3540 Metal Working Machinery 
and Equipment 2 1 
3550 Special Industry Machinery 2 1 
3560 General Industrial 
Machinery and 
Equipment 3 2 
3570 Office Computing and 
Accounting Machines 2 1 
3600 Electrical Machinery Equip¬ 
ment and Supplies 1 1 
3610 Electric Transmission and 
Distribution Equipment 4 1 1 2 
3630 Household Appliances 2 
3640 Electric Lighting and 
Wiring Equipment 1 1 
3651 Radio and TV Receiving Sets 1 1 
3662 Radio and TV Transmitting 
Equipment 7 1 
3674 Semiconductors and Relay 
Devices 2 1 
3679 Electronic Components 1 
*Those firms for which data was available 
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Industry Composition (Continued) 
Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
3680 Electronic Computing 
Equipment 1 
3681 Computers—Mini and Micro 1 
3682 Computers—Mainframe 2 1 1 
3684 Computer Disk and Tape 
Drives 1 
3688 Computer Peripherals 1 
3699 Electrical Machinery 
and Equipment 2 
3714 Motor Vehicle Parts and 
Accessories 3 5 1 
3720 Aircraft and Parts 1 1 
3721 Aircraft 1 
3728 Aircraft Parts and 
Auxilliary Equipment 1 
3750 Motorcycles, Bicycles 
and Parts 1 
3811 Engineering Labs and 
Research Equipment 1 
3820- 
3829 Measuring and Controlling 
Instruments 5 2 
3841 Surgical and Medical 
Instruments-Appliances 1 
3861 Photographic Equipment 
and Supplies 1 
3911 Jewelry and Precious Metals 1 
3940 Toys and Amusement 
Sporting Goods 2 1 
3990 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Industries 1 
*Those firms for which data was available. 
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Industry Composition (Continued) 
Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
Transportation 
4011 Railroads 1 
4210 Trucking, Local and 
Long Distance 1 1 
4400 Water Transportation 1 
4511 Air Transportation Certified 1 1 1 
4811 Telephone Communications 1 1 
4830 Radio and TV Broadcasters 1 
4891 Cable Televison Operators 1 
4923- 
4924 Natural Gas Transmission 4 1 
4831 Electric and Other 
Service Combined 1 
4850 Sanitary Services 1 
Wholesale and Retail 




5080 Wholesale—Machinery and 
Equipment 2 
5093 Wholesale—Scrap and 
Waste Material 1 




5311 Retail—Department Stores 3 4 
*Those firms for which data was available. 
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Industry Composition (Continued) 
Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
5331 Retail—Variety Stores 1 
5411 Retail—Grocery Stores 3 3 
5722 Retail—Household Appliance 
Stores 1 
5730 Retail—Radio, TV and Music 
Stores 1 
5812 Retail—Eating Places 2 1 2 1 
5912 Retail—Drug and 
Propietary Stores 2 2 2 1 
5761 Retail—Mail Order Houses 1 1 
Financial and Brokerage 
6022 State Banks—Federal 
Reserve System 2 
6120 Savings and Loan 
Associations 3 3 1 
6140 Personal Credit Institutions 1 
6199 Finance-Services 1 
6200 Security and Commodities 
Brokers 5 1 1 
Insurance 
6312 Life Insurance 1 4 1 
6332 Property and Casualty 
Insurance 1 
6410 Insurance Agents, Brokers 
and Service 1 
Miscellaneous 
6552 Subdivision Development 
Except Cemeteries 1 1 
6799 Investors 1 1 
*Those firms for which data was available. 
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Industry Composition (Concluded) 
Number of Firms 
SIC Acquirors Acquired Firms* 
Code Industry Group Pools Purchases Pools Purchases 
7011 Hotels-Motels 1 
7200 Services-Personal 1 
7321 Credit Reporting Agencies 1 
7349 Services—Cleaning and 
Maintenance 1 1 
7374 Data Processing Services 2 
7393 Services—Protective 
and Detective 1 
7394 Services—Equipment, 
Rental and Leasing 1 
7397 Commercial Testing Labs 1 
7810 Services—Motion Picture 
Production 1 1 
8050 Services—Nursing and 
Personal Care 1 
8060 Services—Hospitals 1 1 
8911 Services—Engineering 
and Architectural 2 
TOTAL 119 94 31 30 
Number of Industries 
Represented 68 66 27 _27 
Common Industries 31 (46%) 7 (26%) 




1. Amtel Inc. 
2. Arvin Industries 
3. Best Products Inc. 
4. H & R Block Inc. 
5. Brunswick Corp. 
6. Clarkson Industries Inc. 
7. Conagra Inc. 
8. Continental Croup Inc. 
9. Crompton &. Knowles Corp. 
10. Crouse Hinds Co. 
11. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 
12. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. 
13. Diamond International Corp. 
14. Diamond International Corp. 
15. Dillard Department Stores Inc. 
16. Dillon Cos Inc. 
17. Donaldson, Lufkin &. Jenrette Inc. 
18. Dow Chemical Co. 
19. Dresser Industries Inc. 
20. E I DuPont Nemours & Co. 
21. Duplex Products Inc. 
22. Echlin Inc. 
23. Jack Eckerd Corp. 
24. F D I Inc. 
25. Federal Paper Board Inc. 
26. Firstmark Corp. 
27. Fuqua Industries Inc. 
28. P H Glatfelter Co. 
29. Golden West Financial Corp. 
30. B F Goodrich Co. 
31. Gould Inc. 
32. Great American Industries Inc. 
33. Great American Industries Inc. 
34. Gulf United Corp. 
35. Gulf United Corp. 
36. Gulf United Corp. 
37. Harvey Group Inc. 
38. H J Heinz 
39. Horn & Hardart Co. 
40. Household Inti. Corp. 
41. Harvey Hubbell Inc. 
Pooling firm 
Gardner Denver 
Houston Nat. Gas Corp. 
USLife Corp. 
M A Com Inc. 






Bucyrus Erie Co. 
Dexter Corp. 
Diamond Shamrock Corp. 
Penn Traffic Co. 
Norton Simon Inc. 
United Telecommunications Inc. 
Garcia Corp. 
Waste Management Inc. 
Federated Department Stores 
Pillsbury Co. 
Cheseborough Ponds Inc. 
Supermarkets General Corp. 
Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. 
R T E Corp. 
Magic Chef Inc. 
Maul Technology Corp. 
Compo Industries Inc. 
Friona Industries Inc. 
G C A Corp. 
Tidewater Inc. 
Adams Russell Inc. 
Federal Co. 
Nicor Inc. 
1 N A Corp. 
Pillsbury (Jo. 
Pizza Hut Inc. 
Lenox Inc. 
Lone Star Industries Inc. 
Parker Hannifin 
Republic Airlines Inc. 
N L Industries Inc. 
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42. Huffy Corp. 
43. Indian Head Inc. 
44. Insilco Corp. 
45. Iroquois Brands Ltd. 
46. Jewel Cos. Inc. 
47. Johnson Controls Inc. 
48. Kaneb Services Inc. 
49. Kaufman & Broad Inc. 
50. L T V Corp. 
51. Manhattan National Corp. 
52. Mark Controls Corp. 
53. Martin Processing Inc. 
54. C H Masland & Sons 
55. Matrix Corp. 
56. MeCrory Corp. 
57. Mercury Savings & Loan Assn. 
58. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. 
59. L E Myers Group Co. 
60. Nortek Inc. 
61. Orion Pictures Corp. 
62. Patagonia Corp. 
63. Peoples Drug Stores Inc. 
61. Pertec Computer Corp. 
65. Pitney Bowes Inc. 
66. Reliance Group Inc. 
67. Rosario Resources Corp. 
68. Schering Plough Corp. 
69. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
70. Sears Roebuck & Co. 
71. Shearson Loeb Rhodes Inc. 
72. Hayden Stone Inc. 
73. Sheller Globe Corp. 
74. South Carolina Elec &. Gas Co. 
75. Sparton Food Systems Inc. 
76. Storage Technology Inc. 
77. Sun Chemical Corp. 
78. Sunshine Mining Co. 
79. Tracor Inc. 
80. Trafalgar Industries Inc. 
81. Trans World Corp. 
82. U N R Industries Inc. 
83. U N R Industries Inc. 
84. United Technologies 
85. U S Air Group Inc. 
86. Unitrode Corp. 
87. Viacom International Inc. 
88. Wards Inc. 
89. Willcox & Gibbs Inc. 
Dravo Corp. 
Fischbach Corp. 
Colgate Palmolive (Jo. 
Cyprus Mines Corf). 
May Dept. Stores (Jo. 
Signal Cos. Inc. 
Raytheon Co. 
Gardner Denver Co. 
Unocal Corp. 
Alpha Industries Inc. 
Mapco Inc. 
Norris Industries Inc. 
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 
Credithrift Financial Inc. 
Interco Inc. 
United States Home Corp. 
Reliance Electric Co. 
A R A Services Inc. 
High Voltage Engr. Corp. 
Ennis Business Forms Inc. 
Smithkline Beckman Corp. 
Harris Corp. 
Mesa Petroleum Co. 
Sun Electic Corp. 
Ogden Corp. 
First Mortgage Investors 
J M Smucker Co. 
Bank of New York Inc. 
Cooper Industries Inc. 
Colt Industries Inc. 
Genuine Parts Co. 
Overhead Door Corp. 
Fidelity Union Bancorp. 
Spector Industries Inc. 
Motorola Inc. 
Smithkline Beckman Corp. 
American Business Prod. Inc. 
Trico Industries Inc. 
Corroon & Black (Jorp. 
Giddings & Lewis Inc. 
Sirnmonds Precision Prod. Inc. 
Federal Mogul Corp. 
Richton International Corp. 
Lucky Stores Inc. 
Dun &. Bradstreet Corp. 
Mapco Inc. 
Reliance Electric Co. 
General Electric Co. 


